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There are many features unique to submarines among modern naval platforms 
that have long made them attractive to navies around the world� This is especially 
true today, given the increasing threat to surface naval vessels of all kinds posed 
by advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision-strike 
capabilities� As Jan Joel Andersson demonstrates in “The Race to the Bottom: 
Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” there are today some four 
hundred submarines in the navies of forty nations, and both of these numbers are 
on the rise� Because attack submarines are weapons of choice for weaker states, 
this trend is especially pronounced among second- or third-tier navies� What are 
the broader implications of such a development? While plausibly contributing 
to greater stability at the strategic level, for example, does it create a dangerous 
instability at the tactical level? In fact, Andersson argues, the impact of submarine 
proliferation is easily exaggerated, and numbers alone can be highly misleading� 
Daunting maintenance problems, burdensome training requirements, and crew 
recruitment and retention issues can be expected to remain serious impediments 
to actual operational capability in many small submarine fleets, and even larger 
ones, such as India’s or Australia’s, given submarines’ technical complexity and 
the unforgiving undersea environment� Jan Joel Andersson is currently a senior 
analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris�
In “Deconstructing Nimitz’s Principle of Calculated Risk: Lessons for Today,” 
Robert C� Rubel argues that the U�S� Navy would be well served by recapturing 
an understanding of the principle of “calculated risk” famously formulated by 
Admiral Chester Nimitz in a message to his fleet commanders on the eve of the 
battle of Midway� Although concluding—surprisingly—that the principle was 
for all practical purposes essentially ignored by Admirals Fletcher and Spruance 
(and evidently by the Japanese fleet commander as well), Rubel argues that at a 
time when the Navy no longer has assured control of the western Pacific, given 
the rapid rise of Chinese antiaccess and area-denial capabilities, it needs to think 
carefully about the level of risk it can accept to its high-value capital ships (its 
aircraft carriers) relative to the strategic gains at stake in any conflict with that 
nation� Robert C� Rubel is the former dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Stud-
ies at the Naval War College�
The rise of Chinese naval power, and in particular the apparent Chinese de-
termination to project that power into the Indian Ocean and beyond, continues 
FROM THE EDITORS
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to offer circumstances favorable to the development of U�S�-Indian relations in 
the maritime domain and more broadly� In “The American ‘Pivot’ and the Indian 
Navy: It’s Hedging All the Way,” Harsh V� Pant and Yogesh Joshi review the cur-
rent state of Indian thinking about that country’s naval role in the Indian Ocean 
and, prospectively, the western Pacific, where it has already stepped up maritime 
security cooperation with American friends and such allies as Australia and Ja-
pan� In spite of the logic of a closer U�S�-Indian relationship, however, they argue, 
India’s political leaders remain wary of too close an American connection� They 
trace this attitude to the mixed signals emanating from Washington in the first 
several years of the current administration about the degree of American com-
mitment to the region and to, in particular, containment of a rising China� They 
conclude, however, that there are steps the United States could take to advance 
a relationship that is clearly of great potential advantage to both sides� Harsh V� 
Pant is professor of international relations at King’s College London; Yogesh Joshi 
is currently a fellow in the Defence Studies Department, also at King’s College�
Two articles address, from different perspectives, the continuing menace of 
piracy� In “China’s Blue Soft Power: Antipiracy, Engagement, and Image En-
hancement,” Andrew S� Erickson and Austin M� Strange review the history of 
Chinese antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, with particular attention to their 
growing role in Chinese naval diplomacy and “soft power” projection generally� 
They argue that these operations have been a watershed in China’s emergence 
as a fully “blue-water-capable” sea power as well as a demonstration of China’s 
interest in being seen as a cooperative player in the global maritime arena—in 
stark contrast to the poor image it continues to generate by its unilateral actions 
in the seas closer to home� Ali Kamal-Deen, in “The Anatomy of Gulf of Guinea 
Piracy,” reminds us that Africa’s pirate problem is no longer confined to Somalia� 
Indeed, the threat to coastal and international shipping and infrastructure (i�e�, 
oil platforms) in the Gulf of Guinea has gained in intensity over the last five years 
even as Somali piracy has been much reduced� This comprehensive review of 
recent piracy trends in the Gulf of Guinea broadly speaking concludes with a 
series of recommendations for countering this (very underreported) threat� Ali 
Kamal-Deen is a commander in the Ghana Navy and its Legal Director� 
WINNERS OF OUR ANNUAL PRIZES 
The President of the Naval War College has awarded prizes to the winners of the 
annual Hugh G� Nott and Edward S� Miller competitions for articles appearing 
in the Naval War College Review. 
The Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors of the best 
articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize) in the Review in the previous 
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publishing year� Cash awards are provided by the generosity of the Naval War 
College Foundation� 
The winning article is “Smart Defense: Brave New Approach or Déjà Vu?,” by 
Paul Johnson, Tim LaBenz, and Darrell Driver, which appeared in our Summer 
2013 issue ($1,000, shared among coauthors)�
Three articles won honorable mention: “The Gaza Flotilla Incident and the 
Modern Law of Blockade,” by James Farrant (Summer 2013); “The Senkaku/
Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Postponed,” by Paul J� Smith (Spring 2013); 
and “Globalization, Security, and Economic Well-Being,” by Stephen M� Carmel 
(Winter 2013)�
The Miller Prize was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S� Miller for 
the author of the best historical article appearing in the Naval War College Review 
in the same period� The winner is Thomas C� Hone, “Replacing Battleships with 
Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific in World War II,” appearing in our Winter 2013 
issue ($500)� 
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 
335, 309)� For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-
2236)�
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION
Statement of ownership, management, and circulation (required by 39 USC 3685, PS Form 3526-R, July 
2014) of the Naval War College Review, Publication Number 401390, published four times a year at 686 
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Rear Admiral Howe became the fifty-fifth President 
of the U.S. Naval War College on 8 July 2014. Rear 
Admiral Howe is a native of Jacksonville, Florida. He 
was commissioned in 1984 following his graduation 
from the U.S. Naval Academy.
Howe’s operational assignments have included a full 
range of duties in the Naval Special Warfare and joint 
Special Operations communities. He commanded 
Naval Special Warfare Unit 3 in Bahrain, Naval 
Special Warfare Group 3 in San Diego, and Special 
Operations Command, Pacific in Hawaii. His service 
overseas includes multiple deployments to the west-
ern Pacific and Southwest Asia and participation in 
Operations EARNEST WILL, PROVIDE PROMISE, EN-
DURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM.
His key joint and staff assignments include current 
operations officer at Special Operations Command, 
Pacific; Chief Staff Officer, Naval Special Warfare 
Development Group; Assistant Chief of Staff for Op-
erations, Plans and Policy at Naval Special Warfare 
Command; Director of Legislative Affairs for U.S. 
Special Operations Command; and Assistant Com-
manding Officer, Joint Special Operations Command. 
Howe graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School 
in 1995 with a master of arts in national security af-
fairs (special operations / low-intensity conflict), and 
from the National War College in 2002 with a master 
of arts in national security.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE recently hosted, on behalf of the Sec-
retary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
one of the most important events conducted on our campus in more than three 
years� The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard “Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower” challenged the nation’s maritime services to help “foster and 
sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners�” A major step 
toward meeting this challenge took place in September 2014, when the College 
hosted the Twenty-First International Seapower Symposium (ISS)� The theme 
this year was “Global Solutions to Common Maritime Challenges�”
First held in Newport in 1969, the biennial ISS offers a unique opportunity 
for the world’s maritime leaders to discuss and promote international maritime 
security cooperation� These discussions offer opportunities for future voluntary 
regional and international collaboration in searching for solutions to challenges 
facing the global network of maritime nations� Through these symposia, the 
CNO seeks individual inputs and proposals for enhancing regional and global 
maritime security� ISS is indeed unique, as it is the only forum in the world that 
brings together the heads of so many navies at the same time to enhance mari-
time security and collaborative operations� Discussions at ISS have resulted in 
many successful efforts to enhance cooperation in countering piracy, providing 
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, coordinating search and rescue at sea 
(including submarine rescue), and planning and conducting coalition military 
operations and joint law enforcement to counter arms, drug, and human traffick-
ing, as well as fishery and pollution violations�
The Twenty-First International Seapower Symposium
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At the 2014 symposium, 217 naval leaders representing 110 countries came 
together to discuss issues of common concern in the maritime environment� 
Within this distinguished group were eighty-six Naval War College alumni and 
thirty-two U�S� Navy flag officers� Among the heads of navy in attendance was 
Admiral Wu Shengli, the first delegate from the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
to attend ISS� 
In plenary sessions, the delegates heard from Secretary of the Navy Ray 
Mabus; Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert; Pulitzer Prize– 
winning global energy expert Dr� Daniel Yergin; Hoover Institution Distin-
guished Visiting Fellow General James Mattis, USMC (Ret�); and nationally 
recognized climatologist Rear Admiral David Titley, USN (Ret�)� To encourage 
face-to-face discussion of issues with geographical focus, regional breakout 
groups were formed for the areas of the
• Atlantic Ocean
• Caribbean Sea
• Gulf of Guinea
• Indian Ocean / Gulf of Aden / Arabian Sea / Red Sea
• Norwegian Sea / North Sea / Baltic Sea
• Mediterranean / Black Sea / Caspian Sea 
• Pacific Ocean�
In each breakout group, the discussion focused on issues such as 
• Future Trends in Maritime Security
• Enhancing Coalition Operations
• Regional Maritime Agreements
• Lessons learned during the search for Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-370� 
The discussions held over the three-day symposium helped establish the founda-
tion for a more stable global maritime environment for many years to come� 
In his remarks, Secretary Mabus said,
The truth is sailors of all nations have much in common with other sailors� The chief 
of one of our partner navies in Asia who is here today once offered me his view of 
the difference between soldiers and sailors� Soldiers, he said, by necessity focus on 
boundaries and obstacles, man-made or natural� They are constantly looking down at 
the ground� Sailors, on the other hand, head out to sea and see no boundaries, no ob-
stacles� They look out and they see nothing but the horizon, nothing but possibilities�
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The formal ISS XXI proceedings will be published in the spring and will be avail-
able on the Naval War College website, www�usnwc�edu/� 
The Naval War College is fortunate to have Admiral Guillermo E� Barrera, 
Colombian Navy (Ret�), on its faculty as a CNO Distinguished International 
Fellow� He is in the unique position of having attended ISS events at the Naval 
War College since 2007� His reflections on the value of the ISS series included 
the following: 
During ISS XXI, I felt that the assembled CNOs were much closer to one another 
than they were at ISS XVIII in 2007, both as human beings and as friends� I think 
this is one of the reasons why they more fully understand that the challenges at sea 
are common for many countries, and therefore for their navies� Several of the visiting 
CNOs used phrases from the U�S� Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard’s “Coopera-
tive Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (which had been announced at ISS XVIII) 
in their presentations� Many of them subscribed to the notion that “trust cannot 
be surged�” Virtually every speaker referred to the need for enhanced cooperation� 
The CNO of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy publicly supported the concept 
of cooperation and suggested the universal application of the Code for Unplanned 
Encounters at Sea (CUES),* which was an outgrowth of the Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium held in Qingdao, China, in 2014� It was great to hear how the afternoon 
panel on the first day set the example of familiarity and friendship that followed until 
Friday� Many close friendships were started or strengthened during those three days� 
One very important aspect is that ISS provides a great framework for a number of 
bilateral and multilateral meetings that helped the assembled CNOs to grow in co-
operation and friendship� Many of these meetings and reunions could never happen 
outside of ISS� Looking to the future, I believe that there must be a continuous effort 
to connect this year’s event with the next ISS in 2016, in order for ISS to have a truly 
positive impact on the navies of the world�
I echo Admiral Barrera’s thoughts and believe that the ISS series is one of the 
single most influential factors in increasing maritime trust and cooperation 
around the globe� 
Secretary Mabus very succinctly summarized the mission that all in atten-
dance shared: “All of you here today are sailors and marines; you are focused on 
the horizon, on possibilities, on future opportunities� All of us in this room face 
a similar job� We have the task of explaining to our governments and our citizens 
* CUES is a nonbinding, voluntary agreement to follow certain set procedures for communicating 
with other military forces encountered at sea or in the air� It covers what steps should be taken to 
reduce interference and uncertainty during unexpected contact between naval vessels or aircraft� 
Communication methods include the firing of different-colored flares and the use of signal flags, as 
well as using a list of English-language terms�
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why our navies matter� We have to make sure they understand how important the 
maritime world is to our success economically and to our security� We have to 
encourage them to look outward, across the sea to that far horizon�”
I salute the combined Naval War College / CNO Staff team for the years of 
planning and organization that ensured success in this important endeavor� 
P� GARDNER HOWE III
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College 
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 The growing need to protect global shipping routes and the intensification of maritime territorial conflicts have led to a naval arms buildup around 
the world�1 Perhaps the most-cited example of this new focus on naval power is 
the increasing number of countries building or planning new aircraft carriers, 
but many analysts are more concerned about the proliferation of modern attack 
submarines�2 Often considered the ultimate weapon of naval warfare, submarines 
are versatile platforms able to attack surface ships, conduct antisubmarine war-
fare (ASW), deploy mines, and, as they are increasingly equipped with missiles, 
attack land targets�3 In addition, submarines are also highly capable intelligence-
gathering platforms, able to monitor ship movements over vast distances, cut 
undersea communications cables, and insert reconnaissance teams covertly on 
hostile shores�4 Since submarines can operate without prior sea and air control, 
they allow a weaker actor means to attack a stronger one� Submarines also create 
uncertainty for an opponent, since the presence of an enemy submarine is dif-
ficult to confirm until an attack takes place� Countering a hostile submarine force 
is not only difficult but also very time consuming�5 Given such strong offensive 
capabilities, submarines are viewed as especially detrimental to crisis stability�6
Nevertheless, despite the rapidly increasing number of countries buying 
submarines and counter to conventional wisdom, I argue that the threat to in-
ternational security from the current submarine proliferation around the world 
may have been exaggerated� In reality, it is very difficult and costly to operate 
submarines safely and even more difficult to create and sustain a submarine force 
capable of conducting effective combat patrols� Furthermore, the strategic value 
of a submarine force in comparison with other defense assets in times of limited 
budgets is not always self-evident, and some longtime operators of submarines 
Submarine Proliferation and International Security
Jan Joel Andersson
THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM
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have even abandoned them in favor of larger surface vessels�7 In this article I 
analyze the threat to international security from the global proliferation of sub-
marines by focusing on the challenges of maintaining boats and training crews� 
The article consists of three main sections: the first maps the global proliferation 
of submarines; the second analyzes the threat from this proliferation in terms of 
having enough submarines in a fleet, maintaining them, and training and retain-
ing enough personnel; and the third concludes� 
THE GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF SUBMARINES 
Given submarines’ versatility, many navies around the world are currently pro-
curing or actively contemplating the acquisition of new ones�8 Although the total 
number of submarines in the world has fallen since the height of the Cold War, 
mainly due to the retirement of large numbers of old Soviet and Chinese boats, 
the current global submarine inventory stands at over four hundred submarines 
operated by some forty countries (see the table)�9 Of these some 390 are attack 
submarines or nonstrategic guided-missile submarines� It is estimated that more 
than 150 new submarines will be built by 2021 and that up to three hundred 
could be launched in the next fifteen to twenty years�10 According to industry 
sources, the global submarine market was valued at U�S�$14�4 billion in 2013 and 
is expected to grow to $21�7 billion by 2023�11 Such longtime submarine build-
ers and operators as China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States are all renewing their current fleets�12 The main 
export markets are, however, in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America� In 
these regions, many existing submarines from the Soviet era, as well as early Ger-
man export models, are reaching the ends of their operational lives and need to 
be replaced� In addition, several navies without previous experience with the type 
are ordering submarines�13 National security is a main reason driving the demand 
for submarines in some areas, particularly in Asia, but domestic industrial and 
technological development goals, as well as national prestige, are also important 
factors�14 
The submarine world used to be controlled by the great powers and a handful 
of technologically advanced countries, such as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden� Today, in contrast, submarine operators can be found on every in-
habited continent, including Africa�15 In the Middle East, the navies of Algeria, 
Egypt, Iran, and Israel have submarines, while Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the Unit-
ed Arab Emirates are contemplating acquisitions�16 In Latin America too, Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela all have submarines, 
and several of them are in the process of adding to their fleets� In South Asia, 
India and Pakistan have long operated submarines and deployed them in war, 
while Bangladesh and Burma (Myanmar) are planning to procure submarines 
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in the near future�17 In Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea are adding new 
submarines to already impressive fleets to counter China’s and North Korea’s 
very large submarine forces� In Southeast Asia, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam all have attack submarines, and many plan new 
acquisitions�18 In addition, the Philippines and Thailand recently announced that 
they too are seeking to obtain submarines�19 Given that many of these countries 
are parties to territorial disputes and close to some of the world’s busiest shipping 
lanes and maritime choke points, it is not surprising that the proliferating num-
ber of submarines around the world has many observers concerned�20
There are not only more submarine operators than ever, but many of the 
boats they operate are also more sophisticated than ever�21 India recently joined, 
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the nuclear-
powered-submarine club�22 Brazil may soon join too, as it has plans to build a 
nuclear-powered submarine in the coming decade�23 While it does not enable 
submarines to match the underwater endurance of nuclear-powered boats, the 
increasing availability of air-independent propulsion (AIP) allows conventionally 
powered submarines to remain submerged for weeks rather than days�24 Subma-
rine manufacturers in France, Germany, and Sweden all offer this technology 
to prospective buyers around the world�25 China may soon be added to this list; 
it is rumored that it may sell AIP-equipped submarines to Pakistan, though no 
technical specifications have yet been confirmed�26 Another advanced technology 
increasingly being offered to global submarine customers by France, Russia, and 
the United States is that of submarine-launched antiship cruise missiles� Among 
recent buyers of cruise missiles for submarines are China, Egypt, India, Israel, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam�27 These new technolo-
gies, in combination with more sophisticated sensors, combat systems, and tor-
pedoes, make today’s submarines more capable and versatile than ever� 
ANALYZING THE SUBMARINE THREAT 
Reflecting the proliferation of submarines, the literature on the global naval arms 
buildup is dominated by descriptive accounts of the latest submarines acquisi-
tions and procurement plans of navies around the world� These accounts are 
important indicators of armament trends but primarily focus on technical speci-
fications of boats and details of their weapons systems�28 Counting submarines is 
easy� It is far more difficult to evaluate the capabilities of a submarine force; rising 
numbers alone do not necessarily equate to a rising threat� In fact, few serious at-
tempts are made to evaluate actual status or combat capabilities of the many sub-
marine operators around the world�29 Even in the large literature on the Chinese 
submarine program, most studies focus on equipment and overall strategy, rather 
Continued on page 17
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Country Region SSBN SSGN SSN SSG SSK/SS
Canada North America  4
United States North America 14 4 53
France Europe  4  6
Germany Europe  4
Greece Europe  8
Italy Europe  6
Netherlands Europe  4
Norway Europe  6
Poland Europe  5
Portugal Europe  2
Spain Europe  3
Sweden Europe  5
Turkey Europe 14
Ukraine Europe  1
United Kingdom Europe  4  7
Russia Russia 11 8 17 20
Australia Asia  6
China Asia  4  5  1 60
India Asia  1 13
Indonesia Asia  2
Japan Asia 18
North Korea Asia 20
South Korea Asia 12
Malaysia Asia  2
Pakistan Asia  5
Singapore Asia  6
Taiwan Asia  4
Vietnam Asia  2
Algeria Middle East / North Africa  4
Egypt Middle East / North Africa  4
Iran Middle East / North Africa  3
Israel Middle East / North Africa  3
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than analyzing capability in terms of readiness of boats and training of crews�30 
These omissions lead to problems in correct assessment of the threat from the 
growing submarine forces around the world� 
To deploy a submarine force effectively requires not only boats but the tech-
nical skills necessary to service and maintain them and enough trained person-
nel to operate them� Moreover, an effective submarine force requires means to 
communicate with boats and ability to control them once they deploy� These 
requirements are hard to fulfill and are far more complex than their application 
to surface ships�31 
Minimum Numbers
An effective submarine force requires some minimum number of submarines� 
Because of the heavy maintenance requirements of submarines, it is generally 
held that at least four are necessary to keep one or two continuously on station or 
available for deployment�32 A smaller fleet will not provide enough opportunities 
for crew training, regular patrol deployments, or maintenance to sustain a capa-
bility over time� However, many of the world’s submarine forces are very small, 
over a quarter smaller than that threshold size� Of the forty-two current opera-
tors, thirteen (see table) have fewer than four submarines (not counting coastal 
or midget submarines): Argentina (three), Ecuador (two), Indonesia (two), Iran 
(three), Israel (three), Libya (two), Malaysia (two), Portugal (two), South Af-
rica (three), Spain (three), Ukraine (one), Venezuela (two), and Vietnam (two)� 
Moreover, the submarines in several of these small forces are very old, reaching 
Country Region SSBN SSGN SSN SSG SSK/SS
Libya Middle East / North Africa  2
Argentina Latin America / Caribbean  3
Brazil Latin America / Caribbean  5
Chile Latin America / Caribbean  4
Colombia Latin America / Caribbean  4
Ecuador Latin America / Caribbean  2
Peru Latin America / Caribbean  6
Venezuela Latin America / Caribbean  2
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa  3
Total 37 12 89 1 277
Grand Total: 416 
Sources: The Military Balance (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014); U.S. Navy; “Submarine Proliferation Resource Collection,” NTI, 
21 October 2013, www.nti.org/.
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the ends of their safe service lives� Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, and 
Venezuela all operate thirty-to-forty-year-old submarines that are increasingly 
“maintenance heavy” and limited in their ability to go to sea� In a small fleet, this 
fact even further restricts opportunities for necessary crew training and patrol 
deployments� Some of these countries have recently ordered new submarines 
but in most cases will only replace existing boats without significantly increasing 
numbers� Some other submarine forces have four or more submarines but only 
on paper; in reality, many of their submarines are very old and in extended or 
even indefinite maintenance, seriously impacting the training and deployment 
of the remaining units� 
Maintenance and Logistics
Owing to their taxing underwater environment, submarines are particularly 
challenging to keep operational� This is especially the case in the tropics, where 
higher salinity and temperature of seawater increase corrosion on equipment 
that in many cases was designed for much colder and less corrosive northern cli-
mates�33 Modern submarines are complex systems of systems, requiring substan-
tial skills in not only regular ship maintenance but also the upkeep of advanced 
propulsion and technology employed in acoustics, electronics, and periscope 
optics�34 The catastrophic consequences of mechanical or equipment failure un-
derwater require particular attention to quality control and regular maintenance� 
By no means all countries are capable of fully servicing and refitting modern 
submarines; many operators are forced to hire foreign help or send their boats 
abroad for extended periods of time and at great cost� Any deferment of regular 
service and refits quickly renders boats unsafe for operations�35 
Maintaining and servicing complex systems like submarines require both 
technical expertise and suitable shipyards� The challenges of maintaining subma-
rines with inadequate support organizations can be illustrated by the experience 
of the South African navy and its German Type 209 submarines, a minor local 
overhaul of one of which commenced in 2007� Inadequate infrastructure and 
technical understanding of onboard electrical systems reportedly kept the boat 
out of commission for more than five years�36 In August 2012, it was reported, 
all three of South Africa’s submarines were in dry dock, the only operational 
vessel having crashed into the seabed�37 The problems of maintenance also in-
crease when there are many different types of boats in a fleet�38 The complexity 
of servicing the Indian submarine fleet—comprising German Type 209, Russian 
Kilo, Russian nuclear-powered Akula II, indigenously designed nuclear-powered 
boats, and soon also French Scorpène—must be daunting, to say the least� In fact, 
a lack of adequate domestic repair facilities and difficulties in obtaining spare 
parts have forced India to send many of its submarines to Russia for lengthy refits 
over the years�39 
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Even long-established, single-class submarine services can have great diffi-
culties in maintaining their boats� The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) currently 
operates six Swedish-designed Collins-class submarines that were coproduced in 
Australia and commissioned between 1996 and 2003� These boats, among the 
largest and most advanced conventional submarines in the world, have suffered 
from persistent maintenance problems that have resulted in reduced availability 
and opportunities for crew training� The RAN’s stated goal is to have always two 
submarines deployed or available for immediate deployment, two in training, 
and two in maintenance� However, this goal has reportedly never been achieved; 
the navy has at times been 
left with only one operational 
submarine, sometimes none 
at all�40 
Many of the problems of 
the Collins-class submarines 
are not design related but stem from a failure by the RAN to make adequate 
maintenance and logistical arrangements when they entered service�41 This early 
lack of attention to maintenance and logistics and subsequent failure to adopt 
processes for reliability control led to maintenance backlogs that greatly reduced 
the number of available submarines for the RAN� Despite improvements, the 
Australian submarine force still has problems with availability, and RAN subma-
rines have reportedly had to withdraw from three recent international exercise 
deployments, among them RIMPAC 2012, because of technical problems�42 The 
failure of the RAN to establish adequate and comprehensive maintenance pro-
cedures for its submarines shows that even experienced operators with access to 
domestic comprehensive shipbuilding industries may have trouble keeping their 
fleets at sea� 
Another case in point is Canada, whose current fleet of four Victoria-class 
submarines, bought secondhand from the United Kingdom, has since the boats’ 
commissioning between 2000 and 2004 suffered ongoing mechanical problems 
and accidents� The Royal Canadian Navy has never had more than two of these 
boats in operational condition, sometimes none�43 Servicing the boats has proved 
not only far more complicated than expected but also far more costly�44 Accord-
ing to defense experts, shortsighted management decisions in the procurement 
process, such as failing to acquire sufficient spare parts or establish supplier 
relationships beforehand, have led to repeated and significant delays in restoring 
submarines to operational status�45 The Canadian submarine fleet is at this writ-
ing expected to reach a steady state for the first time in late 2014, whereby three 
of its four submarines will be available for operations at any one time, on a rolling 
schedule� It will have taken more than a decade to reach this point�46 According 
Counting submarines is easy. It is far more 
difficult to evaluate the capabilities of a sub-
marine force; rising numbers alone do not 
necessarily equate to a rising threat.
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to the Canadian navy, the four Victorias together managed to spend only around 
1,300 days at sea over the ten-year period 2003–13�47
Maintaining submarines is costly� Any submarine force lacking funds for 
maintenance and training will struggle to maintain any useful level of readiness� 
To get Canada’s submarine force fully operational, the nation’s Treasury Board 
approved in 2008 the expenditure of up to Cdn�$1�5 billion over as many as 
fifteen years for the in-service support for the Victoria class� After a competitive 
bidding, the Victoria In-Service Support Contract was awarded to the Canadian 
Submarine Management Group, currently known as Babcock Canada, Inc�48 In 
June 2013 the Canadian government extended the submarine maintenance and 
support contract with Babcock Canada, valued at Cdn�$531 million, for another 
five years�49
Given that submarines are among the most complicated machines in ex-
istence, maintaining them is of central importance� Rigorous and regularly 
scheduled maintenance periods are essential� Failure to include the costs of 
submarine upkeep in defense budgets may therefore be an indication of a low 
level of attention to the issue� As a case in point, in 2011 the Malaysian Ministry 
of Defence was awarded an additional allocation of RM 493�3 million ($167 mil-
lion) to maintain its two recently bought Scorpène submarines, raising the total 
defense budget to RM 11 billion ($3�77 billion)� Apparently the defense ministry 
had not allocated any funds to maintain or administer the submarines in the 
original budget�50 Moreover, owing to the lack of necessary local technical ex-
pertise to service them, the Malaysian navy’s two Scorpènes are now maintained 
by the French company Boustead DCNS Naval Corporation� According to press 
reports, Boustead provides full logistics support to the Malaysian navy—spare 
parts, workshop equipment, yard facilities and equipment, submarine safety 
conditioning facilities, support, and maintenance� The company even provides 
tugboat services and operates and maintains ship lifts, and submarine umbilical 
services (shore electrical power and the like)�51 
Submarine operators that do not have the required expertise or the funds to 
buy it on commercial terms are left to improvise� Iran, for example, has three 
Russian Kilo-class submarines but cannot afford, or does not dare, to send them 
back to Russia for refurbishment and upgrade� Russia refuses to provide neces-
sary technical information and spare parts, so Iran has undertaken upgrades 
at home� Forced to complete refurbishments and repairs to one of its Kilos on 
its own, Iran relaunched it in 2012 after seven years in refit� According to Ira-
nian press releases, replacement parts and components (pumps, compressors, 
engines, sound-absorbent tiles, control surfaces, etc�) were locally produced 
and installed�52 Some were commonly available, but many others were not� It is 
unknown how adequate the Iranian replacement parts have proved, but the fact 
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that it took Iran seven years to refit one submarine indicates how challenging it 
is to keep modern submarines at sea�
Maintenance and repair needs increase with age, as do difficulties in obtaining 
spare parts� Many submarines around the world are over thirty years old, some 
over forty� Both Colombia and Venezuela, for example, have 1970s-era Type 
209s�53 Taiwan’s two World War II–era Guppy-type submarines are even older 
and can be used only for training purposes�54 Indonesia’s two Type 209 boats, 
bought from Germany in 1981, have been repeatedly refitted, but they are not 
to be replaced until 2020, at which time they will be forty years old�55 Given the 
work required to keep such old boats running in tropical climates, their sea time 
must be limited and their safety an issue� Some submarine operators simply have 
run out of money and seem to do little maintenance or none at all� The Argen-
tine navy as a whole is reportedly in disrepair owing to the absence of funds for 
maintenance and training� According to media reports, all three of its submarines 
have defects and barely left port in 2012�56 Given the poor maintenance perfor-
mance of many countries, the operational status of many submarine forces must 
be seriously questioned� 
Training and Deployment 
Operation of a submarine is very different from the case with a surface vessel� 
A submarine without a properly trained crew cannot do much more than sail in 
and out of harbor� Training submarine crews, however, is especially difficult and 
time consuming� To become qualified, a submariner needs between one and two 
years of intensive training; fully mastering some high-technology systems, such 
as advanced sonar, takes even longer�57 It can take at least six years of training 
to make a crew a cohesive unit able to operate at sea effectively�58 A submarine 
captain requires, to reach the highest skill levels, between ten and fifteen years 
of training and deployment� A submarine’s crew, to remain qualified and main-
tain its skills, needs regular deployments� While surface sailors and officers can 
practice many of their skills on any surface vessel, a submarine crew can train 
effectively only on a submarine� Although simulators are becoming increasingly 
powerful, many submarine-related skills cannot be learned or maintained except 
during actual deployments�59 A lack of training boats and shore facilities quickly 
atrophies skills� In navies having only one, two, or a handful of submarines, the 
availability of boats on which to train directly bounds the possibility of achieving 
trained crews and effective deployments� 
In the U�S� Navy, with a large submarine fleet and a high operational tempo, 
submarine crews gain experience and maintain skills from repeated and extended 
deployments� Other highly regarded submarine services are, for example, the 
British, Dutch, German, Japanese, and Swedish� Two common traits among these 
services are focus on maintenance and close relationships with original design 
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firms and building yards, as a result of which their boats can be used effectively 
for training and deployment� For these submarine services, a greater challenge is 
to recruit and retain enough personnel� The shortage of personnel means that, for 
example, British submarines regularly leave for deployments with less than full 
crews; that only three of the Dutch navy’s four submarines can be fully manned; 
and that the Swedish navy would be able to send its five submarines to sea simul-
taneously only by drawing on submarine-qualified personnel assigned to central 
staff and shore duties�60
In fact, many if not most submarine services around the world suffer from 
recruitment problems� South Korea and Taiwan both have difficulty recruiting 
and retaining submariners�61 The Australian navy is so short of submariners that 
it can find crews for only three or four of its six boats and actively seeks recruits 
from overseas�62 The South African navy needs about 150 submarine-qualified 
sailors to form full-time crews for its three boats, but over the last several years it 
has had enough sailors to operate only one� Moreover, owing to high operating 
expenses and a lack of funds, the ships and submarines of the South African navy 
spend a very limited amount of time at sea� On 17 July 2012 the South African 
submarine SAS Queen Modjadji collided with the ocean floor during an exercise 
because of what a member of parliament described as negligence and poor train-
ing�63 Since the other two South African submarines were in long-term mainte-
nance, the crash put the country’s entire submarine fleet in dry dock simulta-
neously, effectively precluding training�64 In Latin America, many submarines 
are in a poor state, resulting in little or no training for crews� According to one 
report, Argentina’s submarine crews spent only nineteen total hours submerged 
in 2011�65 
All submarine services experience incidents and accidents, but with inex-
perienced crews minor incidents are more likely to have fatal consequences� A 
case in point is the Indian navy, where personnel shortages have plagued the 
submarine service since its inception in the 1960s� Rapid introduction in a short 
time of large numbers of submarines from different countries, while simulta-
neously setting up shore support facilities, made recruitment difficult�66 Selec-
tion procedures had to be made less stringent, and pay was increased several 
times� According to naval historians in India, it was only in the 1990s that the 
Indian navy began to attract personnel of the desired caliber to submarines�67 
Even today, despite increases in pay, the Indian submarine service seems to suf-
fer from training and maintenance problems�68 In August 2013, explosions sank 
INS Sindhurakshak (a Russian-built Kilo) in Mumbai Harbor, killing its crew of 
eighteen; the cause, according to preliminary findings, was an accident with or 
mishandling of ammunition by inexperienced crew members in the weapons 
compartment�69 Another possible explanation for the catastrophic explosion is, 
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according to Russian experts, a violation of safety standards and instructions by 
the crew during the recharging of the submarine’s batteries�70 The Sindhurakshak 
disaster and subsequent publicity in Indian media on the harsh living conditions 
on board Russian-built submarines will hardly make future recruitment any 
easier for the Indian submarine service�71 
All established submarine services conduct their own training� Some co-
operate and send students to each other’s schools� The Australian and Cana-
dian navies, for example, both collaborate with Britain and the United States 
in submarine training� Joint submarine training is also common within NATO� 
The British and Dutch ad-
vanced “Perisher” courses 
for prospective submarine 
commanders are increasingly 
open to other friendly nations’ 
submarine communities� Students from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States have all participated in 
these legendary courses�72 
However, navies with little or no previous submarine experience must seek 
training elsewhere� All major exporters of submarines provide some degree of 
training to their customers� There is little available information on such pro-
grams, but they seem to last between six months and four years, depending on 
the nations involved� Sometimes such training is organized by the host navies; 
in other cases the companies building the submarines are in charge� The level of 
training also depends on the quality of crews sent� Two of the biggest purveyors 
of submarine training of this kind are France and Russia� 
Malaysia is the most recent beneficiary of French submarine training� In Janu-
ary 2005, 156 Malaysian sailors began a program in France that included at-sea 
training on a retired French navy Agosta-class submarine� In December 2005, 
twenty-three crew members qualified as submariners, and in January 2009, after 
four years of training, the first Malaysian submarine crew became operational� 
Information on the level of Malaysian submarine training is scant, but it is known 
that the Malaysian navy has long-standing problems recruiting qualified sailors 
and coping with technologically advanced systems�73 In this case, after the Ma-
laysian submarines were brought home, local sea trials were repeatedly delayed, 
owing to technical and maintenance problems� The submarines have reportedly 
been unable at times to conduct basic diving exercises, and they have been criti-
cized for not being deployed�74 Malaysia has since turned to DCI, a French com-
pany, which is participating in the creation and running of a submarine school at 
the Kota Kinabalu base in Malaysia�75 
The threat to international security from the 
current submarine proliferation around the 
world may have been exaggerated.
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Russia is providing training to its many submarine customers in both the 
Baltic Sea and in the Far East� Russian submarine training heavily emphasizes 
classroom teaching and dockside drills�76 Because Russian submarines have 
shorter design life spans than Western boats, Russian-trained crews spend less 
time at sea, to minimize wear and tear on components and equipment� Also, 
foreign officers are apparently given command of their boats after comparatively 
little sea time� The first Vietnamese sailors arrived in Russia in January 2013, 
with no experience with the type, to begin the theoretical part of their submarine 
training�77 Sea training was conducted near Kaliningrad, on the Baltic Sea, in 
April and May 2013 and included “five 10-days [sic] sea voyages,” according to 
press reports�78 The first boat was officially accepted by the Vietnamese navy on 
15 January 2014, and its crew began to operate it, after some ten total months of 
submarine training�79 
Vietnam lacks a domestic submarine training school; India has offered to 
train Vietnamese sailors at its own� Even with sustained Russian and Indian 
support, however, there are major questions regarding the ability of Vietnam to 
develop a fully functioning submarine force over the coming years�80 Moreover, 
it is far from clear how these submarines will communicate and fit together with 
all the other new ships and aircraft Vietnam is currently acquiring from Russia, 
the Netherlands, Canada, and France� Given the Vietnamese military’s limited 
experience operating each of these platforms even separately, industry analysts 
predict that Vietnam will fall somewhere between Singapore (at the high end) 
and Indonesia (at the low end) in ability to create eventually an effective subma-
rine capability�81 
COMPLICATED AND COSTLY
There is a great concern among many defense analysts that the rapid spread of 
submarines around the world will threaten international crisis stability� More 
countries than ever are fielding submarines, but it is less than clear that the risk 
of conflict and war has increased thereby� In this article I argue that the threat 
from the growing number of submarines around the world may have been over-
stated� At the very least, the available evidence indicates that building up and 
maintaining an effective submarine force are far more complicated and costly 
than is commonly understood� By examining maintenance facilities and logistics 
organizations we learn that many countries are not able to keep their boats safely 
at sea� Having few submarines available, they cannot properly train their crews; 
the costly mistakes and deadly accidents that result leave even fewer boats and 
personnel for actual deployment� 
Accordingly, any assessment of the strategic threat posed by submarine prolif-
eration should focus on the effectiveness of submarine forces’ maintenance and 
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logistics organizations, the quality of their recruitment and training processes 
for crew and commanders, the rates of deployment, and the numbers of patrols 
conducted� Many of the world’s navies are finding it hard to maintain and service 
their submarines properly or even to recruit and retain qualified personnel, and 
these services have little opportunity to conduct enough patrols to give their 
crews the operational experience necessary to deploy effectively� 
However, any evaluation of a submarine threat must also take available anti-
submarine warfare capabilities into account�82 Hunting submarines is difficult 
and time consuming� Even advanced navies find ASW taxing; as the British 
discovered during the Falklands War, locating even an old and poorly operated 
submarine can be a challenge�83 Nevertheless, the very presence of advanced 
ASW capabilities can be expected to have a deterring effect on a hostile subma-
rine force� For example, during the East Timor crisis in late 1999, Indonesia’s two 
submarines shadowed the fleet carrying the Australian-led peacekeeping force 
toward Dili� The presence of Indonesian submarines obliged the force to intensify 
the protection of its sea lines of communications and step up the ASW operations 
of the escort group of frigates, a destroyer, a cruiser, and ASW patrol aircraft�84 
However, once the Indonesian submarines had been detected and their locations 
clearly communicated to the Indonesian authorities the submarines withdrew 
from the area rather than facing the escorting warships�85 (This incident is, of 
course, also a reminder that any maritime force protection ought to include 
advanced ASW capabilities, which means that ASW needs to be maintained and 
further developed as a naval core competency�)86 
While, then, even poorly operated and maintained submarines can never be 
completely discounted as threats to international security, we should neverthe-
less be mindful of the very significant challenges facing many submarine forces 
around the world� The conclusion is therefore that the general threat to inter-
national security from the growing number of submarines appearing in annual 
naval reviews around the world should not be exaggerated; instead, each case 
must be carefully examined� 
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United States Pacific Fleet
USS Pennsylvania, flagship
Flagship of the Commander-in-Chief
Serial 0114W May 28, 1942
SECRET
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet
To: Commander Striking Force (Operation Plan 29-42)
Subject: Letter of Instruction
1. In carrying out the task assigned in Operation Plan 29-42 you will be governed 
by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance 
of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without good prospect 
of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy. This ap-
plies to the landing phase as well as during preliminary air attacks.
C. W. Nimitz1 
 All military operations are attended by various forms of risk� Risk permeates the fabric of war—from the actions of individual soldiers, sailors, and air-
men to the policies, strategies, and decisions of national leaders� Decisions and 
actions have both potential and real consequences, and intelligent decision mak-
ing normally involves a calculation of the odds for success and failure, as well as 
consideration of the consequences of potential failure� When success is less than 
a sure thing but through analysis of the salient aspects of the problem, including 
costs and consequences of failure, a commander decides to proceed nonetheless, 
we can say that he is taking a “calculated risk�”
Making a decision by such a method is different from proceeding on the ba-
sis of doctrine, ideology, or a heuristic� Commanders have adopted tactics and 
strategies based solely or substantially on prewar plans, political imperatives, or 
other factors that displace a calculation of risks involved in the issue at hand� In 
Lessons for Today
Robert C. Rubel
DECONSTRUCTING NIMITZ’S PRINCIPLE OF  
CALCULATED RISK
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such cases no calculation of risk is made, but risks are nonetheless incurred� It is 
the element of consideration and explicit weighing of the odds, of the potential 
payoff and the potential costs, that distinguishes the calculated risk from other 
forms of decision making�
In this article we will focus on a very specific kind of calculated risk—the kind 
that attends the commitment of naval capital ships to battle� While this scenario 
may seem a subject of interest only to naval historians, the emerging realities of 
the U�S� Navy’s operational environment demand that we revisit it and examine 
the prospects for its inclusion in doctrine� The logical starting point is Admiral 
Chester Nimitz’s famous “letter of instruction” (actually, of course, transmitted 
as a message) to Rear Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance on 
the eve of the battle of Midway� To quote a U�S� Navy website, “Nimitz clearly 
possessed tremendous faith in his subordinates, who were nevertheless guided 
by very clear instructions� His principle of calculated risk is, perhaps, his most 
brilliant contribution to the battle, in that it precisely and economically conveyed 
his intentions to his task force commanders� There was no doubt about what they 
were supposed to do, how they were supposed to do it, and what level of risk was 
acceptable�”2 We will deconstruct his instruction, teasing out its underlying logic 
and examining the context in which it was crafted, and then see how the results 
of the analysis might apply in today’s environment�
CAPITAL SHIPS
Before we can start deconstructing Nimitz’s calculated-risk instruction, we must 
establish the basis for calculation—the currency, so to speak, of naval power� For 
most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this unit of measurement was the 
capital ship� The original capital ship was the ship of the line, a large sailing ves-
sel carrying seventy-four or more guns� These ships singly could dominate any 
other ship type, but they were expensive, so governments could afford to build 
them only in limited numbers� However, even marginal superiority in numbers, 
assuming that such factors as seamanship were roughly equal, tended to confer 
decisive strategic advantage� Capital ships thus became the units of currency in 
strategic calculations�
The shift from fighting sail to steel dreadnoughts did not appreciably alter 
the situation� The advent of the submarine and the torpedo at the dawn of the 
twentieth century was thought by many to spell the doom of capital ships, but 
the focus on the latter as the basis for naval arms limitation belied that claim� 
The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty was based on the ratio of capital ships of the 
principal naval powers of the era� The introduction of the aircraft carrier did not 
result in the immediate displacement of the dreadnought as the capital ship (and 
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if one follows the logic of capital ships, there can be only one type at a time), but 
of course Pearl Harbor propelled the transition�
By early 1942 the aircraft carrier was the ship type that mattered in the Pacific; 
the numbers available to each side governed where its forces could and could 
not operate and what missions it could perform at an acceptable degree of risk� 
Exact numbers of available types of carriers entered prominently into the plans 
and calculations of both sides� The first encounter between Japanese and Ameri-
can carriers occurred in the battle of the Coral Sea, 4–8 May 1942� In that fight 
the Japanese lost the light carrier Shoho, and the large fleet carrier Shokaku was 
heavi ly damaged� The U�S� Navy lost Lexington, and Yorktown was damaged� This 
left Admiral Nimitz with three carriers—Enterprise, Yorktown, and Hornet—at 
his immediate disposal and Admiral Yamamoto with four fleet carriers and two 
light carriers for his contemplated Midway operation� The United States was 
furiously building aircraft carriers, but these would not start to come on line for 
at least a year� The Japanese were also building, but because their capacity to do 
so was limited, each of their carriers was more of an irreplaceable strategic asset 
than one of the Americans’ was�
At this early point in the war, in carrier-versus-carrier battles, the offense had 
the advantage� It was thought that one carrier air wing could put more than one 
carrier out of action�3 As a consequence, carrier battles were risky, unstable affairs 
that hinged on striking effectively first� To do so, a carrier force had to locate its 
adversary before it was detected itself, or not long after� This was problematic for 
American carrier forces, because Japanese strike aircraft significantly outranged 
their U�S� counterparts� This meant that if the U�S� force were to engage on any-
thing like equal terms, it had to avoid detection while at the same time detecting 
the Japanese force� If timing permitted, the U�S� force would use the cover of 
darkness to rush toward the Japanese force so that at daybreak its strike aircraft 
would be in range� However, the use of carrier aircraft as scouts produced a dif-
ficult zero-sum situation, as generally these aircraft could not be used in a strike 
until they had been recovered, refueled, and armed with bombs� When possible, 
land-based, long-range bombers and patrol planes were used for searches, to in-
crease their “density” (intensity of coverage) and lessen the need for carrier-based 
scouting� Nonetheless, the ocean is a very large place, and any search scheme, 
however well designed, involves an element of chance� Most portions of a search 
area would eventually get covered, but the exact timing of detection was critical�
CALCULATED RISK AT MIDWAY
We start by considering how Nimitz’s letter of instruction might have come into 
play� The principle of calculated risk hangs on the notion of relative attrition of 
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symmetrical forces� As just discussed, after Pearl Harbor aircraft carriers became 
the coin of the realm of naval power� Nimitz had only three at his immediate 
disposal, and he was throwing them all into the fray� In theory, any naval ship is 
a “consumable” under the right circumstances, but Nimitz understood that if he 
lost more carriers than the enemy in this battle, its command of the sea would 
extend all the way to the U�S� Pacific coast; Japanese carriers would be able to 
strike where and when they wished� American naval airpower had to be pre-
served, regardless of what became of the small Midway archipelago� In their haste 
to mount their next operation, the Japanese relied on radio communications to 
coordinate planning� U�S� Pacific Fleet cryptanalysts were able to read enough of 
this traffic to establish that Admiral Yamamoto’s next target would be Midway, 
and in fact they were able to determine intended force dispositions in some 
detail� This was precious information for Admiral Nimitz� His battle plan was 
thus predicated on the assumptions that, first, American intelligence on Japanese 
plans based on code breaking was accurate; second, the Japanese did not suspect 
the compromise; and third, this forewarning would permit the U�S� task force to 
get in a devastating first strike�
Tactical Level: Fletcher’s Choice
Nimitz’s letter of instruction states explicitly that Admirals Fletcher and Spruance 
were to avoid engagement with superior enemy forces unless by so doing they 
had the chance to inflict greater damage on the enemy than they would expect to 
receive� As we have seen, the key was to find and strike the Japanese first� How 
would the task force commanders find out if any of Nimitz’s assumptions were 
false, at least in time to execute effectively the “avoidance” part of his instruction? 
First, any enemy radio traffic that could be decoded might give timely warning 
that the Japanese were on to the fact that their plans were known to the Ameri-
cans� However, the Japanese navy had just changed its codes, and code breaking 
was out of the picture at this point�4 
Beyond that, the key indicator could have been failure of the Japanese car-
rier force to show up where it was expected to� If air searches by aircraft flying 
from Midway had failed to yield a sighting of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s four- 
carrier striking force north-northwest of Midway by daybreak on 4 June, as pre-
dicted by Nimitz’s intelligence officers, a decision point would have been upon 
Fletcher� Should he hang around, hoping for a sighting? What if a Japanese scout 
plane had found him first? (As it happened, the Japanese cruiser Tone’s scout 
plane might have done just that by seven o’clock that morning if it had been 
launched on time�) Assuming that the Japanese carriers’ flight decks were “spot-
ted” for an antiship strike, as Yamamoto had directed be done and an American 
commander would have in any case to assume, the prospects for running away 
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from such a strike were poor� Thus by moving the night before toward the 
expected position of the Japanese force, Fletcher would have violated Nimitz’s 
guidance� Given that long-range search aircraft had spotted the Japanese invasion 
force far to the west the day before, one had to assume the carriers were around 
somewhere� 
The decision whether to stay and fight or to cut and run was balanced on a 
knife-edge� With the omniscience of hindsight we can see that the two forces 
were about two hundred miles apart when Midway planes first sighted the Japa-
nese carriers� If Fletcher had turned away at that point, the Japanese aircraft, if 
they got into the air by 0730 and cruised at around 150 knots, could have over-
taken him� In theory, then, Fletcher would have needed to break and run no later 
than about 0600 if no sighting had been made� In fact, the first conclusive sight-
ing report came in at 0552�5
Absent any specific information on whether Fletcher had calculated a “fight 
or flee” time, the razor-thin margin we have calculated suggests that the previous 
day’s sighting of the Japanese invasion force was what triggered commitment, 
presumably confirming that the intelligence was correct�6 For better or worse, by 
sunrise on 4 June the American task force had been committed to battle and the 
calculated-risk instruction overtaken by events� Relative attrition was now a mat-
ter of tactical skill and luck, the parameters of the battle having been established 
by the planning and command skills of the respective fleet commanders in chief� 
There was, however, in the actual conduct of battle one instance of adherence 
to the calculated-risk directive, and that was Spruance’s decision on the evening 
of 4 June to run eastward to avoid a night surface battle with the Japanese force� 
Calculated risk or not, this made good tactical sense, as Nagumo’s force included 
two battleships and the American force had only cruisers� We must assume that 
Nimitz’s calculated-risk order at least reinforced Spruance’s natural caution�
Operational Level: Nimitz’s Calculation
We now back up half a step and look over Nimitz’s shoulder as he composes 
his message on calculated risk� Aside from the intelligence gleaned by his code 
breakers, there was no good indication of Japanese intentions� They might have 
been targeting any of a number of places in a vast theater, and Nimitz was under 
pressure to protect the Aleutians, Hawaii, and even the West Coast� From his 
perspective, this priceless intelligence represented an opportunity for an am-
bush� But he would have to go in with all his available carrier forces to have any 
chance of favorable reciprocal attrition� This was his calculated risk; the prospect 
of truncating the Japanese strategic initiative was the upside potential that justi-
fied the inherent risks of concentrating his three aircraft carriers� Did Nimitz 
have his own “fight or flee” decision point? Of course, he could have chosen to 
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second-guess his code breakers and keep his carriers safely out of the range of 
the Japanese carriers�7 If he had, the decision would have occurred in late May� 
Task Forces 16 and 17 would never have sortied to battle, or—in consideration 
of the concern of Admiral Ernest J� King, Commander in Chief, U�S� Fleet 
(COMINCH), that Hawaii was a target—they might have taken up a conservative 
position to the east�8 Nimitz might, in contrast, have banked on Fletcher, as the 
senior task force commander, being able actually to execute the calculated-risk 
order on the avoidance side� As we have seen, however, by sunrise on 4 June the 
likelihood that Fletcher could do so was marginal at best� One wonders what 
would have been the thought processes of the American chain of command had 
no sightings been achieved on 3 June�
The possibility of Nimitz’s plan’s unraveling did not hinge only on a potential 
absence of timely sightings by reconnaissance aircraft� There was concern from 
his staff that radio chatter by U�S� Navy units might “tip” the Japanese that the 
Americans were on to their plans�9 The cryptanalysts certainly felt that way, 
even up to the eve of battle: “HYPO’s analysts worried that the Japanese might 
put two and two together, grasp what was going on, and spring a trap of their 
own�”10 In fact, Japanese analysts were picking up on such indications, but for 
various reasons their assessments were not passed to Nagumo� Nagumo’s staff 
actually did intercept some of this information but apparently did not “put two 
and two together”—at least not in time�11 As with so many aspects of the battle, 
the Japanese force failed to capitalize on such “seams” and defects as there were 
in the American plan and its execution� However, from the standpoint of sound 
military planning, we see that the Americans really had no effective “branch 
plan” to cover instances like this, a plan that would have brought the principle of 
calculated risk to the fore� 
Strategic Level: King’s Order
What did the situation look like from the vantage point of Admiral King, sitting 
in Washington? King was ostensibly operating under the Allies’ agreed “Ger-
many first” strategy, which envisioned an invasion of North Africa in 1942� This 
operation would require aircraft carrier support; the small carrier Ranger had 
been assigned� Otherwise, King’s eye was keenly focused on the Pacific, and he 
was determined to take the offensive there as soon as conditions permitted� An 
American defeat at Midway—that is, the loss of two or three carriers—would 
have set this objective back many months, if not a year or more, whereas the loss 
of Midway itself, the carriers being preserved, would likely have meant a lesser 
delay� Thus Nimitz’s calculated risk made good sense from King’s global perspec-
tive, less with respect to other operations than from a timing standpoint� That 
is probably why, as we will see, he had directed Nimitz to use caution with the 
carriers and cruisers� 
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There is another angle on Nimitz’s instruction that bears scrutiny� It turns out 
that the whole idea of calculated risk was likely not Nimitz’s in the first place� In 
a 17 May message to Nimitz, COMINCH provided the following injunction: “In 
view of last clause of para two chiefly to employ strong attrition tactics and not 
repeat not allow our forces to accept such decisive action as would be likely to 
incur heavy losses in our carriers and cruisers�”12 Moreover, there is an entry in 
Nimitz’s records for 25 May that several COMINCH suggestions that had been 
received by message had been complied with�13 Nimitz’s estimate of the situation 
of 26 May is pretty explicit about the matter: 
3� Not only our directive from Commander-in-Chief, U�S� Fleet, but also common 
sense dictates that we cannot now afford to slug it out with the probably superior 
approaching Japanese forces� We must endeavor to reduce his forces by attrition—
submarine attacks, air bombing, attack on isolated units� The principle of calculated 
chance [sic] is indicated, as set forth in a letter of instructions to Task Force EIGHT�14 
If attrition is successful the enemy must accept the failure of his venture or risk battle 
on disadvantageous terms for him�15
Indeed, paragraph 3(a)(1) of Operation Plan 29-42 orders, “Inflict maximum 
damage on enemy by employing strong attrition tactics� Do not accept such de-
cisive action as would be likely to incur heavy losses in our carriers and cruisers� 
A letter of instructions is being furnished separately to striking force command-
ers�”16 The mechanisms internal to Nimitz’s staff are not known, but here is at least 
evidence that the calculated-risk principle originated with King� The implications 
are not only interesting in the context of the history of the battle but also perhaps 
important for today� The picture that emerges is of an American commander who 
has gone “all in” to do battle with the Japanese because he believes he has exquisite 
intelligence that will allow him to gain a decisive victory� This view is backed up 
by Joseph Rochefort, Nimitz’s chief cryptanalyst, who said of a meeting to which 
he was called on 27 May, “It was obvious when Nimitz sent for me that he had 
already decided his course of action� He had already made up his own operation 
orders by this time and the matter was closed�”17 
The Japanese Perspective
Although we are dissecting Admiral Nimitz’s calculated-risk order, examining 
the issue from the Japanese perspective gives additional insights� Setting aside the 
widely reported issue of “victory disease”—the overconfidence that infected the 
Imperial Japanese Navy at that point in the war—we can see whether there was 
any corresponding calculation of risk on that side� The Japanese certainly faced 
potential logistical challenges in seizing and holding Midway, but so long as they 
avoided pitched battles with land-based American aircraft, their carriers were at 
liberty to conduct hit-and-run raids almost wherever they wished� In this way the 
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Japanese could have significantly disrupted and delayed the U�S� Navy’s war effort 
in the Pacific� However, the Midway operation has to be viewed in the context of 
their larger strategy� Admittedly the operation had a number of nested objectives, 
among which was eliminating the threat of American interference with projected 
operations in the “southern resource area�” In other words, their carriers would be 
needed elsewhere later, especially if Midway produced a Japanese victory� How-
ever, if the Japanese lost too many carriers in the process, even in victory, these 
other operations might be delayed or compromised� Thus Admiral Yamamoto 
might have done well to issue his own calculated-risk directive�
It is also worthwhile examining Admiral Nagumo’s actions at Midway on the 
afternoon of 4 June� The morning had brought disaster, putting three of his four 
carriers out of action� He had one left, Hiryu� Setting aside all the Japanese cultur-
al baggage concerning aggressiveness and focusing instead on the battle at hand, 
we might apply our calculated-risk reasoning to his decision-making situation� 
He had just lost three of Japan’s six large fleet carriers, and Japanese industry was 
not in a position to spew out replacements like its American counterpart� Hiryu 
was now more precious than ever�18 A set of calculations like those we performed 
before, for Fletcher and Spruance, reveals that shortly after the devastating 
American attack at 1020, Nagumo would have been at the calculated-risk choice 
point� If at 1100 he had decided to run west at thirty knots with Hiryu, he would 
have been just outside the range of Spruance’s aircraft by the time protective dusk 
fell� By launching an attack against American forces he ensured the doom of 
Hiryu� Our intent is not to criticize Admiral Nagumo but to illustrate the tactical 
dynamics of calculated risk� Key decision points sneak up on a commander or 
can pass unnoticed� These choice points might be tactical, but they necessarily 
have strategic consequences�
CALCULATED RISK IN TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT
It has been a long time since Nimitz’s calculated-risk instruction has had other 
than historical interest for American naval officers� This, of course, is due to near-
ly absolute U�S� command of the sea since the end of World War II� Now, however, 
the rise of China and its navy presents a situation in which calculated-risk logic 
might very well come into play� The difficulty of actually adhering to this logic, 
as illustrated by our parsing of Nimitz’s directive, suggests that both careful study 
and analysis are needed, as well as a determined effort to incorporate the logic 
into education and doctrine�
First, and most obviously, the strategic context for any new instantiation of 
calculated risk is radically different now than in 1942� The United States enjoys 
global command of the seas as a default condition; it does not have to win it� 
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What the United States does do is exercise its command of the sea through the 
forward deployment of its carrier battle groups around the periphery of Eurasia� 
It does so to deter potential aggressors and generally contribute to the “strategic 
stability” that allows the global system of trade and security to function smoothly� 
It is the power-projection-ashore capability of the carriers, coupled with their 
mobility and ability to be “ready on arrival,” that makes them broadly useful to 
American presidents� However, the United States has only eleven of them (ten, 
temporarily), and while this number exceeds the total in the rest of the world 
combined, it is small enough when all the factors underpinning forward presence 
are factored in� In view of the strategic purposes of American carriers and the 
scope of their missions, eleven is not much more sufficient to us today than were 
three to Nimitz� So American carriers are still scarce strategic assets�
The Global (Strategic) Level
Let us parse today’s version of calculated risk in a top-down manner� Today there 
is no position of naval command authority equivalent to that of Admiral King, 
but we can at least take his view in terms of asset management� The recent “rebal-
ance” to the Pacific would seem to mirror a bit the conditions in 1942, when fleet 
carriers were not a critical asset in the Atlantic� However, the current crisis in 
Crimea and Ukraine may signal an increased need for carriers in and around the 
European theater� In the 1960s and ’70s it would have been unthinkable to strip 
the Atlantic Fleet of carriers, despite the war in Vietnam� However, in those days 
the U�S� Navy had, at various times, from thirteen to twenty-three carriers� Eleven 
just barely allows the maintenance of three stations continuously with single 
carrier strike groups� Any concentration of carriers such as occurred in DESERT 
STORM (seven) would require the gapping of one or more stations and would 
disrupt the logistic cycle for years� In 1990 this was an acceptable risk, given the 
unraveling of the Soviet Union and a China that had not yet built a significant 
navy� In today’s world such a risk is less strategically acceptable�
Of course, none of this logic has yet considered the notion of carrier losses� 
The United States can build only one at a time, and each takes four or five years, 
plus another two for outfitting and workups� In wartime this could be com-
pressed somewhat, but in no way will the Chief of Naval Operations today have 
the industrial production backstop enjoyed by King and Nimitz� For all intents 
and purposes, we are in the position of Yamamoto and Nagumo; losses to car-
riers could not be made good in the likely span of a modern war� This being the 
case, it becomes important to consider the ends for which the carriers are being 
risked� Is there a strategic imperative or an upside potential that makes such risk 
acceptable? This is unknown intellectual territory for admirals several genera-
tions removed from June 1942�
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The first problem we encounter is that although Russia and China have one 
aircraft carrier each and China is building more, these ships do not constitute the 
foundations of their navies’ strategic capabilities� So the kind of symmetrical at-
trition calculation that underpinned Nimitz’s instruction does not exist now� We 
must also note that China’s potential military objectives lie close to home, gener-
ally beneath a dense missile and airpower umbrella� Defeating Chinese military 
aggression against Taiwan or various islands in the East and South China Seas 
would be desirable, but what things can aircraft carriers do that would satisfy the 
upside of the calculated-risk equation? It is beyond the scope of this article to 
define what those things might be; the main point here is that we must ask the 
question, instead of reflexively committing carriers as the Japanese—and perhaps 
the Americans—did in 1942�
The Regional (Operational) Level
Let’s “drill down” a level and examine the issue from a theater order-of-battle 
perspective� What if Nimitz had possessed a submarine fleet that was perhaps 
not much larger than the one he had—several American submarines actually got 
in among Nagumo’s carriers at Midway but to no good effect—but was equipped 
with torpedoes with the range and lethality of the Japanese Long Lance? Maybe 
that would have changed things� If Nimitz had had enough confidence in such 
boats, he would not have needed to risk his precious carriers and would still have 
had a good prospect of sinking Nagumo’s� Such a situation would essentially take 
the calculated-risk equation off the table� Nimitz might lose several submarines 
in the battle, but these could be made good more quickly than could Japanese 
losses� We can see that a dozen or so well-placed torpedoes would have been the 
functional equivalent of several carrier air wings of the era� Such a comparison 
cannot be made today, because of the fundamentally different warfare environ-
ment wrought by missiles and other modern technology, but the overall lesson 
is still clear and valid—dispersal of credible combat power among submarines 
or smaller surface combatants removes the embedded dilemma inherent in the 
calculated-risk equation�
The Local (Tactical) Level
However, we should not stop with the submarines-versus-carriers discussion� Let 
us descend farther, to the level of Fletcher and Spruance—in today’s parlance, the 
carrier battle group commander� Let’s also imagine some kind of crisis involving 
China or perhaps Iran� The United States has elected to dispatch one carrier or 
more to the scene as a show of force and resolve� If such positioning puts the 
carriers inside the threat arcs of hostile missile systems or mixes them among 
potentially hostile combatants (as was the case in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war), 
a new version of the calculated-risk equation emerges� Assuming the carrier’s 
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escorts cannot create an impregnable bastion around the carrier, the battle-group 
commander has a decision to make� Does he or she break and run at some point 
before shots are fired in order to get untargeted? Doing so could have adverse 
political effects� In 1973, had U�S� carrier groups run west of the Strait of Sicily 
to extract themselves from the spiderweb of Soviet missile shooters, the Soviets 
would have been left in possession of the eastern Mediterranean and Israel would 
have been isolated� Does simply showing up at the scene of a crisis automati-
cally take the battle group commander past the calculated-risk decision point? It 
would seem so, as modern aircraft carriers are no more able to outrun antiship 
missiles than were Nimitz’s carriers to outrun Japanese carrier aircraft�
The Chain of Command
In 1942 the U�S� Navy chain of command in the Pacific consisted of three layers� 
As we have seen, the notion of limiting risk to the aircraft carriers appears to have 
originated with Admiral King, whose strategic perspective allowed him to weigh 
objectively the potential costs and benefits of a pitched battle off Midway� His 
guidance was processed by Nimitz’s staff and turned into a letter of instruction 
to Fletcher and Spruance� Even with so straightforward a process, it appears that 
neither Nimitz nor his task force commanders really took the principle to heart�
Today the chain of command is not as short or as straightforward, at least 
from a naval perspective� In the Pacific, a carrier task force commander has above 
him or her four levels of command: the numbered fleet (say, Seventh Fleet), the 
theater naval component (Pacific Fleet), the combatant commander (U�S� Pacific 
Command), and finally the Secretary of Defense� Whatever may be all the po-
tential problems with this arrangement, two are salient here�19 First, and perhaps 
most problematic, is the lack of a naval commander with global perspective� The 
Joint Staff has no command authority, and the secretary’s staff is neither designed 
nor manned to exert direct operational control� Rather, both provide broad 
policy guidance to the regional combatant commanders� It is therefore not likely 
that finely tuned assessments of allowable risk to naval forces will emanate from 
the Pentagon� The second issue resides within Pacific Command itself� Absent 
any useful risk guidance from Washington, the burden of assessment falls on the 
combatant commander� However, this officer’s perspective is regional, not global, 
and his or her preoccupation will be obtaining political access—always a con-
suming challenge—and achieving overall synchronization of joint forces� This 
leaves the commander of the Pacific Fleet as the uppermost command echelon 
positioned to assess allowable risk� As we have seen from the battle of Midway 
example, objectivity about risk can be hard to attain�
Our analysis suggests several potential fixes for this critical emerging is-
sue� The first and perhaps most effective would be for the Navy to develop a 
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calculated-risk doctrine and ensure that it be incorporated into almost every 
level of training and education� It needs to become almost an instinctive reflex 
of officers selected for operational command� We cannot count on the current 
military command structure to generate such calculations� The second potential 
fix, much more difficult to put into operation, would be to establish a global-level 
naval component commander, with staff, responsible for the management of 
scarce naval resources from a global perspective� Most practically, this would be 
a collateral duty of the Chief of Naval Operations�
Finally, we have the somewhat murky issue of staff objectivity� Much has been 
made in the literature of war about the French adherence on the eve of World 
War I to the doctrine of all-out offense, which produced disaster in the Battle of 
the Frontiers in 1914� Admiral William F� Halsey’s reflexive aggressiveness is also 
a subject of criticism� Our analysis here provides at least some indication that 
Nimitz and his staff had developed a collective determination that their commu-
nications intelligence was correct—and, of course, there they had good reasons� 
However, this underlying belief seemed to undercut the written guidance from 
King, which was put in both the operations order and the letter of instruction� 
What was not in the instruction was any decision branch that envisioned what 
to do if the enemy were not located first or by a certain time� This indicates there 
was no real thought given to a “Plan B” should the searches not have produced 
results; the American planners were committed to executing a battle plan based 
on the assumption that their intelligence was accurate� Historically, the results 
justified that confidence� However, in retrospect we can see that the principle of 
calculated risk was not observed in the lead-up to the battle� The general danger 
here is of the development of a form of “groupthink” that leads to unexamined 
assumptions and potentially lures commanders and staffs into military blunders� 
Intelligence is a mesmerizing thing� The Allies used it with some effect in the 
European theater before the invasion of Sicily when they put fake invasion plans 
in a briefcase and attached it to a cadaver dressed as a diplomatic messenger� The 
body washed ashore in Spain, where the plans were found and taken to Hitler, 
who bought the ruse conveyed by the planted papers that the invasion would 
be in Greece and persisted in believing so in the critical first weeks of the actual 
invasion�20 It is one thing to rely on intelligence; it is quite another to fail to make 
provision for retrieving the situation if the intelligence proves false�
Avoiding the Problem
Earlier, we speculated about how Nimitz might have been spared the dilemma 
inherent in the principle of calculated risk if he had had a substantial flotilla of 
submarines armed with good torpedoes� The principle of calculated risk, as de-
fined in this article, is a consequence of concentration and scarcity, manifested 
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in the form of a capital ship—the aircraft carrier� If combat power is distributed 
and units are relatively numerous, the principle, with its embedded command 
dilemma, is avoided� In today’s environment, this approach would take the form 
of smaller combatants, including submarines, armed with antiship missiles and 
other advanced weapons and sensors� Also embedded in the logic of calculated 
risk is the idea of the “decisive battle�” Risking scarce and expensive strategic 
assets in an engagement that does not figure to be strategically, or even opera-
tionally, decisive makes no sense� Calculated risk, as specifically defined herein, 
cannot enter into the decision-making calculus in such a situation� Therefore, if 
an engagement is likely to be part of a campaign of cumulative attrition—such 
as the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II—the forces committed ought to be 
appropriate to the form of warfare envisioned� Given the projected objectives of 
revisionist coastal states in today’s world, however, it is more likely that drawn-
out attrition warfare will result from our attempts to counteract their aggression, 
unless the United States inappropriately commits its strategic forces to a high-risk 
environment� Understanding the internal logic of calculated risk can assist in 
revising the U�S� Navy’s approach to warfare in the littorals�
A NEW SET OF INTELLECTUAL REFLEXES 
Our inquiry has revealed several things� First, unless there was in fact some 
understanding among American commanders on 3 June 1942 that Fletcher and 
Spruance would “bail out” if there was no sighting of Japanese forces before 
sunrise on the 4th, the calculated-risk directive was not worth the paper it was 
written on, regardless of its vaunted clarity� Japanese operational and tactical mis-
takes only served to cover over this uncomfortable fact� That being said, the logic 
of calculated risk certainly applied on both sides of the battle� Nagumo had his 
chance to abide by the logic of relative attrition, but of course no such guidance 
existed in the Imperial Japanese Navy� In retrospect, if someone were going to 
back off, it would have been Nimitz himself� However, if the notion of calculated 
risk was not his in the first place, one wonders whether he was even thinking in 
those terms� The sighting of the Japanese invasion force on 3 June spared him the 
decision, if indeed he ever anticipated having to make one� What was really going 
on was that two fleets were hell-bent on destroying each other, and the subtleties 
of calculated risk had little or nothing to do with the matter�
Such a negative judgment notwithstanding, we can see that the principle of 
calculated risk has salience today, perhaps even more than in 1942� Among the 
many “warfare gaps” that afflict the U�S� Navy today in terms of readiness to fight 
a high-end war at sea is the intellectual preparation of the officer corps, which has 
been accustomed to projecting power across the shore with impunity� As China 
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builds its capability to deny access to the high seas within the first and second 
“island chains” and as advanced antiship missile technology proliferates, the risks 
to U�S� aircraft carriers and other forces will escalate, and a new set of intellectual 
reflexes will be needed, from the local to the global level in the naval command 
structure� The need is particularly great in view of all the rhetoric that has been 
advanced over the years asserting the “dominance” that is presumed to be pos-
sessed, or else aspired to, by U�S� forces� While dominance is certainly desirable, 
the facts quietly taking shape in the world suggest that the Navy’s situation is 
more like that which Admiral Nimitz faced in 1942 than what he enjoyed in 1945� 
Recognition of the problem is the first step in solving it� There is a particular logic 
that attends war at sea, and calculated risk, as so elegantly but perhaps futilely ar-
ticulated by Admiral Nimitz in 1942, is an emerging critical element that deserves 
more study and consideration�
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THE AMERICAN “PIVOT” AND THE INDIAN NAVY
 Just after addressing the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2012, Leon Panetta, then the American secretary of defense, visited New Delhi, where he 
remarked that “defense cooperation with India is a lynchpin in this [pivot] strat-
egy�”1 Since the thrust of the “pivot” has been on the maritime balance of power 
in the Indo-Pacific, both the Pacific and the Indian 
Oceans have gained tremendous traction in the 
new U�S� strategy� From the very initiation of the 
pivot, India has featured on the American radar 
as an important strategic partner� Based on pub-
licly available Indian government and Indian Navy 
documents, as well as structured interviews with 
key Indian naval officials, this article investigates 
the Indian Navy’s response to the strategy of the 
pivot and argues that it has had no major influ-
ence on its approach to the region� This is evident 
in the unchanging nature of its exercises with the 
U�S� and regional navies, stagnation in defense 
agreements with the United States important for 
interoperability, and Indian Navy reservations 
on increasing its constabulary role in the Indian 
Ocean� This lack of response can be located in the 
larger strategic discourse that is guiding Indian 
foreign policy vis-à-vis the changing balance of 
power in the region� Indian strategy so far has 
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been primarily to hedge—which translates into reluctance and caution when it 
comes to actively participating in the pivot� 
This article first discusses the current strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific, 
underlining the transition of power taking place in the region—that is, China’s 
ascending relative power vis-à-vis the United States� Further, it reflects on the 
strategy of the pivot as a response to this strategic flux, suggesting that this 
power transition is more likely to unfold on the high seas rather than on Asia’s 
continental landmass and that the Indo-Pacific region, therefore, is geostrategi-
cally significant for the success of the pivot� Subsequently, this article focuses on 
the Indo-Pacific nature of America’s pivot, then on India’s emergence as a potent 
naval power in the region� India’s maritime strategy, ambitions, and objectives are 
seen as largely compatible with those of the United States� An empirical appraisal 
of the Indian Navy’s response to the pivot follows, along three dimensions: naval 
exercises with the U�S� and regional navies, progress on interoperability with the 
U�S� Navy, and change in India’s constabulary services in the region� Finally, the 
article explains the unresponsiveness of the Indian Navy to the American strategy 
in terms of the larger Indian foreign-policy paradigm� It concludes with some 
policy recommendations for better coordination between the two countries in 
the Indo-Pacific, given their mutual apprehensions over China’s regional aims 
and their compatible objectives in seeking greater regional stability�
THE “PIVOT” AND THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC PARTNERS
In late 2011, the Barack Obama administration issued a series of official state-
ments and policy directives indicating a shift in America’s strategic focus� In 
a major foreign-policy speech to the Australian parliament, President Obama 
declared the strategy of a “pivot,” a shift that entailed a strong military commit-
ment to the Asia-Pacific�2 Action followed words: it was announced that 2,500 
U�S� Marines would be stationed in the Australian port city of Darwin�3 By Janu-
ary 2012, the Pentagon was ready with a major policy directive, Sustaining U.S. 
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense�4 The terminology it used 
to define the new strategic vision—one geared toward the Pacific—was “strategic 
rebalancing�”5 
This rebalancing entailed a comprehensive shift in America’s military and 
diplomatic commitment to the Asia-Pacific� By the summer of 2012 the Depart-
ment of Defense had declared that 60 percent of America’s naval assets would be 
stationed under the U�S� Pacific Command�6 Washington followed up by increas-
ing its defense cooperation with Vietnam, renewing its military engagement with 
the Philippines, promising more conventional arms to Taiwan, and permanently 
stationing a flotilla of littoral combat ships in the port city of Singapore�7 New 
missile-defense systems were installed in East Asia, and similar plans were made 
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for Southeast Asia� Naval reallocation to the Pacific was followed up with the 
dedication of 60 percent of the U�S� Air Force to the Pacific theater by mid-2013�8 
In April 2014, to reassure its Asian allies, President Obama visited a number of 
key countries in the Asia-Pacific� In Tokyo, Obama declared that the Senkaku 
Islands fall under the purview of the U�S�-Japan Security Treaty�9 He also signed 
a ten-year defense pact in Manila, paving the way for a greater U�S� military pres-
ence in the Philippines� 
This dramatic change in U�S� military commitment to the region is largely a 
function of the astonishing rise of China� Riding high on two decades of double-
digit economic growth, China is now on the cusp of becoming a serious regional 
military power� Capabilities notwithstanding, the transition appears all the more 
menacing because of China’s aggressive posturing in the East and South China 
Seas, challenging the freedom of navigation in these waters� This behavior has 
aggravated concerns that a rising China may jeopardize America’s basic com-
mitments in the region, such as respect for international law, free and open com-
merce, open access to the global commons, and the principle of resolving conflict 
without the use of force�10
Since most of China’s territorial conflicts are spread across the East and South 
China Seas, naval force projection has gained uncharacteristic momentum for 
a country that has had for most of its history a continental mind-set� China’s 
maritime strategy and its increasing capabilities underscore, for some, Beijing’s 
Mahanian ambitions�11 It may simply overwhelm the smaller powers in the 
region� With respect to extraregional powers such as the United States, China’s 
singular objective is to deny them any operational space in its oceanic sphere of 
influence�12 Its robust submarine fleet and antiaccess/area-denial capabilities are 
aimed against any possible intervention by the U�S� Navy�13 The Chinese might 
also use these sea-denial platforms to conduct “anti-SLOC operations” (that is, 
against sea lines of communications), which its naval doctrine identifies as one 
of the six legitimate offensive and defensive campaigns it might carry out in the 
open seas�14 According to the Pentagon, trends in Chinese military power sug-
gest that the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) DF-21D antiship ballistic 
missile will soon be able to target the entire South China Sea, the Malacca Strait, 
most of the Bay of Bengal, and parts of the Arabian Sea�15 
Against this background, the pivot strategy “represents a simultaneous attempt 
to warn China away from using heavy-handed tactics against its neighbors and 
provide confidence to other Asia-Pacific countries that want to resist pressure 
from Beijing now and in the future�”16 The focus of the pivot has been extensively 
on America’s freedom and capability to intervene in Asia’s littorals to maintain 
a healthy balance of power� The U�S� Navy, not surprisingly, has received enor-
mous attention in recent years� It is the only service that has escaped the worst 
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consequences of budgetary sequestration and new capabilities continue to be 
introduced� Its activity in the Asia-Pacific theater has also seen a spike� However, 
China’s oceanic offensive is not limited to its immediate neighborhood� Though 
the eastern Pacific is its immediate area of operation, where it would like to have 
absolute control, lately the Indian Ocean too has gained currency in China’s 
grand strategy� Most of China’s trade—energy or otherwise—passes through the 
SLOCs in the Indian Ocean� China considers the Indian Ocean, with its multiple 
choke points, its “soft underbelly,” where constant vigilance might be required� 
America’s articulation of a strategy of the pivot has catapulted the Indian Ocean 
to the center stage of the geopolitical tussle between Washington and Beijing� The 
Pentagon’s “post-pivot” declarations underline that America’s “security interests 
are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the western 
Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean and South Asia�”17 
The Indian Ocean region (IOR) is the highway of international commerce� Fif-
ty percent of the world’s container traffic and 70 percent of its crude and other oil 
products go through the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean� Securing the Indian Ocean’s 
SLOCs is extremely important for sustenance of U�S� allies in the eastern Pacific, 
as well as for the international economy�18 The Indian Ocean’s geography makes 
it an extremely difficult place for an extraregional power to operate� Encircled by 
strategic choke points such as the Strait of Malacca and Gulf of Aden, the Indian 
Ocean highway can easily be blockaded by sea-denial strategies� Maintaining a 
constant presence in the Indian Ocean is therefore a strategic necessity� As two 
American analysts have argued, the U�S� presence in the Indian Ocean “provides 
important defense-in-depth for countering threats to strategic chokepoints�”19 
The Indian Ocean may well be the space wherein India and China compete 
for supremacy in Asia� Whereas China is trying hard to spread its influence in 
the IOR, India—the preeminent power in the Indian Ocean—is turning its gaze 
toward the Pacific� This quest for “mastering space” in the Asia-Pacific has led 
to a naval competition between the two Asian giants�20 The probability that any 
future conflict over the unsettled Himalayan frontier may spill over to the Indian 
Ocean and the eastern Pacific remains high� The clash of these geopolitical tec-
tonic plates may ultimately render the Indian Ocean a “cockpit of great power 
rivalries�”21 For all these reasons, the Indian Ocean occupies a distinct place in 
America’s strategic imagination, and therefore the pivot is not restricted to the 
Pacific� It has redefined Asia’s oceanic geography—the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
have converged to become a “single strategic system�”22 However, as one Ameri-
can scholar cautions, “this reorientation will demand the redeployment of [U�S�] 
naval forces that have been traditionally split between the Atlantic and the Pacific 
to the Indo-Pacific, a unified, albeit massive, stretch of water�”23
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Contemporary Asia is witnessing a transition of power largely unfolding in 
its oceans� As in the great-power transitions of the past, naval force will be the 
principal determinant in the end result of this strategic flux� However, the suc-
cess of the pivot and “strategic rebalancing” is far from assured� The ultimate 
outcome, as has been argued, “will turn on whether Washington has the will, and 
the wallet, to follow through the initiatives of the last several years�”24 Owing to 
a large debt burden, the United States is going through an era of austerity� Cuts 
in defense outlays may range anywhere from $450 billion to a trillion dollars�25 
Though “pivoting” toward Asia means strengthening U�S� naval forces, if the 
military sequestration continues the Navy will suffer� Cuts in American defense 
outlays will impinge on the U�S� Navy’s ability to operate simultaneously and with 
effect in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, just as the pivot to the Indo-Pacific 
entails greater commitments in the region�26 
It has rightly been suggested that as the United States directs its attention to-
ward the Indo-Pacific and assumes more responsibilities there, “a potential mis-
match between US policy objectives and the structure of American naval power 
looms over the coming decades�”27 This is true especially given that the Indian 
Ocean’s numerous choke points may demand that “American naval forces con-
front transcontinental distances, complex strategic geography, and the emergence 
of anti-access threats that will severely complicate future operations�”28 There is 
also a growing debate in America about finding suitable partners to share the 
load of strategic rebalancing� Any overcommitment by Washington would pro-
vide an incentive for potential partners to shift the burden onto U�S� shoulders; 
undercommitment, however, might force them to “bandwagon” with Beijing�29 
It is therefore important for the United States to be extremely careful in forging 
meaningful partnerships with credible strategic partners� 
American officials have found a strategic partnership with India extremely 
enticing, especially in guarding the Indian Ocean from the negative fallouts of 
China’s rapid rise� Washington continues to express its appreciation of India “as a 
net security provider in the IOR�”30 Maritime security cooperation between India 
and the United States has become a strategic necessity, especially for sustaining 
a favorable strategic equilibrium as Chinese power rises� American strategy, ac-
cording to some, “should focus on supporting Indian pre-eminence in the Indian 
Ocean and closer U�S�-India strategic cooperation�”31 
In both the U�S� government and strategic circles there is an emerging expecta-
tion that India should play a significant role in maintaining the maritime balance 
of power in the Indo-Pacific� The readiness of India to assume that role, however, 
remains ambiguous, despite New Delhi’s assertions about India’s emergence as an 
Indo-Pacific maritime power� 
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INDIA AS AN INDO-PACIFIC MARITIME POWER
India’s political leaders, diplomats, and strategic thinkers have been articulating 
an Indo-Pacific vision for the nation’s maritime power in the twenty-first century 
for some time now� On a visit to Japan in May 2013, Manmohan Singh, then 
prime minister, mentioned the increasing “confluence of the � � � Pacific and the 
Indian Oceans,” even as he cautioned his audience that “this region faces mul-
tiple challenges, unresolved issues and unsettled questions� Historical differences 
persist despite our growing inter-dependence�” This was clearly an allusion to the 
rise of China and its impact on the region� Maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, 
therefore, in Singh’s view, is “essential for regional and global prosperity�”32 The 
idea of the Indo-Pacific as an arena of geopolitical tussles also informs the Indian 
Navy’s assessment of the strategic environment: “It signifies the fusion of two geo- 
politically sensitive and economically vibrant regions � � � [and] could well define 
the future trajectory of political interactions in the 21st century�”33 Accompanying 
this shift of focus toward the Indo-Pacific is a larger shift in self-perception, in 
that India’s unique geography in the Indian Ocean “gives [it] a point of a pivot” 
in the Indo-Pacific region�34 
In the last two decades, the geographical extent of India’s maritime inter-
ests has expanded to cover the whole of the Indo-Pacific� This geographical 
reimagination of India’s maritime interests has been driven by India’s economic 
performance and the growing economic opportunities in the East� India’s trade 
with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
with Japan, South Korea, and Australia has increased considerably (see the table)� 
Moreover, with its booming economy, India’s energy dependence on the Middle 
East has also increased; maintaining the flow of energy and commodities has be-
come a prime concern� India is the fourth-largest consumer of oil and gas in the 
world, and its dependence on imports increased from 40 percent of total demand 
in 1990 to about 70 percent in 2011�35 Sixty-four percent of these imports come 
from the Middle East and 17 percent from Africa, making security of supply 
Partners Trade (billions of dollars, 2007–2008)
Trade 
(billions of dollars, 2012–13)
India–ASEAN 40� 80�
India–Australia 10�9 13�8
India–Japan 9�89 16�
India–South Korea 11�22 17�44
Sources: Government of India, Annual Report 2012–13; idem, Annual Report 2007–08.
INDIA’S TRADE WITH ASEAN, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA
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routes in the Indian Ocean a vital national interest�36 Economics, however, is only 
one among a number of drivers in this reorientation� Strategic necessities have 
hugely influenced India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific� 
India views growing Chinese naval power with concern� For the first five 
decades of India’s independence, its geographical advantage of the Indian Ocean 
and its limited interests in the East facilitated its lackadaisical approach to 
maritime security in the Indo-Pacific� China’s rapid naval modernization and 
its forays into the Indian Ocean have forced New Delhi to rethink the role of its 
navy in maintaining the maritime balance of power� In the last decade, China 
has developed naval facilities in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan and is planning 
to build naval infrastructure in Seychelles�37 Though Beijing considers these 
installations as economic hubs, some strategists in India argue that economics 
notwithstanding, they can be later converted into military facilities and used 
against India as an elaborate “string of pearls” to contain New Delhi’s influence 
in the Indian Ocean�38 The Indian Navy, as is evident from its 2007 doctrine, is 
particularly alarmed by China’s growing naval presence in the region�39 As one 
senior naval official underlined to the authors, “They [the Chinese] are definitely 
not building these facilities to develop golf courses�”40 Though the Indian national 
security adviser has tried to allay the fears engendered by the “string of pearls” 
theory, the Indian strategic community remains wary of China’s ultimate inten-
tions�41 China’s antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have also raised hackles 
with some in the Indian Navy who question the need for the PLAN’s continuous 
deployment of two frontline warships and a tanker�42 But the rivalry also extends 
to waters beyond Malacca� If for China the Indian Ocean is not an Indian lake, 
New Delhi’s imperative is to contest impressions in Beijing that the waters east 
of Malacca automatically fall under the latter’s sphere of influence�43 India’s naval 
engagement in the East, therefore, has also been a reaction to China’s expansion 
in the Indian Ocean region� The turf war between the two navies, as both nations 
further prosper and seek greater roles in regional dynamics, is set to grow� This 
was illustrated even in the search and rescue operations for the missing Malay-
sian jetliner MH370 in April 2014� China deployed eight major naval warships in 
this operation, a presence that may have been unthinkable a decade ago�44 China 
also requested that India allow four of its warships to conduct search operations 
in the Andaman Sea, which New Delhi categorically rejected, insisting that 
search operations in that area are its own responsibility�45 
Another strategic imperative that has facilitated India’s naval engagement in 
the Indo-Pacific is New Delhi’s burgeoning relationship with Washington� The 
end of the Cold War forced India to mend fences with the world’s only remain-
ing superpower� However, nuclear proliferation and India’s own nuclear status 
kept bilateral relations tense� Change accompanied the presidency of George W� 
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Bush� President Bush transformed Indo-U�S� ties by offering India the landmark 
civil nuclear energy cooperation pact�46 His administration perceived India as 
a rightful competitor with China, with its growing clout in Asia, and foresaw 
India playing a particularly important role in the Indian Ocean�47 Management 
of maritime threats in the IOR gained further momentum after 11 September 
2001� The Indian Navy launched Operation SAGITTARIUS, providing escorts and 
protection to U�S� ships passing through the Indian Ocean, operationally reliev-
ing the U�S� Navy of its constabulary services in the region, and facilitating the 
American operations in Afghanistan�48 Annual joint naval exercises, suspended 
since 1998, were restarted by India and the United States in 2002, with a series 
now code-named MALABAR� This interaction fostered “operational cooperation” 
between the two navies, which, according to the U�S� Department of Defense, 
was evident in the post-tsunami relief operations in the Indian Ocean in 2004�49 
Learning from those experiences, the two navies established a “U�S�-India Disas-
ter Response Initiative to spur greater training and engagement to prepare for 
combined responses to future disasters in the Indian Ocean Region�”50
Following the footsteps of the Comprehensive Defence Agreement of 2005, In-
dia and the United States signed a Maritime Cooperation Agreement in 2006 that 
institutionalized cooperation between their navies� INS Jalashwa, a Trenton-class 
amphibious ship, joined the Indian Navy in 2007, augmenting its capability to 
undertake “amphibious and expeditionary warfare�” Subsequently, P8I maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft were obtained from Boeing, the Indian Navy thereby be-
coming the “first [foreign] navy in the world,” as India’s external affairs minister 
told his audience at Harvard University, to operate this “state of the art” aircraft�51 
Strategic necessities notwithstanding, an important agent of change in India’s 
maritime ambitions has been the Indian Navy itself� Least ideologically driven 
and also the most strategic minded of all the services in India’s defense establish-
ment, the navy has long articulated the need to expand India’s maritime vision� 
This ambitious streak in the Indian Navy’s thinking is evident in its policy docu-
ments, as well as in its increasing maritime engagement with states across the 
Indo-Pacific� Indian naval officials and maritime strategists seem to be “intent on 
a ‘naval forward strategy’ that, logically speaking, could extend eastward into the 
South China Sea and the Pacific Rim�”52 Forward defense of the subcontinent or of 
India’s traditional sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean means a forward pres-
ence on the very edge of the Indian Ocean and beyond in the Pacific� The logic of 
forward presence is manifest in the Indian Maritime Doctrine, a policy document 
released by the naval arm of the Integrated Headquarters of the Indian military 
in May 2004�53 Unlike the “limited framework of defensive limited coastal ‘sea- 
denial’” that had defined the navy’s strategic thinking for the first fifty years of inde-
pendence, the maritime doctrine in 2004 “moved to a more assertive competitive 
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strategy for projecting power deeper into and across the Indian Ocean�”54 Rec-
ognizing that a shift in global maritime focus is taking place “from the Atlantic- 
Pacific to the Pacific-Indian Ocean region,” the document envisages as one of 
the major missions of the navy raising the costs of intervention by extraregional 
powers in India’s maritime sphere of influence�55 Equal emphasis was given to the 
navy’s role as an instrument of diplomacy in the larger interest of India’s foreign 
policy�56 Moreover the doctrine, given the navy’s experiences in escorting U�S� 
cargo during SAGITTARIUS, also paid attention to the service’s ability to supply 
international “public goods,” such as the protection of SLOCs, humanitarian as-
sistance, and disaster relief�57 The nation’s first document on maritime doctrine 
in the twenty-first century had an ambitious vision for India’s maritime power� 
The Indian Navy also seemed to walk the talk� In 2005, India finally estab-
lished the Far Eastern Naval Command in the strategic islands of Andaman and 
Nicobar� The strategic value of the base is evident in the fact that it provides the 
Indian Navy a forward operating platform in the Indian Ocean only sixty nauti-
cal miles from the Strait of Malacca� In consonance with the changing maritime 
realities and roles the doctrine envisaged, the Indian aircraft carrier INS Viraat 
visited in 2005 for the first time a number of ports in Southeast Asia while transit-
ing to the western Pacific�58 The year 2007 was quite eventful for the Indian Navy, 
insofar as its expansion into the western Pacific is concerned� The MALABAR 
exercise with the United States was conducted off the coast of Okinawa from 6 
to 11 April, followed by a trilateral exercise, called TRILATEX, with the navies of 
the United States and Japan�59 Later, the Indian Navy participated in West Pacific 
Naval Symposium multilateral at-sea exercises with regional navies in the South 
China Sea�60 If the Indian Navy was sailing across the western Pacific in the spring 
and summer of 2007, major navies of the region—those of Japan, Australia, and 
Singapore—and that of the United States gathered in the Bay of Bengal in Sep-
tember to conduct with India a joint multilateral naval exercise called MALABAR 
07-02�61 This was in addition to the annual MALABAR bilateral exercise between 
India and the United States, and it was one of the largest exercises ever conducted 
in the region, involving approximately twenty-five ships, 150 aircraft, and twenty 
thousand personnel� For the first time in the Bay of Bengal, three carrier strike 
groups, two from the United States and one from India, participated�62 
If the underlying reason behind the exercise was to signal to China an impend-
ing shift in the regional balance of power, the 2007 policy document issued by the 
navy, Freedom of the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy, conveyed the same� 
Forewarning India’s decision makers of China’s creeping influence and power-
projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean, it stated that the “Chinese navy is 
set on the path to become a blue-water force [along with] attempts to gain [a] 
strategic toe-hold in the IOR�”63 This allusion to China’s growing capabilities, in 
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conjunction with the strategy document’s acknowledgment that “strategic objec-
tives of a majority of extraregional navies are broadly coincident with India’s own 
strategic interests,” suggests that India’s naval strategy in some sense had become 
China focused�64 It is therefore important to note that the document laid great 
emphasis on maritime cooperation with regional powers, with a clear intention 
“to prevent � � � incursions by powers inimical to India’s national interests�”65 In 
2008, the Indian Navy organized the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, inviting all 
navies of the IOR to address regional security challenges multilaterally� The scope 
of its annual naval exercises with regional navies has also expanded considerably; 
the MILAN exercises, initiated in 1995 with just five members, have now fourteen 
regional navies under their ambit� Engagement with other navies has also been 
institutionalized; the Indian Navy now conducts institutional staff talks with 
fifteen other national naval forces� 
This shift in strategy can also be located in India’s increasing capabilities� In 
a span of two decades, the Indian Navy has seen a growth of 30 percent in its 
military wherewithal, emerging as the third-largest navy in Asia, after China’s 
and Japan’s�66 In 1992–93, the navy’s share of the defense budget stood at 11�5 
percent; by 2012–13, it had grown to 19 percent� Though compared to Japan and 
China these financial figures may appear small, “in local terms India’s military 
spending now being channeled into naval purposes is significantly greater than 
naval spending by all other Indian Ocean states�”67 Capital investment in future 
capabilities constitutes 50 percent of its budget, much higher than in its sister 
services� The navy’s strategic decision to invest in long-term capabilities has lately 
started manifesting itself� INS Vikramaditya, India’s second aircraft carrier and 
by far the largest ship in its kitty, joined the force in 2013� Though the ship took 
more than a decade and double the initial cost, the Indian Navy now boasts a very 
capable force-projection capacity in the Indian Ocean and beyond� Indigenous 
production of defense equipment is also high on the navy’s agenda, with all forty-
five vessels currently on order being constructed within India� The nation’s first 
indigenously designed aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, 37,500 tons, was launched in 
August 2013, entering the second phase of construction, during which it would 
be fitted with weapon and propulsion systems and the entire aircraft complex� It 
is set to enter sea trials in 2015–16 and is estimated to be introduced into service 
by 2017� Designs for another aircraft carrier, INS Vishal, are in preparation� The 
Indian Navy plans to operate three battle groups by the end of this decade� 
Its underwater fleet, though a cause of concern both in the Indian Navy and 
among observers outside, is now bolstered by the advent of its first nuclear sub-
marine� After a long gestation period of over three decades, INS Arihant, built 
under the pseudonym of “Advanced Technology Vessel,” may now provide the 
navy a perennial presence in the depths of Asia’s waters� 
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The navy also has some very ambitious plans for asset acquisition and con-
struction� Under the new five-year Defence Plan for 2012–17 and the Long-Term 
Integrated Perspective Plan for 2012–27, the “Indian Navy is aiming to induct 
more than 90 fighting platforms in another ten years�”68 Given its past record, in-
corporation of all these platforms may eventually face delays� It is also important 
to acknowledge that lately the Indian Navy has been under great scrutiny due to 
a series of accidents on board major vessels, including the sinking of a submarine 
owing to malfunctioning electric batteries�69 This has further beleaguered a force 
that already suffers from lack of political clout in New Delhi, as was evident in the 
speedy acceptance of the resignation of the Chief of the Naval Staff by the defense 
ministry soon after another accident marred its reputation in February 2014�70 
Though these developments have undermined the navy’s credibility, its motiva-
tion to modernize and to master the space around the Indian Ocean remains as 
potent as ever� 
The above discussion suggests that India’s engagement in maritime Asia is 
not restricted to the Indian Ocean alone; in fact, the nation is increasingly being 
perceived as an Indo-Pacific power� India’s official declarations and its naval pro-
activeness attest to this ambitious portrayal of its maritime sphere of influence� 
Second, this reimagining of India’s traditional maritime outlook is a result of 
India’s ascending economic profile� However, China’s growing power and capa-
bilities, its impressive naval modernization, and its slowly advancing footprints 
in the Indian Ocean area have catapulted the Indo-Pacific to the very center of 
India’s strategic considerations� These changes in the scope of India’s maritime 
interests have been facilitated by engagement with other regional powers, such 
as Japan and Australia, but particularly with the United States� New Delhi’s core 
strategic objectives in the region are largely compatible with those of Washington�
India’s naval expansion has occurred in a period of relative stability in the 
Indo-Pacific region, secured by American military supremacy� Aside from a few 
occasions of activism, India has been reluctant to provide public goods in the re-
gion, relying on the United States to do the heavy lifting� However, after the 2008 
financial crisis, the sustainability of the U�S� commitment came under increas-
ing scrutiny� Moreover, the U�S� strategy of pivot and rebalancing focuses much 
more on the Pacific, especially the East and South China Seas, than on the Indian 
Ocean� Given its geography, threat perceptions, and maritime ambitions, India 
may now be the natural heir to the American role in the region and particularly 
in the Indian Ocean� 
THE INDIAN NAVY AND THE U.S. “PIVOT”
India’s growing capabilities suggest that it can be an important player in main-
taining the maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific� The United States also expects, 
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and has actively encouraged, India to increase its footprint in the region� The 
pivot therefore represents a strategic opportunity for India to realize its true po-
tential as an Indo-Pacific power� The Indian Navy’s response to this new strategic 
paradigm can be discerned in naval exercises with the U�S� and regional navies; 
in progress in interoperability between the Indian and U�S� Navies; and in the 
constabulary services the Indian Navy offers in the IOR�
The “flagship” naval program between the Indian and U�S� Navies—the 
MALABAR exercise series—has gathered momentum since 2002� Just after 
President Obama announced his plans for a pivot to the Asia-Pacific, the 2012 
exercise, conducted in the Bay of Bengal, saw unprecedented contribution from 
the American side—the Seventh Fleet’s Carrier Strike Group 1, which included 
among other ships a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier and a nuclear submarine, par-
ticipated�71 Though its scope may have been decided long before, coming in the 
wake of the pivot this exercise conveyed a forceful message� The Indian and U�S� 
Navies the same year also conducted a joint submarine-rescue exercise off the 
coast of Mumbai, INDIAEX 12�72 Given the fact that the Indian Navy had recently 
commissioned a nuclear-powered submarine, this focus on submarine rescue 
suggested a new leap in naval cooperation� In July 2014, MALABAR exercises were 
conducted off the coast of Sasebo, Japan�73 Japan participated in the exercise on 
India’s invitation� A host of ships, including destroyers, submarines, and long-
range maritime reconnaissance aircraft from all three states, were involved in 
the exercise� 
With regard to regional maritime cooperation, the Indian Navy has been part-
nering with various states in Southeast Asia and Oceania� The SIMBEX exercises, 
between the Indian Navy and the Republic of Singapore Navy, take place annually 
and have been conducted all over the Indo-Pacific, including the Malacca Strait 
and the South China Sea�74 Indian naval ships have been regularly calling on ports 
in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Australia�75 Both Australia and Indonesia have shown 
interest in annual naval exercises with India, which may begin as soon as 2015�76 
The real development, however, has been in maritime cooperation between 
the Indian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force� Since 2007, the two 
services have been constantly interacting with each other in trilateral and mul-
tilateral forums but until recently had eschewed bilateral naval engagement� In 
2012, the two sides decided to conduct direct bilateral maritime exercises to en-
hance maritime security in the Asia-Pacific�77 The first-ever Indo-Japanese joint 
naval exercise took place off the coast of Okinawa in June 2012; four Indian ships 
participated�78 It was here that the Indian Navy observed the capabilities of the 
Japanese US-2 amphibious aircraft, which India now desires to buy� In December 
2013 the Japanese navy conducted its first bilateral maritime exercise with the 
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Indian Navy in the IOR� Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan in 
September 2014 reinforced this emerging defense partnership� The Memoran-
dum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the field of defense was signed, aimed at 
institutionalizing the growing military cooperation between the two navies�79 In 
fact, the Tokyo declaration indicates that rather than being an invited participant, 
Japan may henceforth join the Indo-U�S� bilateral naval exercises as a full partner� 
If “the future direction of the burgeoning Japan-India strategic relationship will 
be one of the important indicator[s] of the degree to which U�S� allies and part-
ners within Asia are prepared to align more closely with each other to maintain 
a favourable strategic equilibrium in the region as the future of Chinese power 
grows relative to the United States,” growing naval cooperation between the two 
navies suggests that a local balance of power might be slowly emerging in the 
waters of the Indo-Pacific�80 
The naval strategy under the pivot focuses extensively on interoperability 
with regional navies� Given that the new American strategy concentrates on 
the Indo-Pacific, with a heavy emphasis on naval forces, the U�S� Navy expects 
to strengthen interoperability with its Indian counterpart� Ever since the New 
Framework for Defence Cooperation was signed in 2005, followed by the Mari-
time Security Cooperation Agreement, the United States has been pressing India 
to conclude a Logistics Sharing Agreement (LSA)� However, even after a decade, 
the “New Framework” remains in limbo; the LSA and two other crucial strategic 
agreements—the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum 
of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement 
(BECA) for Geo-spatial Cooperation—have seen no progress� Proper logistical 
support arrangements are important for practical cooperation between the two 
countries� The most important aspect of the LSA is the element of interoper-
ability, whereby collaborating nations can use each other’s military equipment, 
leading to more efficient joint military operations� The strategy of the pivot ne-
cessitates increased strategic interaction and cooperation between the U�S� and 
Indian Navies� But Delhi has given no indication that it is in a hurry to proceed�81 
The new government in New Delhi under Modi has shown more willingness to 
engage with the United States militarily� During Modi’s visit to the United States 
in September–October 2014, the two nations not only renewed their 2005 de-
fense cooperation agreement for another ten years but also expanded its scope, 
by declaring that the two countries will “treat each other at the same level as their 
closest partners” on issues including “defense technology, trade, research, co-
production and co-development�”82 In their joint statement both nations declared 
their support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, signaling that 
the Modi government is not reluctant to highlight New Delhi’s convergence with 
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Washington on regional issues� The United States expressed its willingness to 
enhance technology partnership with the Indian Navy� Though the two nations 
have now decided to upgrade the MALABAR series of exercises, it is not yet clear 
whether the Modi government is ready to move forward on the LSA, CISMOA, 
and BECA�
Given that the United States is seeking new partners to provide international 
public goods in the Indo-Pacific, one would expect India to take its constabu-
lary role in the Indo-Pacific more seriously� However, in 2012, Admiral Nirmal 
Verma, then the naval chief, categorically rejected any deployment of warships in 
the Pacific: “At this point of time, Pacific and South China Sea are of concern to 
the global community, but in terms of any active deployment from our side, it is 
not on the cards�”83 At the same time, he expressed concern that the Indian Navy 
could do much more in the Indian Ocean region than it was being allowed to� 
According to the Indian Navy, in the last five years thirty-six of its combat vessels 
have been involved in supporting maritime security in the IOR, an average of 
six to seven vessels a year� Given the volume of trade involved and the vast geo-
graphical extent of India’s maritime interests, this is clearly not sufficient� Also, 
the “deployment of warships in Gulf of Aden by various navies is not entirely 
for anti-piracy operations”; it is helpful also for, as an Indian naval commander 
points out, gaining “experience in out of area deployment,” developing “joint-
manship,” and the most vital of all, increasing the “visibility of the Indian Navy�”84 
In the last decade the Indian Navy’s real show of strength in the Indian Ocean 
was in antipiracy operations in Somali waters in the summer of 2008� Since then 
it has maintained a continuous presence in the western Indian Ocean and has 
effectively dealt with specific pirate threats on multiple occasions�85
However, India remains reluctant to participate in Combined Task Force 151, 
an initiative led by the United States, mainly because Pakistan is also a part of 
it� The Indian Navy, just like those of China and Russia, prefers independent 
antipiracy operations, or “national escort missions,” though it does coordinate 
with other navies�86 Also, the navy’s deployment in the western Indian Ocean 
took place only after a prolonged and bitter debate between the service and the 
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)�87 The issue was the legality of unilateral In-
dian deployment of force in international waters� As of now, piracy is not a crime 
under the Indian Penal Code (IPC)� Prosecution of captured pirates, therefore, 
cannot be taken to its logical ends� However, there is a bigger problem for Indian 
Navy operations in international waters� According to the Parliamentary Stand-
ing Committee Report on Anti-Piracy Law, another “limitation of the IPC is that 
the piratical acts by a foreigner committed outside territorial waters of India do 
not constitute an offence under the IPC�”88 
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This clearly limits the Indian Navy’s case for antipiracy operations in inter-
national waters� The navy considers that law should be an important enabler 
in its efforts to curb piracy in the region� “A strong law is definitely needed to 
avoid ambiguities that exist,” opines a senior naval officer who has commanded 
warships in the Gulf of Aden�89 The MEA proposed such a bill in June 2012 but 
immediately ran into controversy, because the ministry had not consulted the 
states over its implementation and operationalization� As a result, the bill is still 
pending in the Indian Parliament�90 
The legal issue must be juxtaposed to India’s historical ambivalence toward 
the use of force internationally� Traditionally, India has refrained from unilateral 
use of force outside its territorial jurisdiction and has been comfortable only in 
United Nations–mandated multilateral security operations� Such reluctance even 
when the UN Security Council has authorized individual states to combat piracy 
suggests deep-seated ideological resistance�91 It also reflects on India’s hesitant 
attitude toward power projection� Given these realities, “ad hocism” pervades 
India’s constabulary role in the Indian Ocean� 
As a consequence, the Indian Navy has found it difficult to take full advantage 
of the new strategic opportunities presented by the U�S� pivot toward the Asia-
Pacific� The next section explores the larger political context within India that has 
prevented the Indian Navy from exploiting the potentials presented to it by the 
changing strategic realities in the region� 
POWER TRANSITION, UNCERTAINTY, AND STRATEGIC HEDGING
Notwithstanding expectations in Washington, Delhi has been a reluctant sup-
porter of the American pivot� Indian official response indicates a preference for 
hedging—India would not like to choose sides in this great game, at least before 
the dust settles, allowing it to make informed choices� Former prime minister 
Manmohan Singh has underscored uncertainty as the driving force behind India’s 
reluctance to participate enthusiastically in the American designs, arguing, “If 
you survey the global strategic environment over the past decade, it would not es-
cape your notice that, just as the economic pendulum is shifting inexorably from 
west to east, so is the strategic focus, as exemplified by the increasing contestation 
in the seas to our east and the related pivot or ‘rebalancing’ by the United States 
in this area� This to my mind is a development fraught with uncertainty.”92 Simi-
lar anxieties were expressed by the prime minister’s special envoy to the United 
States, Ambassador Shyam Saran, back in February 2009� Commenting on a 
future “fraught with deep uncertainty” due to the ongoing transitions of power 
in Asia, Saran prescribed a policy of hedging vis-à-vis the battle between the two 
great powers, the United States and China�93 Some in the military have argued 
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similarly that a “balanced and interest based cooperation with both [the United 
States and China]” allows India “to reduce the risk of over-investing in any of the 
great powers�”94 This early emphasis on hedging is instructive, inasmuch as India 
and the United States during the presidency of George W� Bush were openly talk-
ing of a strategic partnership, shaped partly by China’s growing influence� The 
Indo-U�S� civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, the high-water mark of this 
strategic partnership, had just been signed in 2008�
Compared with the Bush era, Indian-U�S� strategic partnership has lost some 
momentum under the Obama administration� As a senator, Obama opposed the 
civilian nuclear agreement� As president, in formulating his Afghanistan policy, 
he tried to “rehyphenate” India and Pakistan, by bringing Kashmir back onto the 
Indo-U�S� bilateral agenda, which drew a good deal of criticism from New Delhi�95 
But it was Obama’s idea of a G-2 (a condominium of China and the United States 
to manage Asia) that was most heavily contested in New Delhi�96 In the early 
days of the first Obama administration senior American officials reportedly told 
their Indian counterparts that the United States “was not doing balance of power 
in Asia anymore�”97 This view was seen as in strong contrast to the Bush admin-
istration’s more geopolitical approach, and it created a flutter in Indian strategic 
circles, bringing back the memory of American ignorance of Indian concerns 
that had been the case during the first term of the Clinton presidency� Of course, 
within two years, the Obama administration’s policy shifted in response to grow-
ing Chinese assertiveness, and the president declared the rebalancing strategy� 
However, the damage had already been done—at least in perceptions� Hedging 
made inroads in the Indian mind-set mainly as a result of the Obama administra-
tion’s initial strategy of accommodation vis-à-vis China� In the looming maritime 
competition between India and China, the United States sought to play the role of 
a distant “sea-based balancer” and “honest broker�” In reaction, India was forced 
to recalibrate its own position� Reacting to the new stream of thinking in Ameri-
can strategic circles, India’s then national security adviser, Shiv Shankar Menon, 
explicitly rejected the proposition that India would balance China on America’s 
behalf: “Is it likely that two emerging states like India and China, with old tradi-
tions of state-craft, would allow themselves to remain the objects of someone 
else’s policy, no matter how elegantly expressed? I think not�”98 India also seemed 
to be recalibrating its activism in securing the Indian Ocean� Its unwillingness 
to assume alone the mantle of maritime security was evident in the words of 
Ambassador Nirupama Rao: “While India is seen as a net security provider, we 
cannot carry the burden of regional security on our shoulders alone�”99 If some in 
New Delhi saw American retrenchment as an extra burden on India, others were 
deeply skeptical about whether the United States could sustain its commitment in 
the region, given its dire fiscal state� Reliance on American primacy for ensuring 
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regional stability appeared to be “an inherently problematic proposition because 
it relies on U�S� military power which is not only getting thinner on the ground, 
but no longer has the necessary economic underpinning�”100
Obama’s initial policy inclination to retrench from Asia and cede the tradi-
tional American sphere of influence to Beijing created a sense of vulnerability 
in India� This vulnerability was accentuated by the fact that a rising India had 
been used to American primacy� It was ready to take advantage of America’s 
global leadership, but it was not yet prepared to assume any responsibilities of its 
own� The uncertainty regarding U�S� intentions in the Asia-Pacific and its own 
vulnerability in the face of American decline therefore largely determined India’s 
lukewarm response to the pivot� Even as successive policy statements by Ameri-
can officials and government agencies have prodded it to play a bigger role in the 
pivot and rebalancing, India has tried to distance itself from the more threatening 
military connotations of U�S� strategy� 
There are some domestic factors as well behind India’s cautious approach� New 
Delhi remains conscious of the fact that any unilateral naval deployment might 
provoke reactions from other regional actors� As has been noted, the Indian Navy’s 
only show of strength in the IOR was in Somali waters in 2008, and its two major 
tasks in the Indo-Pacific, supporting security for the littoral states and the global 
commons, have been pursued only on an ad hoc basis�101 India’s preference is for 
a concert of power in the region, one in which the United States would be just one 
among several major actors ensuring collective security in Asian waters�102 This 
view, however, clearly discounts the fact that a major military transformation is 
under way in Asia, one that is fundamentally threatening, in that there exist real 
conflicts among principal participants and uncertainty about their intentions� 
Another problem may be the difficulty for India of abandoning its habit of free-
riding on U�S� guarantees and assuming the weight of securing the Indian Ocean 
highway from inimical forces�103 Lastly, India’s economic growth has stagnated 
in the last couple of years, as is evident in the decrease in percentage growth of 
India’s defense budgets� In November 2013, the prime minister warned India’s top 
military commanders of an impending resource crunch�104 Capital investment in 
military modernization may be the first casualty of the decrease in the growth 
of India’s gross domestic product� Whereas rapid economic growth fueled India’s 
naval expansion, it is possible that economic reversals may put limits on it� They 
may direct India inward to the immediate confines of the Indian Ocean� All these 
factors together have made it difficult for Delhi to assume a more prominent role 
in the unfolding American foreign-policy posture of strategic rebalancing� 
However, the coming into office of the Modi government has raised expec-
tations that New Delhi may alter course� Though Modi’s reading of the future 
Asian strategic landscape is also underlined by a sense of uncertainty, he seems 
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more willing than his predecessor to take responsibility in shaping the regional 
balance of power� This was underscored by his comments in Japan that “greater 
uncertainty” in Asia only brings “greater responsibility for Japan and India�”105 
He has also been unequivocal about China’s growing assertiveness in Asian wa-
ters, emphasizing prevalent tensions in the Indo-Pacific and warning that states 
should not pursue “expansionist” policies�106 With the 2005 defense cooperation 
agreement having been extended for another ten years, military-to-military ties 
between the United States and India are likely to prosper further� Yet change will 
not be drastic� The trust deficit accumulated over the last several years between 
the United States and India will take great investment and time from both sides 
to overcome� Moreover, lack of clear focus on the Indo-Pacific as Washington 
continues to struggle to come to terms with multiple crises in the Middle East and 
Europe will only encourage India to hedge its bets for the foreseeable future, even 
as the geostrategic flux in the region is likely to shape its foreign policy choices 
in unprecedented ways�
SITTING ON THE SIDELINES 
The U�S� policy of a pivot to the Asia-Pacific requires a strategic partnership with 
India to maintain a healthy balance of power in maritime Asia� Yet though the 
Indian Navy has been constantly seeking a bigger role in the region, it appears 
reluctant to increase its coordination with U�S� forces in the Indian Ocean and 
beyond� This lack of enthusiasm arises from India’s hedging strategy� India does 
not want to be seen as allied with the United States� Instead, it wants to sit on the 
sidelines while the United States and China slug it out for dominance in the Indo-
Pacific� India felt highly vulnerable when Washington tried to accommodate Bei-
jing at the expense of other, smaller powers in the region between 2009 and 2011� 
The idea of a G-2 has made a strong impression on India’s strategic thought� Even 
now that Washington has committed itself to the pivot, Indian strategic thinkers 
consider a G-2 a possibility that cannot be ignored� Also, the domestic debate in 
India over New Delhi’s role in the pivot is fractured� 
Nevertheless, India may well participate in the U�S� pivot, given strategic cir-
cumstances, if the domestic political context undergoes a change� Meanwhile, 
there are a few things that the United States can do to decrease India’s sense of 
vulnerability and encourage its participation�
First, the United States should provide the Indian Navy technological assis-
tance in such key projects as nuclear propulsion and the design and construc-
tion of aircraft carriers� This could be the new “nuclear deal,” guiding the future 
trajectory of Indian-U�S� relations; it would clearly indicate American resolve 
to help India attain technological sophistication for its defensive prepared-
ness� Indian Navy officials suggest that the force has embarked on an extensive 
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modernization, which presents America with a rare window of opportunity to 
establish a “comprehensive military partnership” by selling India “top of the 
line” defense equipment, complemented by technology transfers� If it does not, 
Russia would love to fill the gap� Given the fact that the shelf life of contempo-
rary procurements is at least twenty or thirty years, Indian-Russian dependence 
would continue, as was the case during the Cold War�107 American technologi-
cal assistance, on the other hand, would strengthen the hands of those in New 
Delhi who are proposing closer defense engagement with the United States, while 
underscoring America’s commitment to India’s rise as a major regional-security 
provider� Also, Washington should appreciate that a potent Indian Navy would be 
an important lobbying force behind a gradual expansion of India’s constabulary 
activity in the IOR� It would also prod the navy to expand its strategic reach to the 
western Pacific, signaling a shift in the balance of power to Beijing� If the pivot 
is meant to signal the same thing, technological assistance should guide the U�S� 
and Indian Navies’ relations in the Indo-Pacific�
Second, Washington must be consistent in signaling its commitment and strat-
egy with respect to the IOR� As is evident from the above discussion, Obama’s 
early flirtations with China, followed by a more muscular approach in the form of 
the pivot, created an environment of uncertainty for regional powers� Also, even 
if other pressing issues—such as the perennial crisis in the Middle East or a sud-
den downturn in U�S�-Russian relations—might divert substantial strategic focus 
and resources, Washington should be clear in its commitment to the Asia-Pacific� 
It was America’s strategic uncertainty that motivated New Delhi to hedge� Hedg-
ing may be clever in the short term, but the long-term consequences of China’s 
rise and assertiveness can be arrested only by a clear display of resolve and will 
to balance its military power� Clarity and consistency on the part of the United 
States would help regional powers shed their reluctance to commit themselves to 
a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific� 
For its part, India needs to think carefully about its role as a security provider 
in the Indian Ocean region and beyond� New Delhi’s credibility as a regional 
balancer has already suffered because of its lackadaisical attitude toward power 
projection� If it is serious about its emergence as a regional security provider, 
New Delhi will have to rethink its opposition to the LSA, CISMOA, and BECA, 
in order to enhance its practical cooperation with the U�S� Navy� There is also an 
urgent need for a law that would provide strong support to Indian intervention 
in international waters to combat piracy� Some in India want to wait for a “grand 
bargain” in which India would become a security provider in the IOR only if the 
United States assumed significant costs in terms of policies on China, Pakistan, 
and technology transfer� If that is indeed attempted, New Delhi would be disap-
pointed, as not even a Republican administration would be in a position to deliver�
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The larger conundrum remains unresolved: Will India see in the changing 
regional environment sufficient cause to begin to act in the IOR of its own voli-
tion? Or will India step in only because the Americans want it to, hoping to ex-
tract concessions in return? Even as Washington and New Delhi try to work this 
out, they need to acknowledge that they share strategic objectives in the larger 
Indo-Pacific and should not let their historical baggage override the imperatives 
of the future� 
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 On 3 September 2014, almost six years since Chinese warships first entered the Gulf of Aden to fulfill antipiracy duties, China Central Television 
(CCTV)–8 aired the first episode of “In the Gulf of Aden” (舰在亚丁湾)�1 The 
multidozen-episode program, designed to “ignite raging patriotism” (燃起熊
熊爱国心), given evening prime-time status, and attracting a popular audi-
ence with a star-studded cast, explores in dramatic fashion Beijing’s experience 
fighting modern piracy� Produced by the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Political Depart-
ment’s Television Art Center (海军政治部电视艺
术中心) over three years, the series offers a unique 
window into how the PLAN has conducted its 
antipiracy mission and seeks to portray its experi-
ence to a Chinese audience�
In the first episode’s action-packed begin-
ning, PLAN Vessel 168 deploys special forces by 
helicopter to repel Somali pirates boarding the 
crippled China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company 
vessel Zhanshan� Meanwhile, Electro-Mechanical 
Branch squad leader Sun Weimin helps fix the 
ship’s stalled engine, enabling it to rejoin the es-
cort formation�2 Political commissar Xiao Weiguo 
subsequently grants Sun a twenty-minute phone 
call home—twice his previous allocation� Later 
episodes intersperse the glories of Gulf of Aden 
operations with the privations of being away from 
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families, who are separated from service members by thousands of miles and 
by limitations in information transmission�3 Gripping scenes portray PLAN 
personnel constantly checking food quality, averting phytosanitary disaster by 
switching in-port suppliers, refueling under way, weathering storms, exercising 
with foreign navies and receiving their officers aboard, adjusting plans rapidly to 
handle unexpected challenges, using special weapons and techniques to dispel 
pirates nonlethally, saving wounded merchant seamen with emergency medical 
treatment, and receiving gratitude from domestic and foreign ships they protect�
While some aspects of helicopter operations, weapons firing, and special 
forces engagement with pirates appear embellished for cinematic effect, the series 
uses real PLAN personnel and PLAN and civilian ships�4 Many details match 
realistic documentation in China’s state and military media� Human experiences 
are personified uniquely—as when a PLAN marine, Fang Xiaoba, pays respects 
at the grave of his father, who died rendering medical assistance in Tanzania—but 
collectively represent actual struggles and triumphs of sailors and families� A few 
scenarios exceed actual events to date� Most prominently, on a small forested 
island off Somalia, Team Leader Mao Dahua leads his special forces in a sixteen-
hour battle replete with exchanges of fire to evacuate thirteen Taiwanese fisher-
men cornered by pirates�5 Yet such heroics are not utterly fanciful and might well 
foreshadow future PLAN operations� 
Beyond simply serving as a blockbuster image engaging domestic dreams of a 
strong military, however, since 2008 China’s antipiracy escorts have provided im-
portant soft-power benefits for Beijing on a truly international stage� For the first 
time in its modern history China has deployed naval forces operationally beyond 
its immediate maritime periphery for extended durations, to protect merchant 
vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden� Over a six-year span beginning in De-
cember 2008, China has contributed over ten thousand navy personnel in nearly 
twenty task forces� In nearly eight hundred groups, these forces have escorted 
over six thousand Chinese and foreign commercial vessels and have “protected 
and helped over 60” of them�6 As the PLAN’s commander, Admiral Wu Shengli, 
informed one of the authors, the mission has achieved “two ‘100 percents’ [两个
百分之百]: providing 100 percent security to all ships under escort, while ensur-
ing PLAN forces’ own security 100 percent�”7
Although it is uncertain how many task forces will be deployed and for how 
long, China’s presence in the Gulf of Aden has extended through 2014, and the 
PLAN appears almost certain to continue efforts through 2015;8 it will likely 
persist for still longer if the United Nations further extends its mandate for na-
vies to fight piracy off Somalia�9 The probability of this is arguably even higher 
following the announcement in late 2014 that East Asian rival Japan’s Maritime 
Self-Defense Force will soon take command of a major international antipiracy 
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coalition� While Admiral Wu acknowledges that new piracy challenges have 
emerged in the Gulf of Guinea, “a concerning trend for all world navies,” he nev-
ertheless maintains, “As long as Gulf of Aden pirate activities continue, so too will 
the escort missions of international navies�” Six years ago, under United Nations 
authorization, China began to dispatch antipiracy task forces to the Gulf of Aden� 
At the beginning, China planned for only one year of antipiracy operations� This 
period was then extended for another year, and another, and so on� “So far,” Wu 
declared, “there is no end in sight for the mission�”10
China’s naval antipiracy mission represents an unprecedented instance of 
conduct by the PLAN of sustained long-distance operations� It provides a rare 
window through which outside observers can see how the naval component of 
China’s “going out” strategy transects economic, political, and strategic dimen-
sions� While many of China’s other maritime activities damage its international 
image, antipiracy operations in the far seas project soft power and a constructive 
image� Likely in part because of this positive publicity potential, Beijing has dis-
tributed copious details on its antipiracy operations via official media, including 
in English�11
The Chinese navy’s antipiracy missions provide much-needed support for 
Chinese overseas interests� But the PLAN has also crafted its antipiracy missions 
to portray blue-water operations positively abroad� Increasingly, the PLAN’s 
antipiracy mandate is oriented toward broader international security objectives� 
Commercial escort statistics exemplify this trend: initially China’s navy was only 
allowed to escort Chinese-flagged ships through the Gulf of Aden, but now in 
some cases over 70 percent of ships in given Chinese escort flotillas have been 
foreign flagged� Similarly, to secure the maritime commons Chinese command-
ing officers and sailors serving off Somalia have worked increasingly in the 
framework of bilateral exchanges with other navies as well as in multistakeholder 
settings� 
This article explores the soft-power dimension of China’s far-seas antipiracy 
operations� It addresses the extent to which Gulf of Aden deployments might 
increase the PLAN’s prospects for cooperation with other navies and also the 
impact of these missions on the role the navy plays within China’s larger diplo-
macy� Finally, it assesses how these deployments might shape future Chinese 
naval development� 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A sharp increase in piracy attacks off Somalia threatened to interfere with 
China’s foreign trade� Several well-publicized pirate attacks prior to the PLAN’s 
antipiracy deployment in 2008 demonstrated Chinese vulnerability� Tianyu 8, a 
fishing boat with twenty-four crewmen; the Chinese tanker Zhenhua 4; and the 
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Sinotrans-owned cargo ship Dajian—as well as two Hong Kong–registered ships, 
Stolt Valor and Delight—were all pirated prior to the PLAN’s deployment�12 Over 
1,200 Chinese merchant vessels transited the Gulf of Aden during the first eleven 
months of 2008, and of this number eighty-three were attacked by pirate groups� 
Direct threats to China’s economic interests and citizens abroad were thus impor-
tant drivers of the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment�
As the PLAN’s initial deployment prepared to set sail in December 2008, 
Senior Colonel Huang Xueping, Ministry of National Defense secondary spokes-
man and deputy director of the ministry’s Information Office, convened a news 
conference in which he clarified the points that, first, the mission’s primary 
objective was to protect Chinese shipping interests, and that, second, it did not 
represent a change in Chinese foreign policy or a desire to project greater blue-
water naval capabilities�13 Idealistic and realistic interpretations of China’s antipi-
racy operations differ greatly� The former focuses on China’s desire to contribute 
meaningfully to regional and international security, while the latter includes a 
“desire to protect Chinese shipping, expand China’s influence, and to provide 
opportunities for realistic training that will enhance the PLAN’s capabilities in 
military operations other than war�”14 
In line with the realists, economic interests in the Gulf of Aden had perhaps 
the greatest impact on pragmatic Chinese policy makers� As Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Liu Jianchao explains, “Piracy has become a serious threat to ship-
ping, trade and safety on the seas� � � � That’s why we decided to send naval ships 
to crack down�”15 China’s overseas maritime trade is highly dependent on vulner-
able sea lines of communication (SLOCs), such as the Bab el Mandeb, Strait of 
Hormuz, Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Singapore, and South China 
Sea� China currently relies on just five SLOCs for roughly 90 percent of its over-
seas trade� In particular, approximately 60 percent of all commercial vessels that 
transit through the Strait of Malacca are Chinese flagged�16 
For China, therefore, the economic benefits of protecting its international 
trade are abundantly clear� China’s leadership continues to emphasize the PLAN’s 
imperative to secure Chinese overseas maritime interests� Specifically, energy 
supplies transported via international SLOCs will constitute a larger percentage 
of China’s aggregate energy consumption� Having become a net oil importer in 
1993, for example, China now relies on seaborne oil imports for over 40 percent 
of its oil consumption�17 China’s oil import dependence will rise substantially 
between now and 2030, by some estimates to as high as 80 percent�18 
Oil and other energy imports constitute just one of many sectors in China that 
face growing dependence on the sea� China Daily reported that as early as 2006, 
maritime industries accounted for $270 billion in economic output, nearly 10 
percent of China’s gross domestic product�19 In 2009, over 260 companies, across 
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various industries, reportedly engaged in international maritime shipping�20 
In 2010 it was reported that each year over two thousand Chinese commercial 
vessels were transiting the Gulf of Aden�21 In 2011, more than two years after 
the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment, a professor at China’s National Defense 
University observed, “From the current situation, ocean lifelines have already 
become a soft rib in China’s strategic security�”22
China’s growth as a sea power has been rapid� It currently has more seafarers, 
deep-sea fleets, and ocean fishing vessels than any other nation� It has become, 
in the words of Ju Chengzhi, of the Ministry of Transport, a “great maritime 
shipping power” (海运大国)� In 2009 China’s merchant maritime fleet report-
edly consisted of over 3,300 vessels and forty thousand crewmen�23 People’s Daily 
reported in 2011 that China surpassed South Korea as the world’s largest ship-
builder in terms of capacity and new orders�24 China’s maritime responsibilities 
are huge, since it has thirty-two thousand kilometers of coastline and claims over 
three million square kilometers of offshore waters�25 
Public awareness of the importance of maritime issues is increasing� In 2008, 
two Chinese media outlets reported separate public surveys in which 86 percent 
and 91 percent of Chinese citizens polled supported the PLAN’s antipiracy de-
ployment�26 Simultaneously, many Chinese “netizens” (frequent Internet users) 
criticized their government for its inability to ensure Chinese sailors’ safety�27 
Domestically, in the period before deployments began Beijing thus faced strong 
political incentives to intervene decisively to protect its shipping� 
These political concerns at home paralleled international expectations� Such 
deployments, it was predicted, would enhance China’s image as a “responsible 
stakeholder” in international society, particularly in the domain of maritime 
security�28 In the years since, China’s antipiracy operations have already aided the 
PLAN substantially in developing its blue-water capacity� 
MILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND BLUE-WATER ASPIRATIONS
Beijing’s deployment of PLAN antipiracy forces appears to be spurring on Chi-
nese military development� As the Chinese newspaper Global Times puts it, over 
five years of deployments to the Gulf of Aden have transformed PLAN antipiracy 
forces from “maritime rookies to confident sea dogs�”29 Since China has not fought 
an actual war since its 1979 conflict with Vietnam, this experience of maintaining 
multiyear, distant deployments of warships is extremely valuable�30 It has brought 
PLAN vessels into what previously were—for China—literally uncharted waters� 
China’s Navy Press has had to perform “nautical chart support tasks” for the Gulf 
of Aden missions�31 In 2011, a PLAN senior captain effectively summarized the 
multidimensional benefits of distant sea antipiracy operations: “The experience 
definitely would be unprecedented not only for officers and sailors, but also for 
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the durability and function of the ships�”32 Some of the PLAN’s most advanced 
ships and personnel have gained valuable experience in the Gulf of Aden, and 
officers serving with distinction there have enjoyed subsequent promotions�33
Furthermore, antipiracy operations have positioned the PLAN as China’s most 
active service� By proving its effectiveness against threats to Chinese overseas 
interests, the PLAN has ensured that it will continue to procure some of the mili-
tary’s newest and best technology�34 More broadly, the persistent threat of piracy 
in international waters has enabled China to expand its far-seas security opera-
tions under the umbrella of benign international cooperation�35 
Close analysis of PLAN antipiracy activities reveals four primary conduits for 
projecting soft power: the escort of commercial ships and other direct opera-
tional aspects of PLAN antipiracy missions; navy-to-navy meetings, combined 
training, and other exchanges and instances of cooperation with foreign navies; 
participation in multistakeholder dialogues on land and at sea related to interna-
tional antipiracy operations; and, perhaps most significantly, a growing number 
of port visits conducted by PLAN warships for replenishment and diplomatic 
purposes before, during, and after service in the Gulf of Aden� Exploiting these 
channels has positioned the PLAN as an important and highly visible player in 
China’s comprehensive quest for international soft power� 
Antipiracy services provided by the PLAN to commercial ships have primar-
ily included area patrols, escorts, and on-ship protection�36 Wang Yongxiang, 
deputy commander of the tenth escort task force, explains that specific tactics 
depend on multiple idiosyncratic factors: “the schedules of the merchant vessels 
to be escorted, their characteristics, and how well our warships have rested� We 
want to not only ensure the safety of our charges, but also improve the efficiency 
of escort protection�”37 Area patrol—monitoring certain maritime zones in and 
around the Gulf of Aden—is the approach least employed by the PLAN� When 
China’s navy does engage in area patrols, it typically maintains two base points 
550–600 nautical miles apart—for example, one a hundred nautical miles north 
of Yemen’s Socotra Island and the other seventy-five nautical miles southwest of 
Aden Harbor�38 On a normal mission PLAN vessels travel between these points, 
typically taking two to three days to do so�39 
Of all the services provided by China’s antipiracy forces, the escort of civilian 
ships is the most common; it has become a daily practice for PLAN task forces in 
the Gulf of Aden� Task forces consist of two warships, usually a combination of 
destroyers and frigates� They are typically accompanied by either a replenishment 
or landing ship� However, since the first task force, two or more warships concur-
rently stationed in the Gulf of Aden have led separate flotillas of merchant ships, 
sometimes in opposite directions, through an area west of longitude fifty-seven 
east and south of latitude fifteen north�40
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PLAN escort efficiency has improved significantly since 2008� As a 2010 Lib-
eration Army Daily article states, “From the first escort to the escort of the 1,000th 
ship the Chinese naval task force used over 300 days, from the 1,000th to the 
2,000th ship used over 220 days, and from the 2,000th to the 3,000th ship only 
used over 180 days’ time�”41 As early as 2011, approximately 70 percent of ships 
escorted by China’s navy at any given time were foreign�42 In terms of aggregate 
escorts over the first four years, roughly 50 percent of PLAN-escorted commer-
cial vessels were foreign flagged�43 People’s Navy reported in mid-2011 that China 
had provided escort services to ships from over fifty foreign countries, and this 
figure has likely increased over the past three-plus years�44 People’s Daily empha-
sizes that escort services are provided gratis for Chinese and foreign commercial 
ships�45 That is, PLAN escort services are being provided as a complimentary 
public good to the international community� 
Foreign civilian ships can apply online to join a PLAN escort convoy via the 
China Shipowners’ Association website� Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general 
of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, has asserted, “China 
shoulders responsibility for foreign vessels based on growing national strength 
and a friendly policy”; many other states do not send escort forces, because of 
limited interest and the enormous costs� In Zhai’s opinion, “such international 
cooperation and exchanges also help the rest of the world to know more about 
China and accept it�”46 
Given the international context in which China’s antipiracy operations take 
place, the PLAN has taken steps to professionalize its services� For example, the 
use of the English language is important while conducting international opera-
tions; the twelfth task force had an on-duty translator on board the frigate Yiyang 
to liaise with foreign naval and merchant counterparts�47 Each PLAN task-force 
member receives four “pocket books” covering the psychological aspects of de-
ployment, security, international law, and the application of international law to 
military operations� Also, naval officers specializing in international law provide 
full-time legal support to officers and crews in meetings with ships of other na-
tions�48 These efforts have assisted China’s internavy exchanges�
INTERNAVY EXCHANGES AND DIALOGUES AT SEA
Chinese and international commentators greatly value the unprecedented ex-
posure of PLAN vessels and crews to foreign navies�49 Rear Admiral Michael 
McDevitt, USN (Ret�), articulates the historical significance of the PLAN’s de-
ployments in this way: “In terms of international engagement, the first de cade of 
the 21st century should be divided into a pre–anti-piracy operations period and 
a post-anti-piracy period, because once the PLAN began to conduct anti-piracy 
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operations, the entire nature of its approach to international naval engagement 
changed appreciably�”50 
The missions have had an undeniable impact on Chinese naval diplomacy; 
interaction with foreign navies that was novel in 2008 is now routine in the Gulf 
of Aden and adjacent waterways� In just a few of countless examples, in 2011 Han 
Xiaohu, commander of China’s eighth escort task force, visited in March the flag-
ship, a frigate, of NATO’s Operation OPEN SHIELD; in May, hosted the Singapore 
navy’s Rear Admiral Harris Chan, then commander of U�S�-led Combined Task 
Force (CTF) 151, on a PLAN warship; and in June hosted the European Union 
Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) commander on board the frigate Wenzhou�51 The 
PLAN and Singapore navy conducted bilateral exchanges in September 2010 
in the Gulf of Aden, sending personnel on board each other’s ships�52 A similar 
exchange occurred in those waters in June 2014�53 China’s navy conducted ad-
ditional exchanges with CTF-151 in July 2012 and with NATO in April and July 
2012�54 An article in People’s Daily stated in 2012 that Chinese naval escort task 
forces continue to inform the outside world about the “activities of suspicious 
ships through network mailbox and radio station every day and shared informa-
tion resources with 50-odd warships of 20-plus countries and organizations�”55 In 
July 2014, the PLAN’s seventeenth escort task force conducted the VENUS NO� 2 
joint antipiracy exercise with EU Combined Task Force 465 in the western Gulf of 
Aden� The guided-missile destroyer Changchun, the comprehensive supply ship 
Chaohu, and a Z-9 shipborne helicopter participated in task-force maneuvering, 
maritime replenishment, flashing-light signaling, and main gun antiship firing 
drills�56
China’s naval diplomacy in the region goes well beyond shipboard interactions 
with Western antipiracy forces� For example, PLAN task forces off the Horn of 
Africa have also been active in a variety of bilateral exchanges� The PLAN and 
the Russian navy executed joint antipiracy escorts for the first time in October 
2009, during the PEACE BLUE SHIELD 2009 (平蓝盾—2009) exercise�57 Similarly, 
China’s navy held extensive joint exercises with Russian navy BLUE SHIELD units 
in May 2011 and conducted similar antipiracy joint exercises in both 2012 and 
2013�58 Amid comprehensive Sino-Russian joint maritime exercises in 2012, Chi-
nese and Russian naval forces performed extensive piracy-deterrence and rescue 
joint training off the coast of Qingdao�59 
The Chinese navy is not interacting only with large navies� During November 
2009, PLAN military officials met with Dutch counterparts to perform on-ship 
inspections and exchanges, and during 2010 PLAN forces collaborated with 
South Korean naval units in antipiracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden�60 In 2012, 
China and South Korea conducted joint antipiracy exercises in which helicop-
ters of the two sides landed on each other’s warships for the first time�61 In April 
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2011, China’s eighth escort task force sent Wenzhou and Qiandaohu to conduct 
joint antipiracy exercises with the Pakistani guided-missile destroyer Khyber�62 
These combined drills followed the Pakistani-hosted PEACE 11 multinational 
maritime exercises, which included naval ships from, among other states, China, 
the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Pakistan� China sent guided-missile 
frigates Wenzhou and Ma’anshan, two helicopters, and seventy special forces 
commandos�63 More recently the PLAN conducted joint antipiracy training with 
the Ukrainian navy in the Gulf of Aden� All of these efforts support China’s grow-
ing naval diplomacy�
CHINESE NAVAL DIPLOMACY
At-sea engagements with other navies are crucial for establishing a positive image 
of China’s growing global maritime presence� These engagements are comple-
mented by a growing focus by the PLAN on establishing effective relationships 
with littoral states in and adjacent to the Indian Ocean region� Indeed, since 
2008 the nature and scope of Chinese naval visits have expanded continuously� 
Growing port calls bolster China’s far-seas soft-power projection by facilitating 
interaction and dialogue between China and the many countries whose ports and 
geographic locations heighten the strategic value of these relationships� 
The PLAN is increasing port visits (see the table) as its far-seas antipiracy 
presence matures� A small sample reveals the dynamism with which the PLAN 
is engaging the navies, governments, and citizens of littoral states in connec-
tion with its antipiracy missions� For example, during September 2012, Yiyang 
of the twelfth escort task force arrived in Karachi for a second cycle of rest and 
replenishment, during which it held seminars and other exchanges with Pakistani 
naval counterparts�64 Later that year Rear Admiral Zhou Xuming and members 
from the twelfth escort task force met with Commodore Jonathan Mead, acting 
commander of the Australian Fleet, in Sydney on an official visit� The Australian 
chief of navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, remarked, “I welcome the continued op-
portunity for our navies to share their experiences today as we exchange lessons 
learned in the conduct of counter-piracy operations�”65 More recently, in late 2013 
the fifteenth escort task force, in addition to holding friendly exchanges with 
fleets from the EU, United States, and NATO, docked for friendly visits in Tanza-
nia, Kenya, and Sri Lanka�66 The sixteenth task force conducted antipiracy duties 
and dispatched the guided-missile frigate Yancheng to escort Syrian chemical 
weapons to their destruction;67 it then “paid consecutive visits to eight African 
countries for the first time�”68 It conducted antipiracy exercises with the navies of 
several of those countries, including Cameroon, Namibia, and Nigeria�69
Clearly, uninterrupted operations in the Gulf of Aden have helped to facilitate 
PLAN maritime engagement with other countries in the vicinity as well as those 
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strategically situated on the route from China to Somali waters� China has ef-
fectively increased the role of naval diplomacy as a component of its antipiracy 
deployments in a number of world regions� People’s Daily reports that “since 
the 2nd Chinese naval escort task force, the Chinese navy has established a new 
mechanism of organizing escort warships to pay friendly visits to foreign coun-
tries, and the Chinese naval escort task forces have successfully paid friendly vis-
its to more than 20 countries, such as India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and Singapore�”70 
Whereas in all of 2009, PLAN task forces berthed in foreign ports in just 
five states, Chinese antipiracy flotillas have, among them, stopped in over ten 
countries every year since 2010� Moreover, the nature of port calls has evolved 
dramatically during the past six years� In 2009 and 2010 most Chinese port calls 
were conducted for replenishment, rest, and relaxation� But by 2012 Chinese 
antipiracy escort task forces had begun making several port calls for friendly 
visits (i�e�, goodwill exchanges with diplomatic elements) before, during, and 
after their service in the Gulf of Aden� This trend has continued over the last two 
years and demonstrates a growing share of Chinese naval resources devoted to 
diplomacy� More importantly, it illustrates the efficiency with which the PLAN 
is deriving soft-power capital from its contributions to international maritime 
nontraditional security�
China has also bolstered international exchanges by hosting foreign navies at 
Chinese ports and cities� In mid-May 2011 China invited twenty representatives 
from eight African nations, including Algeria, Cameroon, and Gabon, to partici-
pate in a twenty-day maritime law enforcement program in Zhejiang Province�71 
At the first International Symposium on Counter-Piracy and Escort Coopera-
tion, in February 2012 at the PLAN Command College in Nanjing, Navy Military 
Studies Research Institute senior researcher Cai Weidong stated, “The Chinese 
navy hopes to build up a platform for international cooperation that will allow 
naval forces of different countries to familiarize themselves with each other� I 
hope the platform well serves our antipiracy goals�”72 
As these examples illustrate, China has derived incrementally greater soft-
power benefits from its antipiracy operations by boosting the number of both 
midmission port calls and goodwill visits en route home� Chinese scholar Wang 
Yizhou has called for a higher degree of “creative involvement,” a foreign policy 
concept that identifies and adapts creative and flexible modes of foreign engage-
ment on a case-by-case basis�73 The PLAN seems to be applying Wang’s concept 
in the far seas, perhaps most notably through its antipiracy operations, without 
changing their fundamental form� Adding more stops before and after antipiracy 
service in the Gulf of Aden has allowed the PLAN to accumulate larger soft-power 
gains� This practice reflects the PLAN’s greatest lesson from far-seas antipiracy 
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 ALGERIA
Algiers
• 2–5 April 2013, friendly visit
AUSTRALIA
Sydney
• 18–22 December 2012, friendly 
visit
BAHRAIN
Manama
• 9–13 December 2010, friendly 
visit
BULGARIA
Varna
• 6–10 August 2012, friendly visit
BURMA
Rangoon
• 29 August–2 September 2010, 
friendly visit
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti 
• 24 January 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 3 May 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 13 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 22 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 24 December 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 21 February 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 5 October 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 24–29 March 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 14 May 2012, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 13–18 August 2012, replenish/
overhaul 
• 1–6 December 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 6–8 June 2013, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 28 July 2013, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 7–9 October 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 22–26 February 2014,  
replenish/overhaul
• 1–5 April 2014, replenish/ 
overhaul and friendly visit
EGYPT
Alexandria
• 26–30 July 2010, friendly visit
FRANCE
Toulon
• 23–27 April 2013, friendly visit
GREECE
Crete
• 7 March 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
Piraeus
• 9–13 August 2013, friendly visit
INDIA
Cochin
• 8 August 2009, friendly visit
ISRAEL
Haifa
• 14–17 August 2012, friendly visit
ITALY
Taranto
• 2–7 August 2010, joint drills and 
friendly visit
KENYA
Mombasa
• 2–5 January 2014, friendly 
visit 
KUWAIT
Shuwaikh
• 27 November–1 December 2011, 
friendly visit
MALAYSIA
Port Kelang
• 6 December 2009, friendly visit
MALTA
• 26–30 March 2013, friendly visit
MOROCCO
Casablanca
• 9–13 April 2013, friendly visit
MOZAMBIQUE
Maputo
• 29 March–2 April 2012,  
friendly visit
OMAN
Masqat
• 1–8 December 2011, friendly visit
Salalah
• 21 June–1 July 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 14 August 2009, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 2 January 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 1 April 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 8 June 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 10 August 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 8 January 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 19 January 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul 
• 10 April 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 8–11 June 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 23 June 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 7–10 November 2011,  
replenish/overhaul
• 21–24 February 2012,  
replenish/overhaul
• 1–3 July 2012, replenish/ 
overhaul 
• 9 July 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 28–29 March 2013, replenish/
overhaul
PAKISTAN
Karachi
• 5–8 August 2009, joint drills and 
friendly visit
• 7–13 March 2010, joint drills and 
friendly visit
• 13 March 2011, joint drills
• 8 September 2012, replenish/
overhaul
PHILIPPINES
Manila
• 13–17 April 2010, friendly visit
PORTUGAL
Lisbon
• 15–19 April 2013, friendly visit
QATAR
Doha
• 2–7 August 2011, friendly visit
ROMANIA
Constanţa
• 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly 
visit
SELECTED PORT VISITS BY PLAN ANTIPIRACY FORCES
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SAUDI ARABIA
Jidda
• 27 November–1 December 2010, 
friendly visit
• 3 September 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 17 June 2012, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 1–6 January 2013, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 5–28 April 2013, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 14–18 September 2013,  
replenish/overhaul
• 2–6 November 2013,  
replenish/overhaul
SEYCHELLES
Port Victoria
• 14 April 2011, friendly visit
• 16–20 June 2013, friendly visit
SINGAPORE
Changi
• 5–7 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul and joint drills
• 18–20 December 2011, replenish/
overhaul and friendly visit
• 5–10 September 2013, friendly 
visit
SOUTH AFRICA
Durban
• 4–8 April 2011, friendly visit
SRI LANKA
Colombo
• 5–7 January 2010, friendly visit
• 7–12 December 2010, friendly 
visit
Trincomalee
• 13–15 January 2014, friendly visit
TANZANIA
Dar es Salaam
• 26–30 March 2011, joint drills 
and friendly visit
• 29 December 2013–1 January 
2014, friendly visit
THAILAND
Sattahip
• 16–21 August 2011, joint drills 
and friendly visit
• 21–25 April 2012, friendly visit
• 12–16 September 2013, friendly 
visit
TURKEY
Istanbul
• 5–8 August 2012, friendly visit
UKRAINE
Sevastopol
• 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly 
visit
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Abu Dhabi
• 24–28 March 2010, friendly visit
VIETNAM
Ho Chi Minh City
• 13 January 2013, friendly visit
YEMEN
Aden
• 21 February 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 25 April 2009, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 23 July 2009, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 28 September 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 5 February 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 16 May 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 26 July 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 1 October 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
SELECTED PORT VISITS BY PLAN ANTIPIRACY FORCES CONTINUED
missions: there is no substitute for experience, and six years of continuous op-
erations have allowed China gradually to become more effective in securing its 
comprehensive interests through the deployment of antipiracy task forces�74
Arguably even more than foreign port calls, other nontraditional maritime 
security operations facilitated by Beijing’s Gulf of Aden antipiracy presence 
contribute to China’s “blue soft power�” Escort of foreign vessels carrying Syrian 
chemical weapons through the Mediterranean and active participation in search 
and rescue operations during the frantic search for Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 
in early 2014 are just two examples of how the PLAN has leveraged antipiracy 
resources to contribute to international security�75 
Some commentators are less sanguine about China’s attempts to expand its 
maritime relations; it is important to note that there are objections to the no-
tion that China’s antipiracy missions are benign� In that view, self-interested 
economic and security calculations are arguably the largest drivers of the PLAN’s 
deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden, and viewing port visits as diplo-
matic exchanges risks oversimplification, since many states may view them as 
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harbingers of creeping Chinese power projection�76 For example, the tiny island-
state Seychelles is one of several coastal and island African states in which China 
has actively sought to enhance its soft power�77 China could be using antipiracy 
operations to support an expansive naval development policy, as well as to pursue 
a more active grand strategy that involves overseas access facilities and a long-
term trend toward a greater overall global presence�
CHINESE NAVAL DEVELOPMENT
The PLAN is just one of several “independent” providers of antipiracy assets in 
the Gulf of Aden� While the majority of naval antipiracy forces fight pirates under 
the aegis of multilateral commands, several states—including China, India, Iran, 
Japan, Malaysia, and Russia—have primarily operated on a unilateral basis rather 
than under the command of multinational antipiracy forces such as CTF-151, 
NATO’s Operation OPEN SHIELD, or EU NAVFOR� This posture suggests that 
China is trying to learn as much as it can from other navies without revealing 
much about its own operations, while also, clearly, maintaining ideological inde-
pendence in foreign policy�
China’s preference to abstain from combined operations is driven by several 
factors� First, greater independence allows the PLAN to conduct its preferred 
method of antipiracy operations—relatively low-risk escort operations aimed at 
deterring, rather than actively searching for, pirates� It also offers China an indi-
vidual identity as a provider of maritime public goods, rather than as just another 
state operating within Western-led security mechanisms� Moreover, if China 
joined the existing security structure, potential frictions might arise that would 
preclude meaningful integration, such as sensitivities related to information 
sharing and technology theft� Some Western defense experts have questioned the 
U�S� Navy’s invitation for the PLAN to participate in the historic 2014 RIMPAC 
exercises and other joint maritime cooperation activities for such reasons�78
These concerns notwithstanding, China’s antipiracy operations over the past 
several years have made meaningful contributions to Gulf of Aden security� In 
addition, they have achieved unprecedented coordination between China and 
other antipiracy maritime forces in the region, such as those of the United States� 
While suspicions abound regarding China’s motives, antipiracy cooperation may 
contribute to more positive outside perceptions of China and its international 
status� China has been “ready to exchange information and cooperate with the 
warships of other countries in fighting Somalian pirates” since its inaugural de-
ployment in 2008�79 One PLAN antipiracy task force commander, Admiral Du 
Jingcheng, has recalled that he was eager to “facilitate exchanges of information 
with escort naval vessels from other countries�”80 
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In the nearly six-year period beginning December 2008, the PLAN has co-
ordinated information with over twenty nations, including the United States�81 
Li Faxin, associate professor (and lieutenant commander) at the Naval Marine 
Corps College, states that PLAN antipiracy forces have established “high-trust 
partner relations” (高度信任的伙伴关系) with many nations operating in the 
Gulf of Aden�82 
Positive results have also been facilitated by Shared Awareness and Deconflic-
tion (SHADE), a voluntary multistate antipiracy information-sharing mecha-
nism� SHADE meetings occur quarterly in Bahrain and regularly host naval and 
industry leaders from various states� Willingness on the part of independent na-
vies, China’s in particular, to synchronize their antipiracy operations with those 
of Western forces within the SHADE mechanism is a historic achievement for 
twenty-first-century maritime commons governance� 
China was denied SHADE chairmanship in 2009 but, notwithstanding, coor-
dinates its antipiracy escorts with those of other SHADE members� For example, 
China has participated in SHADE’s Convoy Coordination Working Group and 
coordinates its monthly escort schedules with other navies providing indepen-
dent escorts� China, India, and Japan reportedly began coordinating their anti-
piracy operations as early as 2011�83 They mutually arranged escort schedules 
twenty-nine times between January and March 2012, with China acting as the 
coordinator for ten escorts, India for ten, and Japan for nine�84 
For six years the PLAN’s antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have symbol-
ized China’s burgeoning out-of-area naval activity� They also showcase Beijing’s 
growing ability to achieve soft-power objectives while concurrently promoting 
its overseas interests and military development� Important components of these 
missions include escort of commercial ships, navy-to-navy meetings, participa-
tion in multistakeholder dialogues on antipiracy operations, and, most signifi-
cantly, the growing number of port visits undertaken by PLAN warships� These 
position the PLAN as an important and highly visible player in China’s recent 
soft-power diplomacy�
China’s ongoing antipiracy operations in the far seas have generated many 
positive assessments� In contrast to the contentious near seas, where Beijing is 
consistently embroiled in sovereignty disputes that show no signs of abating, 
antipiracy missions represent the most significant positive component of China’s 
naval engagement to date, particularly with regard to the degree to which Chi-
nese vessels and sailors are interacting with the outside world� This interaction 
not only enhances China’s maritime image in the eyes of its antipiracy partners 
but may help alleviate fears that China’s naval rise might one day threaten twenty-
first-century maritime prosperity in regions beyond the near seas� The United 
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States and China reportedly planned over forty visits, exchanges, and other en-
gagements for 2013, double the number in the previous year, and successfully car-
ried out joint antipiracy exercises in 2012 and 2013�85 In July–August 2014, China 
participated in RIMPAC for the first time, the U�S�-hosted forum that is currently 
the largest naval exercise in the world�86 There, four PLAN vessels drilled with 
international counterparts off Hawaii, on such subjects as antipiracy�87
China has received well-deserved credit for helping to reduce piracy dramati-
cally in the Gulf of Aden� In 2007–2008, as Admiral Wu told one of the authors, 
the area suffered about a hundred pirate attacks annually, of which between fifty 
and sixty “hijackings” (piratings) were successful� In 2014, by contrast, there were 
only seventeen attacks through September, none successful� China’s contribu-
tion entailed “major costs in forces, human resources, and money�” Admiral Wu 
continued, “The U�S� Navy and other top-level U�S� leaders are very happy that 
this is continuing� They are satisfied that China expends significant resources to 
make a contribution,” thereby reducing the resource burden on the United States� 
“There are just some members of Congress who remain opposed to the missions�” 
Admiral Wu added that he wants to invite U�S� congressional representatives to 
PLAN ships in the Gulf of Aden�88
The PLAN’s experience fighting piracy in distant seas is thus a benchmark 
that can be used by Beijing to cement its positive image in the international 
arena� Antipiracy operations prove that the PLAN can be a provider—not merely 
a consumer or, worse, a disrupter—of maritime commons security� Interna-
tional society largely perceives Chinese naval contributions to fighting piracy as 
positive developments, perceptions that stand in sharp contrast to China’s hard-
power naval approaches in the East and South China Seas� Scholars constantly 
scrutinize the nature and perceived efficacy of China’s soft power�89 While it is 
too early to speculate exactly how Beijing’s contributions to antipiracy today will 
bolster its future soft-power influence, the results should be at least moderately 
positive� More generally, the Gulf of Aden case suggests that China will continue 
to reap international political benefits commensurate with its contributions to 
international maritime security�
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 As a global response to piracy off the coast of Somalia was taking place, alarm bells were ringing about a similar growing insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea� 
Today, the Gulf of Guinea stands as the most dangerous maritime area in terms 
of the success rate of attacks and violence� The United Nations Security Council 
adopted Resolutions 2018 (in 2011) and 2039 (in 2012) expressing grave concern 
about the mounting insecurity in the region and its consequences for regional 
and global security�1 A United Nations (UN) team was deployed to the region to 
assess the situation�2 
The UN resolutions and the report of the assessment team called on regional 
states and institutions, as well as the international community, to respond, and 
a code of conduct for the repression of piracy was 
adopted by Gulf of Guinea states in June 2013 at 
Yaoundé, Cameroon, with wide international sup-
port�3 Nevertheless, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
region remains a serious threat� Indeed, in the 
month following the adoption of the code of con-
duct a Maltese-flagged vessel, Cotton, was hijacked 
off the coast of Gabon, the first attack of its kind 
along that coast, portending a widening of the pi-
racy threat southward�4 It is also noteworthy that at 
the close of 2013 the Gulf of Guinea recorded more 
incidents of attacks on the high seas than in previ-
ous years�5 This deepening threat has continued 
into 2014, as Angola and Ghana registered their 
first significant hijackings (analyzed below)� These 
Commander Ali Kamal-Deen, Ghana Navy
Commander Ali Kamal-Deen is the Director of Re-
search at the Ghana Armed Forces Command and 
Staff College, with additional responsibility as the 
Legal Director of the Ghana Navy. He has previously 
served in various appointments in the Ghana Armed 
Forces, including deployments to Sierra Leone and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo on peacekeep-
ing missions in 2003 and 2007, respectively. He is a 
Fellow of the Africa Security Dialogue and Research 
Network, a Fellow of the Australian National Centre 
for Ocean Resources and Security, and an Asso ciate 
of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy, in the 
United Kingdom. Commander Kamal-Deen holds 
a doctor of philosophy degree from the University of 
Wollongong, Australia. He also holds a master of law 
degree in international maritime law and master of 
arts in international relations.
© 2014 by Ali Kamal-Deen
Naval War College Review, Winter 2015, Vol. 68, No. 1
THE ANATOMY OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY
98
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 1, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20
 9 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
developments reinforce the urgency of effective counterpiracy measures� Real-
istically, however, the success and efficacy of both regional and global response 
will depend on a sound knowledge of the operational environment, awareness of 
the actors, and most crucially, understanding of how the situation has evolved� 
This article provides a critical analysis of the piracy situation in the Gulf of 
Guinea� It sets the background with an overview of piracy statistics and a catego-
rization of the coast according to the degree of risk of attack� This is followed by 
an examination of the paradigm of Gulf of Guinea piracy, while the third section 
analyzes the evolution of the piracy from its pre-2005 low levels into a regional 
and global threat� The fourth section summarizes Gulf of Guinea piracy and ex-
amines future projections� The article concludes with a discussion of the imper-
atives for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea� It should be noted 
first that the geographical scope of the region referred to as the Gulf of Guinea 
varies depending on the issue or interest at stake� It is defined in this article as 
comprising the coastal states stretching from Senegal to Angola and as embracing 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS)�6
OVERVIEW AND DISTRIBUTION OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY 
INCIDENTS
Piracy has historically been a threat to maritime trade and the good order of the 
world’s oceans�7 To ensure the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), 
international law imposes an obligation on states to cooperate in the repression 
of piracy; it also grants universal jurisdiction over piracy, such that pirates may 
be arrested and prosecuted within the legal system of any state�8 The requisite 
international framework is codified in articles 100–105 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of 1982�9 
To be classified as piracy, an act of piracy or depredation must have taken place 
on the high seas�10 The “high seas” in this context include contiguous zones and 
exclusive economic zones� In contrast to piracy, the terms “armed robbery against 
ships,” “armed robbery at sea,” or simply “armed robbery” denote piratical acts 
or thefts that take place within a territorial sea, internal waters, or, by extension, 
archipelagic waters, ports, and anchorages�11 For practical purposes, however, 
piracy and armed robbery pose similar threats to the safety and security of global 
shipping, and the drivers and motivations behind the two crimes are largely the 
same despite the legal distinction�12 For this reason “piracy” is used in this article 
to cover both types of incidents� 
Piracy Statistics in the Gulf of Guinea
Although the Gulf of Guinea has its own history of sea raids and piratical acts, 
they did not constitute a major threat until recently�13 Within the past few years 
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the region has seen a significant rise in piracy incidents� Table 1 reflects inci-
dents from 2005 to 2013, as compiled from International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) reports�14 
The rising threat of piracy is evident� Attacks went from twenty-three in 2005 
to sixty in 2007� For reasons that will be covered below, the incidents decreased 
in 2008 and 2009, but they swelled again between 2010 and 2013; 2012 marked a 
peak, with sixty-four incidents� The situation is actually worse than the statistics 
depict, because, it is believed, unlike in other regions, only about half of the inci-
dents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are actually reported by ships’ masters and 
operators for fear of reprisal during their next visit�15 Even so, since 2009 the Gulf 
of Guinea has been identified as the new piracy territory, displacing Somalia, 
especially with regard to violence employed in the attacks�16
Piracy constitutes a major threat to SLOC security when incidents are not 
confined to ports and anchorages but occur also in territorial waters and, more 
importantly, on the high seas� The Gulf of Guinea manifests all these indicators, 
and the percentage of successful attacks outside port areas has increased, as shown 
in table 1� Robberies and attempted robberies in the territorial sea rose from only 
five in 2005 to thirty-one incidents in 2007� The region recorded a single incident 
on the high seas in 2005; the number jumped tenfold the following year, and the 
number of successful attacks on the high seas has since grown� As early as 2006, 
pirates hijacked a Russian oil tanker, Shkotovo, about sixty nautical miles off Guin-
ea using automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), manifesting their 
ability to hijack vessels far out to sea and their willingness to employ high levels of 
violence�17 Significantly, seventeen out of the twenty-five high-seas attacks in 2012 
were successful, and most attacks in 2013 were against moving vessels� 
Piracy Hot Spots and Enclaves
Table 1 covers the entire Gulf of Guinea region, but two qualifications must be 
made� First, piracy and robbery incidents have not affected the entire region 
continually from 2005 to 2012� Second, even where incidents have been recorded, 
their nature and trends are not monolithic� To allow a nuanced perception of the 
dynamics of the problem, localities in the Gulf of Guinea can be categorized as 
“hot spots,” “enclaves,” or zones of low risk� Piracy hot spots are rated according 
to risk and danger of attacks, while enclaves—localities where pirates are based 
and from which they operate—are classified as primary or secondary, depending 
on the certainty of the presence of piratical groups�
Angola and Cape Verde are areas of low risk; there are hardly any reported 
incidents of attacks off their coasts, and the trends on the neighboring coasts are 
also limited—the hijacking of the tanker Kerala in February 2014 was the first 
major incident off Angola� Incidents in and around the Democratic Republic of 
Continued on page 97
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the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal are also limited to theft from ships 
in ports and anchorages, as well as occasional robberies in territorial seas� Attacks 
off the coasts of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea have declined substantially 
since 2009, thus removing these two states from a high-risk ranking� 
Recent multiple attacks, in contrast, have made Cote d’Ivoire a piracy hot spot� 
Sierra Leone is in the same category, because although attacks off that coast are 
fewer than off Cote d’Ivoire, they are very violent� 
Guinea is both a piracy hot spot and the region’s secondary piracy enclave� 
Attacks off its coast since 2009 have been characterized by heavy use of weapons, 
violence, and sophistication� Shkotovo (as noted) and Maersk Belfast were at-
tacked in 2006 with automatic rifles and RPGs;18 Isola Verde and Songa Emerald 
were successfully boarded while under way in 2009 and 2010, respectively;19 
more recently, in 2012, armed pirates attacked the Maltese-flagged Constanza 
twenty nautical miles off Guinea, causing major damage to the ship�20 It is the 
frequency and similarity of these attacks that suggest the existence of a piracy 
base in Guinea and its environs� 
The coasts of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo are collectively the most dangerous in 
the region� However, Nigeria stands out as the epicenter of Gulf of Guinea piracy 
and as the primary piracy enclave� Nigeria alone accounts for 80 percent of re-
ported incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea�21 
THE PARADIGM OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY 
What fundamentally drives piracy, especially in its primary enclave? Who are the 
primary actors responsible? Answers can be traced in the transmutation of an 
insurgency into a ravaging piracy network� 
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is a loose coali-
tion of militant groups that emerged in 2005 in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, osten-
sibly seeking a greater share of oil revenue for the region�22 A Joint Revolutionary 
Council surfaced in 2006 as an umbrella organization for MEND and other, 
splinter groups;23 MEND is the most dominant and cohesive�24 MEND claims to 
fight for “community” interests, but intense criminality dominates its practical 
existence and activities�25 From its very inception, expatriate workers have been 
regularly kidnapped by MEND activists for ransom at each okrika—area or axis 
of control of a subunit or splinter group�26 
The MEND insurgency gained notoriety at the strategic level for attacks on 
critical installations in the Niger Delta, starting with oil pipelines ashore and 
later expanding to offshore oil platforms�27 The federal government of Nigeria 
responded with the establishment of a joint task force of security agencies to 
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counter the insurgency� Despite the robustness of the joint task force, MEND 
continued to be lethal, engaging government forces in gun battles�28 Three naval 
personnel were missing and feared dead in 2007, nine were killed in June 2008, 
and three in April 2009�29
Rising Threat and the Amnesty Pact 
In late 2008, after almost four years of insurgent attacks, the federal government 
of Nigeria entered into negotiations with MEND; a formal amnesty proclamation 
resulted in June 2009�30 This rapprochement was influenced by the increasing 
threat posed by insurgents to oil security, as epitomized by a successful attack on 
the floating production, storage, and off-loading unit (FPSO) Bonga in 2008�31 
The attack had serious implications for Nigeria, the wider Gulf of Guinea, and 
beyond� The Bonga attack marked a peak in a series of threats to energy security 
in the Gulf of Guinea, and it opened a new chapter in global asymmetric threats� 
Indeed, excluding the attack on Aban VII off the coast of India in 2006, the 
Gulf of Guinea has recorded the most attacks against offshore platforms in the 
world, all of them off the coast of Nigeria�32 Bulford Dolphin, a mobile drilling 
rig, was attacked in April 2007 by insurgents�33 In May 2007 Mystras was also 
attacked, and three days later Trident VIII was targeted�34 In addition to the 
physical damage and personal injuries inflicted by the insurgents, these incidents 
impacted the operation of the platforms�35 The attack on Mystras was indeed very 
significant, as it marked the second on an FPSO in two years� 
These incidents boosted the confidence of the insurgents, and they culmi-
nated in the June 2008 attack on the Bonga FPSO—a major hub of the oil giant 
Royal Dutch Shell—about 120 kilometers offshore�36 After the incident, Nigeria’s 
oil production dropped to its lowest in twenty-five years and global oil prices 
soared�37 The Bonga incident heightened global fears that even deep-sea energy 
installations were not safe from insurgents and terrorists�38 In a statement MEND 
affirmed that its grand objective was to disable oil export operations, described 
the attack as a humiliating security breach for the Nigerian military, and warned 
that MEND’s “next visit [would] be different�”39 Soon after, the Nigerian gov-
ernment and MEND group leaders came to the negotiation table and entered 
into an amnesty pact� The arrangement involved insurgents laying down their 
weapons in return for monthly allowances and skills training�40 However, some 
commentators have charged that insurgent leaders were accommodated in lux-
urious hotels alongside high-ranking politicians and influential people and that 
the insurgent leadership was to receive financial payoffs�41
The amnesty led to the demobilization of insurgent forces and of the organ-
izational structure of MEND, as well as a decline in its activities starting in late 
2008�42 Interestingly, in that period piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea decreased, 
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from a high of sixty incidents in 2007 to fifty in 2008, reaching a low of forty-six 
in 2009 (as shown in table 1)�43 A review of piracy reports by the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB) for 2009 and 2010 shows that there were few piratical in-
cidents in the last and first quarters of 2009 and 2010, respectively�44 However, the 
arrangement became tenuous thereafter, partly because the amnesty “cake” had 
not been shared among all actors (and certainly not in amounts satisfactory to all 
members of the insurgency)�45 Splinter groups announced an intention to resume 
normal campaigns, and in the remainder of 2010 piracy attacks became preva-
lent once again�46 By the close of 2011 the Gulf of Guinea had recorded sixty- 
one piracy incidents, a sharp contrast to the low figures of 2009� 
An Insurgency, Criminality, Piracy, and Security Complex 
It is clear, then, that the creeks of the Niger Delta harbor dangerous pirates who 
threaten the security of sea lines of communication in the Gulf of Guinea� Ele-
ments of MEND that are no longer attacking offshore oil platforms, kidnapping 
offshore workers for ransom, or extorting money from oil companies have turned 
to piracy as their principal activity� This insurgency/piracy nexus often exists 
among different kinds of organized crime�47 In the Gulf of Guinea, however, pira-
cy is committed with impunity, and insurgents, rather than achieving a symbiotic 
relationship with pirates, have fully transformed into pirates themselves� 
The crime of piracy is itself only part of a broad spectrum of actions and com-
plexities that constitutes the piracy threat� It may, for instance, be argued that 
dealing with the Niger Delta piracy is a matter of trading off one element of secu-
rity for another� At any point in time—this was especially so prior to the amnesty 
process—the Niger Delta insurgency poses a threat to five critical security inter-
ests: the national security of Nigeria, the investment security of oil companies, 
global energy security, regional security and stability, and finally, the safety and 
security of shipping� These five aspects of security are in many ways interlinked� 
Insurgent activities impact Nigeria’s economic interests and stability, which are 
key components of its national security� Insurgent attacks equally threaten the 
investment interests of oil companies, as well as global energy security, the safety 
and security of shipping, and regional stability� For Nigeria, safeguarding national 
security became paramount following such incidents as the Bonga attack, making 
the security of shipping a lesser concern� Oil companies initially secured their 
investments by succumbing to the extortion demands of insurgent groups�48 The 
amnesty arrangement offered assurance, albeit temporary, of Nigerian national 
security, oil investment security, and by extension, the contribution of Nigeria’s 
oil to global energy security� But protecting those security interests left regional 
security and the security of shipping in peril� That peril may be regarded as unin-
tended, or it can be viewed as Nigeria sacrificing one element of security interest 
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for the other; indeed, as far as the shipping industry was concerned, Nigeria has 
had “no political will to combat the problem of piracy�”49 
EVOLUTION OF THE NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY INTO A  
REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY THREAT
The Niger Delta insurgency has evolved over time from the primary piracy en-
clave into a region-wide security threat, in scope, tactics, and trends� As in many 
criminal progressions, the exact dates of transitions are difficult to pinpoint but 
the patterns are discernible� What follows is a summary of the seven phases of the 
evolution from 2005 through to the hijacking of Orfeas in October 2012� 
Opportunistic Sea Robbery 
The first phase of Gulf of Guinea piratical attacks may be described as “opportu-
nistic sea robbery�” This taxonomy fits piracy incidents up to 2005 but also applies 
in part as late as 2007� Two-thirds of attacks during this period took place in ports 
and anchorages, interspersed with a limited number of robberies in the territo-
rial sea� It needs to be emphasized, though, that the description of this phase of 
piracy as “opportunistic” is not about the capability of the actors but highlights 
the fact that robberies were conducted as subsidiary activities� The attention of 
insurgents during this period was on attacking offshore platforms; some ships, 
however, were hijacked and crews kidnapped for ransom� 
Piracy reports during this period gave indications of what would become cen-
tral in the profile of threats to SLOC security—that is, gangs of hijackers using 
speedboats armed with heavy weapons� The use of speedboats can be contrasted 
with Somalia piracy, wherein fishing vessels and skiffs are the principal platforms� 
In 2006, four crew members of Northern Comrade were kidnapped for ransom� 
In May 2007, over forty people armed with guns in six speedboats attacked Dlb 
Cheyenne, engaged the Nigerian military in a shoot-out, and kidnapped the crew; 
in the same month Oloibiri was attacked using explosives and its crew kidnapped 
for ransom�50 Thus the tactic of kidnapping and ransoming expatriate oil workers 
was being employed in conjunction with the hijacking of ships� 
Widening the Enclave: Prodding and Surges 
By 2009 there were signs of a new characteristic of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea� 
Unlike Somalia, where pirates set out to hunt for victim ships, pirates in the Gulf 
of Guinea undertake surgical attacks, converging at locations of interest�51 Activi-
ties of insurgents during this period expanded beyond the southern and western 
coasts of Nigeria, westerly swarms targeting vessels off the coast of Benin, and 
those to the south attacking ships off Cameroon and the neighboring coast� In 
2008 about ten armed persons in military clothing boarded the cement carrier 
Elbia off the island of Bioko in Equatorial Guinea, identified themselves as 
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Nigerian rebels, demanded food from the ship’s crew, and after six hours on 
board disembarked into speedboats� Accounts of piracy incidents off nearby 
coasts in 2008 described the pirates and robbers as “Nigerian rebels,” “Nigerian 
militants,” and “protectors of the Bonny River�”52 
These surges signaled an ability of the insurgents to increase the intensity and 
extend the scope of their activities, with widening security consequences� This 
was demonstrated by the alleged involvement of Niger Delta insurgents in a sea-
borne attack on the presidential palace of Equatorial Guinea in February 2009�53 
The incident was the catalyst for the establishment of a subregional maritime 
security framework by member states of the Economic Community of Central 
African States in 2009�54 Despite the challenges confronting the ECCAS mari-
time framework (including inadequate logistics, funding, and legal framework), 
it nonetheless weakened the southern wing of the insurgents, resulting in fewer 
incidents in the southern Gulf of Guinea� 
Pursuit and Violence 
A further evolution of tactics became manifest in 2009 as the insurgents started 
hunting vessels to attack, albeit selectively, but often with great violence� Once a 
high-value target was identified, it was shadowed farther out to sea and at a vul-
nerable location was attacked violently� In February 2009 grenades were thrown 
at the oil tanker Front Chief, killing a crew member� Seamen on board Emirates 
Swam, Sevastopolskaya Buhta, and other vessels also suffered serious injuries 
during attacks the same year�55 The high level of violence not only ensured quick 
outcomes but compensated for the absence of sanctuaries where vessels could be 
kept during ransom negotiations and moved the Gulf of Guinea toward the em-
ployment by pirates of violence and killing to subjugate theaters of operations�56
Full-Scale Insurgent Piracy 
The transition from insurgency into full-scale piracy was a post-amnesty phe-
nomenon, following the withdrawal of insurgent elements from the amnesty deal 
of 2010� Attacks became more prevalent from 2010 through to 2013� They also 
became more brazen, as indicated by the chasing of and firing on Elbtank Ger-
many for over an hour and the shadowing of Cape Bon for two days, in February 
and March 2011, respectively�57 
In this transformation pirates have developed new measures� A variant of the 
mother-ship concept has emerged wherein pirates use hijacked fishing vessels 
to store fuel for extended operations� That is similar to Somali methods, but in 
the Gulf of Guinea it is primarily a deception measure to get close to oil vessels� 
Pirates have targeted especially ships loaded with refined oil, which they always 
siphon into smaller tankers and then sell illegally, both within and outside the 
region�58 
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Regional Threat and Piracy Networks: The Benin Case
That the threat of piracy had become regional by mid-2011 was made evident by 
multiple incidents off the coast of Benin� Piracy off the coast of Benin was by no 
means new, but unlike earlier cases the June–July 2011 attacks amounted to an 
invasion of Benin’s coastal space� The pirates of the Niger Delta had expanded 
their enclave to Benin�59 Two significant trends emerged from the 2011 Benin 
attacks, the first of which defies normal risk analysis regarding the safety and 
security of ships� It is usual to assume that ships in port are shielded from violent 
piracy, and crews normally lower their security posture, expecting at most only 
minor robberies and minimal violence by actors from within the coastal state� 
This assumption was crushed when pirates of the Niger Delta actually entered 
port areas of Benin to hijack vessels. One ship, Aristofanis, was sailed to the open 
sea, where its cargo was discharged�60 
The second piracy trend that became apparent in the Benin onslaught was the 
emergence of a growing transnational criminal network in the Gulf of Guinea� 
This is evident from the hijacking of Duzgit Venture�61 The captain was forced 
to sail the vessel all the way to the coast of Gabon, where the pirates planned to 
transfer the oil into a barge� When the pirates failed to meet the barge, the captain 
was forced to sail off Warri, Nigeria, to lighter the cargo� After a series of unsuc-
cessful attempts to do so, the pirates disembarked into fast boats, kidnapping the 
captain and another crew member� The pirates were in cahoots with other actors 
about four thousand kilometers away from the point of hijack, and to meet them 
they sailed the commandeered ship across the coastal waters of five states�62 The 
incident also raises serious question about the capability of Gulf of Guinea states 
to monitor their maritime domains� 
Togo in the Claws: Post–Operation PROSPERITY
The multiple piracy attacks off the coast of Benin had a staggering economic im-
pact on the country, including an estimated port-revenue loss of U�S�$81 million 
in 2011�63 The president of Benin took two diplomatic steps in response to the 
crisis� At the multilateral level, he requested the support of the international com-
munity, through the United Nations secretary-general�64 Second, he sought the 
support of his counterpart in Nigeria�65 In August 2011 the two states launched 
joint patrols; known as Operation PROSPERITY, they lasted a year and concen-
trated largely on the coast of Benin� Benin had operational command over the 
patrols, while tactical command was exercised by Nigeria�66
Within months, a UN report indicated that Operation PROSPERITY had led to 
a reduction in piratical incidents off the coast of Benin�67 This was corroborated 
by the military chief of Benin�68 However, the fundamental question that should 
have been asked was, What has been the effect of PROSPERITY on the immediate 
regions of Nigeria and Benin? 
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Since the launch of Operation PROSPERITY there has been, on the one hand, a 
steady decrease in piracy off the coast of Benin, but on the other hand, an emer-
gence of incidents off the Togolese coast�69 Interestingly, attacks off the Togolese 
coast coincide with periods of few or none reported off Nigeria and Benin� Some 
have occurred deep inside port areas of Togo, like the earlier attacks in Benin� 
The IMB has noted that the Togo coast has become a piracy hot spot, with inci-
dents increasing from a single attack in 2008 to fifteen in 2012�70 This indicates 
that Operation PROSPERITY had simply pushed pirates and robbers farther to the 
west� The short coastlines of Benin and Togo have allowed pirates to treat the two 
coasts tactically as a single theater of operations� This can be inferred from two 
reported incidents in September 2011�71 On the 14th, at 4:15 am, armed robbers 
attacked Abu Dhabi Star, a Singapore-flagged chemical tanker, a few nautical 
miles off Lomé, Togo, but aborted the attack upon being noticed by the ship’s 
company� Four hours earlier, at 11:52 pm, two gangs of pirates had hijacked two 
tankers, Mattheos I and Northern Bell, that were conducting a ship-to-ship trans-
fer, sixty-two nautical miles off Benin� The pirates succeeded in sailing Mattheos 
I to an unknown location, but the crew of Northern Bell regained control of their 
ship� 
Analysis of these two incidents, taking into account time, location, and dis-
tance, suggests that the same gang of Niger Delta pirates that lost control of 
Northern Bell off the Benin coast sailed toward Togo, and then paid their preda-
tory visit to Abu Dhabi Star� The IMB subsequently confirmed that Nigerian 
pirates have expanded into Togolese waters�72 
Cote d’Ivoire under Siege: Nowhere Is Safe 
The hijacking of Orfeas in October 2012 marked the seventh phase of the evolu-
tion of piracy from a primary enclave in the Niger Delta into a well-entrenched 
regional threat� Orfeas was hijacked on 6 October 2012 off the coast of Cote 
d’Ivoire�73 Gaining control of the vessel, the pirates sailed it over two thousand 
kilometers to the Niger Delta and stole the oil cargo, releasing the vessel two days 
later�74 The hijacking encapsulates most of the tactics already discussed but also 
brings to the fore the new sophistication of Gulf of Guinea piracy� Soon after the 
hijacking, the pirates took the vessel into deeper water, both to make contact with 
their criminal networks and to put the ship out of reach of rescue� In December 
2012, armed pirates with machine guns attacked another oil tanker in a Cote 
d’Ivoire port�75 These incidents show that attacks in the western Gulf of Guinea 
have become more brazen� 
EMERGENT PROFILE AND FUTURE PROJECTION 
This seven-phase evolution shows that in the absence of robust responses the pi-
rates are likely to consolidate and expand their activities� Effective counterpiracy 
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action must take into account the modus operandi of pirates, the piracy profile, 
and emerging trends� By the close of 2012, the evolving piracy profile of the Niger 
Delta pirates had crystallized, as summarized in table 2� 
The above profile reflects a primary focus on the Niger Delta� However, Gulf 
of Guinea piratical activity is now marked by fluidity and increasing complexity� 
Effective responses should therefore assume the scope of the broader maritime 
security context, with particular attention on the evolving piracy track and crimi-
nal networks� The following trends should be closely watched�
Widening of the Niger Delta Factor 
Unlike Somalia, where multilateral counterpiracy efforts have led to a steady de-
cline in successful attacks since 2009, the Gulf of Guinea has seen an escalation�76 
This suggests that pirates in the region are mastering its geography and shipping 
profile� Distance is not a limiting factor for piratical activities; conversely, long-
range attacks give pirates more time to plunder ships and transfer stolen cargo� 
Clearly, there is no area in the Gulf of Guinea too remote or too secure for piracy� 
Indeed, in the primary piracy enclave we see two mutually reinforcing devel-
opments: consolidation and further widening� It is logical for the Niger Delta 
pirates to continue to view the coasts of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo as their normal 
Subject Description/Outcome 
Platforms Speedboats, already used by insurgents� Ideal for piracy because of their speed and maneuverability� 
Generally faster than victim ships and naval ships�
Grouping Up to forty pirates in multiple speedboats� Large numbers ideal for overpowering crews�
Weapons AK-47s, machine guns, RPGs, grenades, and knives� Able to stop ships under way with firepower�
Violence High level of violence and injury to crew� Instills fear and ensures quick outcome of attacks�
Reach/range Southward: Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea (over 1,550 km)� Westward: Nigeria to Cote d’Ivoire (over 
2,000 km)�
Time Operate day and night but shifting more to night operations� Surprise achieved through night  
attack�
Target ships Oil and product tankers; objective to steal refined oil cargo� Other vessels attacked for money and 
valuables�
Mother ship Hijacked fishing vessels occasionally used as resupply basis or as decoy when approaching targeted 
ships�
Assisting ships Tankers used to transfer stolen oil cargo�
Ransom Increasingly not a prime motivation but still employed as a supplementary activity�
Networks Stolen oil sold within and outside the region� Timing of attacks suggests prior information about 
locations of oil tankers�
TABLE 2
PROFILE OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY AS OF 2012
109
War College: Winter 2015 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 K A M A L - D E E N  1 0 5
zone while they venture into new areas� This new dynamic was unleashed in Jan-
uary 2014, with the hijacking of Kerala in Angola�77 The tanker was subsequently 
sighted under the control of the hijackers off the coast of Nigeria, where part of 
the oil cargo, worth eight million U�S� dollars, was stolen�78 This incident signified 
a southerly expansion of piracy attacks� The months of June and July saw three 
hijackings off Ghana, two of them of oil tankers, signifying a further enlargement 
of piracy threat, this time westward�79 These attacks shattered the reputations of 
Angola and Ghana as having coast waters among the safest in the region� The in-
cidents also demonstrated that oil tankers will continue to be targeted, because the 
financial rewards for the pirates and their accomplices, as well as for buyers of the 
stolen oil, are extremely high�80 However, all other vessels are also susceptible prey� 
Other Piratical Groups within the Primary Piracy Enclave 
But even the primary piracy enclave can get  more complicated� There is a history 
of attacks by two organized groups in neighboring Cameroon that are completely 
removed from the Niger Delta insurgency� One, the Bakassi Freedom Fighters 
(BFF), is opposed to Nigeria’s return of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon�81 The 
BFF attacked an oil tanker in 2008, kidnapping the crew and detaining them for 
ten days before negotiating a ransom payment�82 The second group, the Africa 
Marine Commando (AMC), kidnapped a Chinese fishing crew in 2010 and ex-
torted a ransom for their release�83 There have been no other discernible piratical 
attacks by the BFF or the AMC, partly because of robust responses from the 
Cameroon government, including lethal force�84 However, the groups are far from 
being dismantled; reports indicate that the AMC was involved in the kidnapping 
of local officials in 2011�85 
Concerns in the Secondary Piracy Enclave 
Another concern is the future safety of the coasts of Guinea and Sierra Leone� 
Incidents in this enclave are fewer than off the Niger Delta but worrisome be-
cause of the high level of violence employed� There is also a very close correlation 
between reported piracy off the coast of Guinea and incidents in neighboring 
Sierra Leone—a portent of organized criminal activity in the latter area� In March 
2007, pirates armed with machine guns boarded Atropos, which was under way 
forty nautical miles off Sierra Leone�86 In August of the same year, thirty pirates 
armed with guns boarded a United Kingdom–registered product tanker off 
Guinea�87 That December pirates armed with AK-47s and wearing military-like 
uniforms fired on and boarded a tanker off Sierra Leone�88 In August 2010, ten 
pirates armed with AK-47s attacked a ship off the coast of Guinea;89 more recent-
ly, in 2012, a Maltese cargo ship, Costanza, was attacked twenty nautical miles 
off Guinea by pirates, again armed with AK-47s, damaging the ship�90 These are 
indications of entrenched piratical activity in this secondary enclave� 
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Threats beyond Piracy 
While the Gulf of Guinea grapples with a spate of piratical activity, new transna-
tional actors are gaining notoriety in the region� The Nigerian extremist Islamist 
group Boko Haram, whose activities were previously confined to the northern 
part of the country, has broadened its operations across Nigeria and neighboring 
states�91 In August 2011, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on 
the United Nations office in Nigeria, killing eighteen staff and injuring over a 
hundred others�92 This attack dramatically changed earlier assessments that had 
viewed the group’s threat as limited�93 In June 2013, following repeated attacks 
on major cities and towns, the government of Nigeria officially declared Boko 
Haram a terrorist group;94 the Nigerian minister of defense emphatically de-
scribed it as a franchise of Al Qaeda�95 
To date, there have been no reports of maritime attacks by Boko Haram� Al-
though a strike on an onshore pipeline in February 2012 by militants “want[ing] 
to register their presence” raised fears that Boko Haram may have been targeting 
strategic oil assets, no connection with it has been established�96 Nevertheless, 
the possibility of Boko Haram or another terrorist group, such as Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), targeting offshore oil and gas installations in the Gulf 
of Guinea cannot be discounted�97 Indeed, the high value of these assets, coupled 
with their vulnerability, makes them attractive targets�98 
COUNTERPIRACY IMPERATIVES 
This article has established an increasing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea� 
As attacks spread southward from the secondary enclave in Guinea, a piracy arc 
reaching to the primary enclave of the Niger Delta will be formed, leading to a 
very grave situation for the safety of shipping, offshore energy security, and the 
stability of the region� Effective remedial measures must be adopted by regional 
states and the international community� In designing these measures lessons 
from recent multilateral efforts in Somalia would certainly be useful, but cogni-
zance should also be given to the distinctive dynamics of this new theater� On the 
whole, five thematic areas must be addressed� 
Improved Governance 
The governance nexus with piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is important� The con-
sequence of a governance deficit goes beyond the spiral of piratical attacks being 
witnessed� It also finds expression in a myriad of maritime security challenges, in-
cluding illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing and illegal migration by sea�99 
The 2006 UN Niger Delta Human Development Report provides an incisive 
description of the conditions of the people of the Niger Delta�100 The report notes 
that the region has “dismal health and health service delivery,” that the people live 
in “predominantly � � � poor quality [housing],” and that nearly all school facilities 
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are in “a state of extreme disrepair�” It reports increasing “disillusionment and 
frustration,” as well as “deepening � � � deprivation and environmental devasta-
tion�”101 Research suggests that the quantity of oil spilled in the Niger Delta over 
the last fifty years is more than fifty times the volume spilled in the Exxon Valdez 
accident of 1989—one of the greatest environmental disasters the world has ever 
witnessed�102 Such poor environmental management has led to serious pollution 
and environmental degradation, limiting the opportunity of people to earn a liv-
ing from either farming or fishing�103
Realistically, therefore, bad governance must be said to lie at the heart of the 
maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea� Considering the tremendous 
oil wealth generated by the Niger Delta region, the dismal social picture painted 
by the UN report is otherwise difficult to comprehend� Resentment would be at 
its height in such an environment, leading to restiveness, conflict, and crime�104 In 
any case, poor governance creates a malignant environment that can be exploited 
by pirates and transnational criminal networks�105 
Enhanced Capability 
The impunity with which ship hijackings are conducted in the Gulf of Guinea, at 
times deep inside ports, is symptomatic of weakness in policing, surveillance, and 
response capabilities�106 Although security-sector funding is generally inadequate 
in the Gulf of Guinea, the situation with respect to navies and coast guards is 
especially problematic� Angola’s allocation of resources for the protection of 
its maritime estate is typical for Gulf of Guinea states� Angola has an estimated 
coastline of 1,600 kilometers—the longest in the region� Its gross domestic 
product is the second highest in the region, much of it derived from offshore 
resources� Yet the personnel strength of the Angolan navy is only a thousand 
(compared to a hundred thousand for Angola’s army and six thousand for its air 
force), and its equipment state is palpably inadequate, in contrast to that of the 
army�107 The Nigerian navy is similarly underfunded and limited in capability�108 
Its personnel strength of eight thousand is the largest in the Gulf of Guinea but 
in sharp contrast to the sixty-two-thousand-strong Nigerian army�109 Liberia 
represents another anomaly, not just for the Gulf of Guinea but with respect 
to how the global maritime community as a whole matches responsibility with 
maritime interest� Although Liberia is the second-largest flag state in the world, 
its diminutive coast guard has only fifty personnel and eight craft, all under ten 
feet in length�110 
A quick glance at the other navies and coast guards reveals a similarly 
worrisome situation�111 It is evident that the maritime jurisdiction and interest 
available to Gulf of Guinea states are not commensurate with the exercise of 
responsibility to ensure the safety and security of their coasts�112 This capability 
gap must be addressed� 
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Effective Legal Framework 
An inadequate legal framework too undermines maritime security in the Gulf 
of Guinea� Article 100 of UNCLOS encapsulates two interrelated obligations 
regarding piracy� States are required, first, to suppress piracy at the national level, 
and second, to cooperate with other states in that effort at the regional and in-
ternational levels�113 To give practical effect to the former, Gulf of Guinea states 
must enact and enforce laws covering all aspects of the crime of piracy�114 With 
respect to the second obligation, cooperative instruments and structures should 
be established that facilitate the sharing of information, at the minimum, and also 
possibly lead to joint patrols� 
However, Liberia and Togo are the only states in the region that have up-to-
date piracy legislation�115 It was only in January 2013 that Nigeria initiated the 
process of enacting a law to combat piracy and other maritime crimes�116 A UN 
assessment mission observed that the definition in the national laws of Benin 
of the crime of piracy was outdated and inconsistent with the provisions of 
UNCLOS�117 In summary, there is a legislative deficit with respect to the crime 
of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea� Thus, even were states able to patrol their coasts, 
they would be unable to prosecute or punish offenders� The likely result would 
be a “catch and release syndrome,” as was manifested in the early periods of So-
mali piracy when counterpiracy forces frequently released apprehended pirates 
because of difficulties in prosecution, thus further entrenching insecurity�118 The 
Gulf of Guinea states must therefore create an effective counterpiracy regime, 
first passing laws against piracy, with accompanying penalties, and second, pro-
viding the necessary prosecution and judicial structures� 
A related important global instrument is the Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 (known 
as the 1988 SUA Convention), and its protocols�119 The 1988 SUA Convention 
established a basis for responding to a spectrum of violent crimes at sea, from 
insurgency to terrorism�120 These crimes tend to fall outside the scope of piracy 
as defined by UNCLOS�121 The 1988 SUA Convention has addressed such gaps, 
giving Gulf of Guinea states the opportunity to respond effectively to these 
threats� 
Despite the relevance of the SUA regime, ratification and implementation of 
SUA instruments by Gulf of Guinea states have been unsatisfactory� Only Cote 
d’Ivoire is a party to all the SUA instruments, but only since 2012�122 Angola, 
Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Nigeria—all of them major oil-
producing states with substantial offshore infrastructures—have not ratified the 
1988 SUA Fixed Platform Protocol� States that have ratified SUA instruments 
have generally failed to incorporate them into their domestic legal systems�123 
For example, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria have all ratified the 1988 
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SUA Convention, but not one has incorporated the convention into its national 
law�124 Since 2004 the UN has emphasized the importance of the SUA framework 
for maritime security�125 It is therefore imperative that Gulf of Guinea states 
ratify and implement the SUA instruments within their domestic legal and 
policy frameworks� They should then develop regional responses, on the SUA 
framework� 
Robust Regional Cooperation
Maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is increasing; however, it 
is crucial that initiatives be tailored to meet the needs of the region� Member 
states of the ECCAS in 2009 adopted a Protocol on Maritime Security, based on 
a structure that divides the ECCAS grouping into zones to enhance joint patrol, 
monitoring, and enforcement�126 This structure is being replicated for the entire 
Gulf of Guinea as part of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct� For instance, ECOWAS 
member states decided to establish a pilot Zone E, comprising Nigeria, Benin, 
Togo, and the landlocked state of Niger�127 However, a number of issues have to 
be addressed: information sharing, realistic funding, interoperability, and current 
and future maritime boundary disputes�128
Viable International Cooperation 
International maritime security cooperation too has gained traction in the 
Gulf of Guinea; the United States has achieved a good deal of visibility in this 
regard� The United States launched its Africa Partnership Station (APS) in 2007 
with the deployment of the catamaran HSV-2 Swift and the dock landing ship 
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) to the Gulf of Guinea, and there has since been a 
consistent APS presence in the region�129 While serving as a platform for capacity 
building and joint exercises, the APS also contributes to the strategic objectives 
of power projection and cooperative engagement for the United States through 
the U�S� Africa Command (AFRICOM)�130 Other U�S� government and policy 
institutions, including the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, at Fort McNair in 
Washington, D�C�, are also engaged in meeting nonmilitary maritime-security 
needs of the Gulf of Guinea� 
The European Union launched the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf 
of Guinea (CRIMGO) project in January 2013�131 The initiative is designed to 
improve safety and security off the coasts of seven states�132 Several other states 
as well are keenly engaged with the Gulf of Guinea on maritime security, as 
epitomized by the increasing port visits of foreign navies in the last couple of 
years�133 Even the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy, which traditionally 
has had no presence in the region, visited Cameroon in May 2014 and reportedly 
undertook antipiracy joint drills with the host country�134 At the multilateral level, 
both the International Maritime Organization and the United Nations Office 
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on Drugs and Crime have maritime security capacity-building programs in the 
Gulf of Guinea� There is also an initiative by the international police community 
(INTERPOL) focused on the investigation of maritime-security incidents�135 This 
will be a useful means of unearthing patterns of maritime crime and criminal 
networks� 
Although international cooperation holds out the prospect of enhancing 
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a number of challenges have to be 
addressed, of which two deserve highlighting here� First is the need for coordina-
tion of international partnerships� Multiple cooperative initiatives are currently 
being unpacked in the region that national administrators and regional institu-
tions are required to respond to and then implement� They overcrowd national 
and regional policy, adversely affecting maritime-security decision making and 
coordination� External actors, donor agencies, and relevant international orga-
nizations should instead engage with Gulf of Guinea states in a harmonized, co-
ordinated way� Second, while maritime security cooperation is arguably a means 
for nonregional states to pursue wider strategic interests, some have made no 
allocation of logistical support or funds corresponding to the maritime-security 
needs of the region� For example, France pledged only U�S�$1�6 million to sup-
port maritime security in 2013, while funding for the CRIMGO project is just 
€4�5 million�136 This amounts to a fraction of the annual cost of the Nigerian-
Benin joint patrols (Operation PROSPERITY), estimated by the UN at U�S�$112 
million�137 
Given the socioeconomic realities in the Gulf of Guinea, where many states 
are at the bottom of the global development index, external partnerships should 
contribute substantially to the enhancement of capacity and capability�138 An ar-
rangement similar to the trust fund established under the auspices of the IMO 
to facilitate counterpiracy initiatives in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden 
is recommended for the Gulf of Guinea�139 Of course, the prevailing governance 
nemesis in the region makes such a fund susceptible to corruption and abuse� 
The framework must therefore have inbuilt mechanisms and checks to ensure 
the transparent and efficient application of the fund� 
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
Was the battle of Midway won or lost? In a recent edition of the Naval War Col-
lege Review, James Levy grappled with some of the recurrent issues found in the 
scholarship of the battle of Midway, all of them related to the question whether 
one or another aspect of the Japanese way of war led to a catastrophic defeat at 
the hands of the U�S� Navy�1 Levy observes that an assumption common to many 
works is “that the Japanese did as much to lose the battle as the Americans did 
to win it, or more�”2 He takes issue with “cultural” explanations for the outcome 
of 4 June 1942, specifically the extent to which Japanese war strategy and naval 
doctrine were descendants of Oriental philosophy and the children of a culture 
that valued conformity and obedience over creativity and personal initiative� 
Levy rightly concludes that American “diligence” more than any other single fac-
tor contributed to the total destruction of the Japanese carrier fleet sent against 
Midway�3 
Levy devotes special attention to Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully’s book 
Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, a work whose scholarly 
thoroughness he lauds yet one he simultaneously indicts for an obsession with 
debunking myths about Midway and with demonstrating that its outcome was to 
be found in Japanese practice and doctrine�4 In the 
process he gives rather short shrift to the degree 
to which their account of the early episodes of 
the war in the Pacific supports his own argument: 
that the U�S� Navy applied itself diligently and 
thoroughly to the requirements of carrier warfare 
in the Pacific, in such greater measure than its 
adversary that the resulting triumph reversed the 
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direction of the Pacific War within six months of its opening gambit at Pearl 
Harbor� In a careful reading of both engagements, the battle of Midway and the 
battle of the Coral Sea, one is struck by those specific qualities of the U�S� Navy 
that in the first six months of the Pacific War made it especially ripe for a major 
victory over the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)� 
Admittedly, Parshall and Tully level many substantive criticisms against the es-
tablished scholarly myths about Midway and trace much of the IJN’s thought and 
action to systemic factors derived as much from a way of life as from the practical 
challenges of modern naval warfare� Yet in this they are in the good company of 
other works, such as Kaigun, by David Evans and Mark Peattie, that locate much 
of the spirit of Japanese early naval thought in the mystical bent of Akiyama 
Saneyuki, whose most baleful impact on the IJN of World War II was, ironically, 
a Mahanian faith in decisive battle that the U�S� Navy no longer shared�5 In Levy’s 
effort to make the case for American diligence in preparation for Midway, howev-
er, Levy himself fails to pay sufficient attention to a factor appropriately stressed 
by Parshall and Tully in the introduction and conclusion of their analysis, one 
that cannot be excluded from any responsible treatment of Midway—the learn-
ing culture developed in the white heat of conflict between the battle of the Coral 
Sea and the battle of Midway� The U�S� Navy’s greatest triumph was the product 
less of Japanese cultural pathologies than of the intellectual profit the Americans 
gained from the lesser engagement only a month before� For Parshall and Tully, 
Coral Sea was in many respects the overture to the opera, so much so that what 
happened at Midway is not wholly comprehensible without an understanding of 
the outcome of the earlier engagement, as well as of the American and Japanese 
reactions to it� Any study of Midway ought to acknowledge that the limited en-
counter of the first instance that exerted decision influence on the main event of 
the second is not unlike the relationship of the battle of Ligny to Waterloo�
All histories of Midway, of course, acknowledge up front the enormous con-
tribution of the code breakers at Pearl Harbor in giving the U�S� Navy actionable 
information on the movements of Japanese task forces in the Pacific, along with 
coherent calculations of the intentions behind them� In the early months of 1942 
the U�S� Navy had an emerging image of the overall operational situation in the 
central and western Pacific, and in the weeks leading up to Midway it was also 
able to sketch a plausible tactical picture of the coming clash with the IJN� As this 
knowledge evolved, changes to command structure were also made, the better 
to integrate intelligence with command� Whereas Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto 
sailed with the Japanese Combined Fleet to Midway, which is consistent with the 
custom of decentralized command common to all navies of the time, Admiral 
Chester Nimitz remained at Pearl Harbor to orchestrate the U�S� Navy’s response 
to the Midway attack� Eliot Cohen and John Gooch note in their study of failure 
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in war that “Nimitz’s behavior at Midway suggests that the U�S� Navy did not sim-
ply refuse to change its traditional attitudes to command, painful as that might 
prove�”6 Yamamoto’s preference for sticking with what he assumed to be the tried-
and-true meant that he had all the foggier notion of what awaited him at Midway�
What awaited him, however, had to a significant extent been determined by 
the outcome of the Coral Sea battle only a month earlier and by the determina-
tion of the U�S� Navy to make the most of both the material balance of forces 
following that battle, and the lessons learned in its prosecution� The battle of the 
Coral Sea, the first-ever clash of aircraft-carrier fleets, had been occasioned by 
Japan’s efforts in the first stage of the Pacific War to establish a chain of air bases 
across the southwest Pacific and to seize Port Moresby on the southern coast of 
New Guinea, to maintain access to the Coral Sea and any potential targets in 
northeast Australia� These plans were short-circuited by the U�S� Navy’s Task 
Force (TF) 17, commanded by Rear Admiral Jack Fletcher� On 7 and 8 May 1942, 
attacks by Fletcher’s aircraft mauled the Japanese invasion in its opening phase 
sufficiently to force the postponement of any follow-through on the larger plan� 
Thus although the Coral Sea fight was a marginal tactical victory for the IJN, in 
terms of ships and tonnage sunk, it amounted to a small strategic triumph for 
the U�S� Navy� 
However, the material knock-on effects of the Coral Sea conflict were highly 
significant� At the beginning of 1942 the IJN had a quantitative edge over the 
U�S� Navy’s carrier force� Japan had six fleet carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Hiryū, Sōryū, 
Shōkaku, and Zuikaku. In addition, the light carriers Hōshō, Ryujo, Shōhō, and 
Zuihō were available to support operations of the fleet carriers� The United 
States had five fleet carriers available for operations in the Pacific� The design 
and capabilities across all classes varied enormously; USS Lexington (CV 2) and 
USS Saratoga (CV 3) were converted cruisers dating to the 1920s, whereas USS 
Yorktown (CV 5), USS Enterprise (CV 6), and USS Hornet (CV 8) were the first 
genuinely modern fleet carriers� At Coral Sea, Japanese aircraft were able to sink 
Lexington and inflict serious damage to Yorktown. In return American aircraft 
destroyed Shōhō� 
Parshall and Tully, as well as Craig Symonds in his book on Midway, note that 
the overall material damage rendered at Coral Sea to the IJN’s fighting capacity 
went well beyond the ships sunk outright� Although Shōhō’s loss was hardly a 
body blow, the damage to the fleet carrier Shōkaku was sufficient to strike it from 
the roster for the Midway operation, and Zuikaku was withdrawn as well, owing 
entirely to aircraft losses� In this instance a factor intervened in the aftermath of 
Coral Sea that might be deemed “cultural” but that was, strictly speaking, organi-
zational in nature� Parshall and Tully point out that the IJN could have attempted 
to reconstitute Zuikaku’s air wing in time for Midway but that such a change 
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would have violated an organizational custom that married Japanese air units to 
specific carriers� If either a ship or its air wing were not in condition for opera-
tions, both were withdrawn� So Coral Sea took one light IJN carrier, Shōhō, out 
of action permanently, while two heavy carriers slated for the attack on Midway, 
Shōkaku and Zuikaku, would not be there�7 The IJN decided to take four, not six, 
carriers to its showdown at Midway� 
Furthermore, before Coral Sea the Japanese had a wide edge over the U�S� 
Navy in experienced pilots� At Coral Sea they lost many of their best pilots, while 
their comparatively green American adversaries gained valuable experience in 
the art of attacking Japanese carriers�8 What Fletcher’s force achieved at Coral 
Sea, therefore, amounted to much more than a short-term check to Japanese 
strategic plans; it seriously compromised the total strength the IJN could bring 
to bear against the American carriers at Midway� Paul Dull, in his battle history 
of the IJN, wonders whether these losses alone might have deprived Japan of the 
smashing victory at Midway�9 
Even if one sets aside such speculation, Coral Sea was at the very least an in-
stallment on a future defeat� If a cornerstone of Japanese strategic doctrine was 
to employ overwhelming force and advantage of numbers, Coral Sea sharply 
reduced that advantage; “if an objective wasn’t important enough to require 
sending all six carriers,” Parshall and Tully remind us, “it wasn’t worth going 
after at all,” so that “Japan paid the ultimate price for her violation a month later 
at Midway�”10
That the price at Midway turned out to be so high was the U�S� Navy’s achieve-
ment, both in making the most of the strategic opportunity that sound intelli-
gence afforded it and in drawing tactical lessons from Coral Sea to maximize the 
dividend offered by the opportunity at hand� The effect of the IJN’s decision to 
scratch off two carriers from the Midway operation following Coral Sea was com-
pounded by the U�S� Navy’s extraordinary efforts to ensure that Yorktown, badly 
damaged but able to escape destruction, would be repaired and refitted in time 
to rejoin the hostilities� Whereas under normal circumstances Yorktown would 
have required three months to refit, Admiral Nimitz gave the 1,400 fabricators, 
shipfitters, and welders at the dry-dock facility at Pearl Harbor less than three 
days of around-the-clock labor in which to patch and replace what they could� 
The effort drew so much electrical power that some districts of Honolulu suf-
fered outages� Symonds stresses that “whereas Yamamoto assumed that the loss 
of Shōkaku and Zuikaku only narrowed the Kido Butai’s [carrier force’s] margin 
of superiority, Nimitz knew that if the Americans were to have any chance against 
the oncoming juggernaut, they would need all three of their carriers�”11 By using 
the available intelligence to contrive an ambush of the Japanese force in Midway’s 
proximity, he improved the odds further� Along with Enterprise and Hornet, the 
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presence of Yorktown plus the use of the airstrip on Midway Island would give 
Nimitz four platforms from which to launch aircraft—parity with the Japanese 
force that at no other time and place in the opening months of the war in the 
Pacific had been possible� 
Meanwhile, the Japanese command assumed that Coral Sea had put both Lex-
ington and Yorktown out of action� Whether or not one indicts “victory disease” 
for the overconfidence in proceeding with the Midway operation, the casualness 
with which the IJN reduced by a third the forces it intended to employ stands in 
stark contrast to American effort to retrieve Yorktown from near death to fight-
ing fitness� It is important to underscore, moreover, that Yorktown’s presence 
at Midway was valuable far beyond the mathematical balance of carriers� Spe-
cifically, the experience of Yorktown’s aviators at Midway sharpened American 
air-strike capabilities significantly� John Lundstrom’s study of naval air combat 
in the Pacific notes that Coral Sea was the first acid test of American naval car-
rier doctrine� Although there was little time between the Coral Sea and Midway 
engagements to study and apply the lessons of the former for systematic applica-
tion to the latter, “the Yorktown aviators were the only ones in a position to profit 
from their hard-earned Coral Sea experiences, and their excellent performance 
at Midway demonstrated the value of those lessons�”12 At Coral Sea, American 
naval fighter pilots had been introduced to the storied A6M Zero fighter, and 
they had appreciated the remarkable maneuverability of the Japanese fighter 
while learning that their own F4F-3 Wildcats were its equal in speed and climb-
ing ability and its superior in firepower and protection�13 Although Yorktown’s air 
group was reorganized prior to Midway—both to facilitate an increase in overall 
fighter strength in time for Midway and to integrate the new F4F-4 folding-wing 
Wildcats into its numbers—leaders such as Lieutenant John S� (“Jimmy”) Thach 
listened to the accounts of Yorktown’s flyers of their Coral Sea experiences� A 
hastily innovated version of the “Thach Weave” beam-defense position debuted 
at Midway under the most challenging circumstances and was remarkably ef-
fective in meeting Japanese fighter attacks�14 So, not only was Yorktown available 
for action northwest of Midway Atoll on 4 June 1942, but the experience that its 
aviators acquired at Coral Sea was integrated into the Midway force through the 
American mix-and-match approach to carriers and air wings, an approach from 
which the IJN abstained�
There is no need to engage in discussions of cultural contrasts between 
American and Japanese naval traditions or to work over the latter for real or 
imagined strategic pathologies to acknowledge that the United States brought 
organizational flexibility to the engagement and extracted every ounce of innova-
tive energy in its determination to prevail� Levy’s stress on American diligence is 
wholly in harmony with Parshall and Tully’s observations that with the overnight 
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refitting of Yorktown the U�S� Navy was already benefiting from superior organi-
zational practices before the trial of strength at Midway�15 In addition, it mattered 
a great deal not only that the U�S� Navy was to have a third carrier for Midway 
but that Admiral Nimitz gave tactical command of the two task forces (TF 16, 
with Enterprise and Hornet, and TF 17, with Yorktown), joined for the ambush 
of the Japanese force closing on Midway, to Fletcher—together, a commander 
and ships with more experience in combat with Japanese carriers than any other 
combination available�
Owing to combat experience of Coral Sea battle and the efficient launch of 
torpedo planes, fighters, and dive-bombers of Yorktown’s air group, Fletcher’s 
team was the only force to arrive over its target almost exactly according to navi-
gational calculation to deliver a timely and coordinated attack� Torpedo bombers 
were launched first, followed by dive-bombers, and then, in turn, the fighters� 
The objective of this procedure, that the three groups would rendezvous before 
encountering the Japanese, involved a quantum of risk, but Yorktown had already 
rehearsed en route with considerable success at Coral Sea� Other American car-
rier aircraft formations at Midway flew in small groups and became separated, 
but Yorktown’s remained closely coordinated, “with each of the tactical elements 
remaining in sight of each other up until the time they initiated their attack�”16 
Because Yorktown’s dive-bombers, to their own amazement, came upon the Japa-
nese carrier Sōryū without the cover of any combat air patrol (CAP), their attack 
was devastating� Seventeen SBD Douglas Dauntless dive-bombers, under Lieu-
tenant Commander Maxwell Leslie, scored three hits on Sōryū with thousand-
pound bombs, destroying its flight deck and gutting its hangar below� 
In combination with the destruction of Akagi and Kaga by the dive-bombers 
of TF 16, the IJN lost three of its four carriers (and the battle of Midway) in 
scarcely more than five minutes of action�17 Because dive-bombers from Enter-
prise had initially been unable to locate the Japanese carriers and had arrived 
over them from the southwest almost at the same time as Leslie’s strike force ar-
rived from the east, the Japanese carriers were caught from two directions at the 
moment of maximum vulnerability, when their flight decks were covered with 
aircraft preparing for launch� Not only did the U�S� Navy air groups approach 
from separate axes at approximately the same time, but they came in at high and 
low altitudes, presenting the Japanese air defenses with a challenge beyond their 
capability� Although coincidence accounted for this (what Parshall and Tully call 
“a healthy dollop of bad luck”), the impression among the Japanese that the U�S� 
Navy had such accurate knowledge of their position that it could synchronize 
attacks from different directions must have been psychologically devastating�18 It 
was certainly materially catastrophic�
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Other factors, then, contributed directly or indirectly to the scale of the 
American triumph� Among them were the improvements made to the U�S� Navy’s 
combat air patrol, based in part on the failure of American fighters at Coral Sea 
to break up Japanese strike forces before they could close in on the American 
carriers� Fighter direction and CAP at Midway were more effective (Task Force 
16 escaped attack entirely) when the idea of a layered CAP, aircraft operating at 
different altitudes, was applied to carrier defense� Even after Midway, American 
CAP required further development, principally through multicarrier task forces 
with highly integrated CAPs, but the effort to learn and adapt from recent expe-
rience was very much in evidence among the American fighters on 4 June 1942� 
By contrast, the IJN’s CAP did not improve significantly between Coral Sea and 
Midway and did little to compensate for Yamamoto’s misty appreciation of his 
enemy’s dispositions around Midway� Admittedly, Japanese pilots had to operate 
without the early-warning capabilities of radar; still, as Parshall and Tully point 
out, relatively simple tactical improvements could have improved the defense of 
the IJN’s carriers�19 One cannot help but be struck by the fact that the IJN’s CAP 
in no way compensated at the tactical level for Japan’s inferior operational intelli-
gence, so that the ambush effect hoped for by the U�S� Navy’s command unfolded 
largely as planned�
The limitations of the damage-control practices on board Japanese carriers, 
meanwhile, ensured that once the American dive-bombers scored major hits, 
the chances of recovering operational effectiveness diminished quickly� We have 
here another instance of contrast with the learning culture of the U�S� Navy fol-
lowing Coral Sea� It was at Coral Sea that Oscar Myers, Yorktown’s Air Depart-
ment fuel officer, realized that among the factors that sealed the unhappy fate of 
Lexington was the presence of aviation fuel on its hangar deck� Because the U�S� 
Navy thereafter drained fuel systems after usage and filled the lines with CO2, 
Yorktown was spared the ravages of a runaway fire when it absorbed a major Japa-
nese dive-bomber assault� The patched-up Yorktown was actually more resilient 
under attack at Midway; the carrier that had contributed so much to the U�S� 
Navy’s heroic struggle in 1942 ultimately succumbed not to bombs but to tor-
pedoes� Fifteen aircraft from Yorktown’s bombing group were able to participate 
in the retaliatory strike from Enterprise that began the destruction of Hiryū, the 
fourth and last IJN carrier at Midway�20 Lastly, the extraordinary performance of 
the U�S� Navy’s torpedo bombers and dive-bombers must be noted—the former 
sacrificed in the battle’s opening phase to annihilating attacks from Japanese 
fighters while the latter delivered the fatal blows to the IJN’s carriers when there 
were comparatively fewer Japanese fighters to meet them� Indeed, Yorktown’s 
third bombing group was unruffled by fighters during or after its attack� After 
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initial misses, the American dive-bomber pilots settled into a rhythm of multiple 
hits with five-hundred-pound and thousand-pound bombs on such vital parts of 
the Japanese carriers that even appropriate damage control would have been hard 
pressed to save them�
Above all, it is Levy’s point about diligence (a point not missed, and indeed 
stressed, by Parshall and Tully) that needs to be underscored� A culture of learn-
ing, arising from experience rather than theory and shared in the weeks between 
Coral Sea and Midway at every level of the U�S� Navy’s carrier task forces, meant 
that ultimately victory was earned by the Americans rather than thrown away 
by the Japanese� Levy is right to conclude that military historians are too quick 
to apportion blame� An almost perverse fascination with failure often seems 
to mark qualification for the profession� I do not share his aversion to cultural 
explanations for behavior in battle any more than I share the attraction of oth-
ers to such explanations� Cultural factors are simply harder to measure and less 
satisfying as an explanation than is a careful reconstruction of what actually hap-
pened� I do share Levy’s enthusiasm for Eric Grove’s scholarship on the Philip-
pine Sea, and I recommend that his stress on technology and training be applied 
to Midway, along with emphasis on the extraordinary application of hard-won 
knowledge in evidence in the U�S� Navy in the early months of the Pacific War�21 
This knowledge was remarkably on duty at all levels: Chester Nimitz’s courage 
in acting on the intelligence in his possession, to toss the iron dice on a fight as 
big and potentially disastrous as Midway, was complemented by the decisions 
of Fletcher and Spruance (in a knife-edge balance of prudence with bravery) 
to launch air strikes before they had perfect knowledge of the enemy’s position 
and intentions� Their commitment to tactical conviction, however, was in turn 
redeemed by the tenacity, skill, and personal sacrifice of the U�S� Navy’s bombers, 
scout planes, and F4F pilots in delivering a staggering blow to Japanese carrier-
borne airpower� John Keegan points out that for Midway, American cryptanalysts 
provided a picture “as clear as the obscurities of war will ever allow” but that a 
little less intuition by the pilots engaged to act on it might have compromised that 
advantage�22 Happily, the recent experience of Coral Sea in aerial reconnaissance, 
tactics of aerial combat, and techniques of dive-bombing made that intuition 
especially acute� Whereas the years between 1909 and 1941 witnessed the rise of 
Japanese naval airpower, the spring of 1942 marked the beginning of its sudden 
and steep decline�23
Nothing in the actions of the U�S� Navy indicates that its personnel believed 
God was on their side at Midway and so all would simply be well; to the contrary, 
every fiber of arm, heart, and brain was applied to narrowing the advantage of 
a foe who had hitherto seemed invincible� If there was a “miracle” at work at 
Midway, then surely it was that the U�S� Navy, at every level, drew all the right 
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conclusions from one engagement for application to the next� Any familiarity 
with military history teaches us that this virtue is so rare as to tempt the conclu-
sion that, if not the Almighty, then surely Sweet Reason intervened wholly to the 
benefit of one side�
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A STRATEGY HAS TO BE ABLE TO WORK TO BE MASTERFUL
Alan D. Zimm
Commander Zimm is a member of the Johns Hop-
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Naval War College Review, Winter 2015, Vol. 68, No. 1 
This essay was written in response to an article by Angelo N� Caravaggio, “‘Win-
ning’ the Pacific War: The Masterful Strategy of Commander Minoru Genda,” 
which appeared in the Winter 2014 issue of the Naval War College Review (pages 
85–118)� 
Dr� Caravaggio takes to task “criticisms leveled at the Japanese for their ‘ill 
conceived’ or ‘poorly planned’ attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941�” Since 
his endnote supporting this comment listed only my Attack on Pearl Harbor: 
Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions as a source of this criticism, the finger ap-
pears to be pointed directly at me� Understandably, I was eager to learn more of 
Genda’s masterful strategy and to learn how I had missed Genda’s “depth of vision 
and professional intellect�” I was disappointed�
Dr� Caravaggio’s article never substantiates his view that Genda’s planning for 
the Pearl Harbor attack was in any way masterful� None of my criticisms were 
addressed, nor was there any explanation of how my analysis was inaccurate� I 
found no evidence in the article of any strategic planning created by Genda—only 
a few suggested courses of action that the author assumes were masterful, without 
any real evaluation as to their feasibility�
Genda was the lead planner for the Pearl Harbor strike� In my previous life 
as a commander in the U�S� Navy, performing exercise analysis, I gained some 
experience in evaluating and criticizing operational planning� I found Genda’s 
plan full of poor decisions, with some outright blunders, even considering the 
state of the art of the time�
If Dr� Caravaggio contends that the attack was not “poorly planned,” he will 
need to address the deficiencies that I have identified in Attack on Pearl Harbor 
—twenty-one specific, major problems� The following are a few of the most sig-
nificant that are related to planning�
•  Genda’s plan for the torpedo bombers em-
ployed a horrendously complicated target-
prioritization scheme that could not have been 
executed even under the best of conditions� 
It resulted in an overconcentration on two 
battleships, as well as other targeting errors� 
One-third of the torpedo hits were wasted on 
inappropriate targets or in overkill� 
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• The prioritization scheme assigned primary (battleship) and secondary 
(cruiser) targets� There was enough force to allocate killing firepower to six 
of the eight battleships and all the cruisers� The plan, however, provided for 
no positive command and control over the attack as a whole, with the result 
that not one torpedo bomber intentionally attacked a cruiser, and only one 
bomb hit a cruiser�
• The approach formation chosen by the planners for the torpedo bomb-
ers was dangerously wrong� The torpedo bombers did not approach in a 
mutually supporting defensive formation but rather in long, one-at-a-time, 
line-ahead “strings�” The heavily loaded aircraft, flying “low and slow” in this 
formation, would have been appallingly vulnerable had there been any U�S� 
fighters over the harbor—even a few of the obsolete P-26s based in the area�
• The torpedo bombers’ formation did not allow for anything other than “fol-
low me” leadership, which contributed to poor target selection�
• Due to a lack of practice (another of the planner’s responsibilities) and 
a poor means to communicate which attack plan had been selected, the 
torpedo bombers spread and straggled, with aircraft intervals as large as five 
hundred to 1,200 yards instead of the planned one hundred yards� 
• The torpedo attack lacked simultaneity� The bomber strings attacked one at a 
time� An attack that should have taken ninety seconds stretched into eleven 
or twelve minutes, allowing time for more antiaircraft (AA) gunners to get 
into the action� Five of the last seven torpedo bombers were shot down� Had 
there been any warning, this would have likely been near the loss rate for the 
entire torpedo force�
• No contingency plan was provided should the carriers be absent, other than 
“find another target�” Some pilots misidentified USS Utah and wasted torpe-
does on this demilitarized target ship� Others aborted their runs and chose 
other attack routes to other targets�
• Attack routes conflicted� Many routes crossed within groups and among 
groups� When the aircraft assigned to attack carriers went for other tar-
gets, the result was several near collisions, causing attack runs to abort and 
one aircraft to jettison its torpedo� The reattacks allowed more time for the 
defenders to shoot them down� This was the fault of the planners, not the 
aviators�
• Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s objective was to sink battleships (the symbol of 
sea power) and thereby inflict a shock to the morale of the American people 
to induce them to come to a negotiated peace� Genda undermined his boss’s 
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objective by disproportionately assigning torpedo and dive-bombers to 
strike carriers�
• No fighter “top cover” was assigned� The few U�S� fighters that managed to 
get aloft had clear runs at Japanese bombers�
• No fighters were assigned to escort the main effort—that is, the torpedo 
bombers—to the harbor� The fighters broke off to strafe airfields, leaving 
the torpedo bombers undefended for the last ten to twenty miles of their 
approach� 
• The plan assumed clear visibility and unlimited (CVU) weather conditions� 
The dive-bombers were trained in an attack technique that required CVU 
weather up to twelve thousand feet� When the second-wave dive-bombers 
encountered dense clouds between three and five thousand feet, they could 
not bomb, and their bombsights were not capable of lower-altitude glide-
bombing� As a result, the dive-bombers’ hit percentage was miserable� Only 
two hits were scored on targets appropriate to the dive-bombers’ 250- 
kilogram general-purpose bombs by the seventy-eight bombers that arrived 
over the harbor� Their only “kill” was the naval shipyard “gedunk” wagon, 
which was eviscerated, scattering ice cream and pies all over a quay near Ho-
nolulu� If the dive-bombers had performed as expected, with the firepower 
they had they could have sunk all the cruisers in the harbor� As it was, they 
scored only one hit on a cruiser—again, a result of poor anticipation by the 
planners, not poor execution by the aviators�
• The plan, as briefed, included sinking a ship in the channel if one was found 
under way� The second-wave dive-bombers found the battleship USS Nevada 
under way, and probably fourteen to eighteen dive-bombers attacked it, 
scoring five hits with bombs that did not have the capability to penetrate the 
ship’s deck armor� The ship sank, but owing to damage-control and design 
errors, which the Japanese could not have anticipated (and for which they 
should not be given credit)� The planners knew that these bombs were not 
lethal against battleships and that it would normally take over sixty such hits 
to produce any expectation of sinking one, yet they planned for it anyway—a 
waste of bombs� 
• The planners did not make the elementary calculation needed to determine 
whether a sunken battleship could actually block the channel� As it was, even 
if a ship had sunk at a right angle to the channel and in the exact center, the 
channel was wide enough to allow ships to pass in either direction�
• There was no planned suppression of enemy air defenses, though the Japa-
nese employed such techniques in China� U�S� AA was a major factor in 
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disrupting the attack and reducing weapons-delivery accuracy to well below 
expectations�
• The planners assumed they would achieve surprise� There were no contin-
gency plans should surprise be lost, even though they knew that the carrier 
force would attack the island even if it had been sighted as much as twenty- 
four hours in advance� It was not until the day before the force departed 
Japan, when Admiral Yamamoto reminded its crews of the quality of their 
opponents and “the snare of overconfidence,” that the planners realized their 
plan was not robust enough to deal with conditions other than those envi-
sioned by their initial, rigid, assumptions� En route to the launch point, the 
planners cobbled together an inadequate “no surprise” contingency plan� The 
means by which it would be communicated to the first-wave aircraft, while 
en route to the target, which plan was to be executed—by firing flares—was 
not well considered� The flare signal was misinterpreted by some of the force, 
which resulted in a string of blunders that caused the attacking formations to 
lose all cohesion in their approach, while other elements executed the wrong 
plan�
Overall, the attack force had the killing capacity to destroy or sink six battle-
ships and eight cruisers, with additional overkill hits available to ensure this 
result� The killing ordnance (actual hits delivered that were sufficient to destroy 
or sink the target) destroyed or sank only three battleships� The attack achieved 
21 percent of its potential�
This was a poorly planned attack� It does not reflect any particular depth of 
vision or professional intellect� Dr� Caravaggio’s statement that any shortfalls in 
the results arose because Genda’s plan was “just not executed as originally envi-
sioned” is specious� Most of the faults of execution can be traced to deficiencies 
in planning� It is possible that the author was referring only to masterful strategic- 
level planning, but the text of his article is not clear on this� In Genda’s initial 
evaluation of the idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor, he suggested that the strike be 
followed by the invasion and capture of Oahu� Dr� Caravaggio chides those who 
vetoed this idea, as if they had rejected a war-winning strategy� However, he does 
not mention why the Naval General Staff originally dismissed it� 
A member of the Naval General Staff Planning Section, Captain Shigenori 
Kami, was asked to investigate an invasion of Hawaii� Kami found that the 
islands were not self-sufficient in food, noting that 2,900,000 tons had been 
shipped there in 1941� He calculated that, under Japanese occupation, thirty 
ships a month would be required to feed the population, with another thirty 
ships a month for military supplies� Considering the distance of the routes and 
the turnaround times (as well as potential losses from submarines), far more than 
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sixty ships would have been required, ships that Japan did not have� The Japanese 
military had taken over two million tons out of commercial service to support 
its offensive, which it intended to return before their absence could cripple the 
industrial effort; to withdraw half a million tons permanently was not support-
able, and the scheme would have presented a stream of targets that would have 
been an American submariner’s dream� A discussion of this study can be found 
in John Stephan’s Hawaii under the Rising Sun: Japan’s Plan for Conquest after 
Pearl Harbor (2002), cited in the article’s endnotes� The Japanese rightly rejected 
the idea of invading Oahu at the outset of the war� If they had taken Hawaii, they 
could not have held it� This strategic idea was not masterful; it had no depth of 
vision, because it did not consider what had to follow�
My own criticisms of the Pearl Harbor strategy are that the attack displaced 
an existing plan around which the Japanese navy was designed and built and that 
it forced the United States into a course of action that would nearly guarantee a 
Japanese defeat�
The Japanese fleet was designed around a concept wherein the U�S� fleet would 
be lured to the west, escorting the large amphibious force required to retake the 
Philippines� The American fleet would be subject to attrition by submarines, 
long-range aviation, carrier strikes, and destroyer and cruiser night torpedo at-
tacks� After inflicting significant losses, the Japanese expected to close and crush 
the U�S� fleet in a battle-line engagement� With the U�S� fleet annihilated (as the 
Russians’ had been at Tsushima), there would follow, the Japanese assumed, a 
favorable negotiated peace� 
Their dilemma was that this plan had to be carried out early in the war, before 
the vast American industrial capability could develop� The Japanese calculated 
that the Americans were building three to five tons of warships for every ton 
coming out of Japanese yards and that by 1944 the fleet tonnage ratio would be 
ten to three� The Japanese needed to lure the Americans into a decisive battle 
quickly, while the fleets were roughly comparable� 
However, if the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor succeeded, they knew, the 
Americans would not come early� There would be no incentive for the Ameri-
cans to engage in decisive battle until their fleet was repaired and reinforced to 
overwhelming strength� The strategic mechanism for victory, then, was changed 
from that of annihilating the U�S� fleet to undermining the morale of the Ameri-
can people by sinking a few battleships at Pearl Harbor—a strategy forced on the 
Japanese by Yamamoto� They rationalized the new strategy as “protecting the 
flank of the southern advance,” when in fact a successful attack on Pearl Harbor 
would negate Japan’s only potential war-winning strategy� Dr� Caravaggio does 
not address this analysis or explain why he believes the strategy of an attack on 
Pearl Harbor reflects depth of vision by Commander Genda�
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Genda originally suggested that the Japanese carriers remain off Hawaii and 
deliver follow-on strikes to “deny the use of Pearl Harbor as an operating base�” 
In my book, I calculate that, optimistically, a follow-on strike would destroy at 
most 6 percent of the area of the naval shipyard, and I point out that there was sig-
nificant regeneration capability in the tenders and civilian shipyard at Honolulu� 
Even further reattacks would not eliminate Pearl Harbor as a base; the Japanese 
carrier magazines simply did not carry enough ordnance� I would also nudge the 
author toward the calculation of probable losses by the Japanese attackers from 
AA and any residual fighter capacity� The Japanese carrier force could easily lose 
half to three-quarters of its aircraft and pilots in repeated vain attempts to put out 
of service a base that could be readily regenerated� Considering that the Japanese 
had few aviators in reserve and a painfully small and inflexible pilot training 
program, such losses certainly would have changed the course of the war in the 
Pacific, putting half or more of the Japanese carriers out of service for six months 
for lack of pilots� In addition, the idea of remaining off Oahu for repeated strikes 
discounts the American submarine capability� There were four submarines in 
Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, with others operating in adjoining train-
ing areas� These submarines, even with defective torpedoes, could have severely 
discomfited the Japanese fleet or any convoy of amphibious and support ships, 
especially considering the poor Japanese antisubmarine warfare capability� Lastly, 
the Japanese striking force simply did not have the fuel to hover off Oahu, nor 
did it have a logistics train that could support extended forward operations far 
from bases�
A strategy has to be able to work to be masterful� 
Dr� Caravaggio seems also to believe that it would be possible to take Oahu 
with two (later revised to three) Japanese infantry divisions� He does not identify 
where these divisions would be obtained, along with the eighty-odd ships re-
quired for their transport, and more for their sustainment� The Japanese Three-
Phase Offensive was stretched thin in troops and vessels, and Japan’s operations 
in the Philippines, Indochina, and the Netherlands East Indies were only possible 
through careful staging and reuse of merchant ships in each succeeding wave of 
landings� The Imperial Army had refused to provide additional divisions to at-
tack what it saw as naval objectives� 
The author appears to agree with Genda’s assessment that taking Hawaii would 
be a “knockout punch�” Yamamoto had considered this strategy and thought 
that having 400,000 American citizens under his control would bring the United 
States to the negotiating table� As in the case of his belief that sinking four battle-
ships at Pearl Harbor would break the Americans’ morale, I suggest that this idea 
is flawed� The capture of Oahu would likely have further enraged the American 
population, possibly to the extent that the “Germany first” strategy would be 
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abandoned and U�S� forces concentrated instead against the Japanese� Consider-
ing that most of the Japanese gains in the first phase of the war were due to a 
vacuum of U�S� and British power, it is likely that, had U�S� air, ground, and naval 
assets been directed initially against Japan, Japan would have been overwhelmed 
earlier, resulting in a stay of execution for Germany but a disaster for Japan� 
As noted, the author seems to accept that two or three Japanese infantry divi-
sions could overcome Oahu’s two defending U�S� Army divisions, each with two 
regular and one National Guard regiment� Japanese infantry divisions were not 
well suited to combat against opponents heavy in firepower, as the 80 percent 
losses suffered in 1939 at Nomonhan against the Soviets demonstrated, as did 
the failure of Japanese wave attacks during the Guadalcanal campaign� The lack 
of Japanese artillery would not be made up by shore bombardment or by close 
air support, as the Japanese ships and carrier aviators were not trained, equipped, 
or supplied for these roles� As for the prospects of success through a flanking 
strategy, traversing a mountain chain on the eastern side of Oahu (as mentioned 
approvingly in the article), Japan’s lack of success using a similar strategy in New 
Guinea, along the Kokoda Trail, is well known�
Which brings us to what the article contends is the “opportunity lost”— 
Genda’s proposal after Pearl Harbor to collect troops from Guam, survivors of 
the Wake Island assault force, and forces earmarked for the seizure of Rabaul and 
redirect them to invade Midway and Johnston Islands� Dr� Caravaggio contends 
that this “plan” is a “clear [indication] of [Genda’s] impressive ability to connect 
the strategic imperative with the tactical necessity�” 
I would have been more impressed with Genda’s “strategy” (really, an off-
the-cuff suggestion, with little thought to feasibility) if there had been a more 
detailed look at the practicality of the suggested actions� From where were the 
ships coming that would move these troops? Where were the logistics, and the 
intelligence? Was there sufficient force to carry off multiple opposed amphibious 
operations successfully? 
The Japanese did not have a good record of opposed amphibious assaults� The 
first landing at Wake Island was repulsed, the landings at Rabaul succeeded only 
on beaches where they were unopposed, and the invasion of the Philippines at 
Lingayen Gulf was nearly stymied by a single �50-caliber machine-gun post� 
The Rabaul invasion force was embarked on 14 January 1942� This is the 
earliest date on which Genda’s proposal could have been put into motion� There 
was no shipping to pick up the troops occupying Guam without displacing 
other Japanese movements, a very unlikely option� American reinforcements to 
Midway began 17 December, and additional infantry, coastal batteries, and anti-
aircraft were in place by 26 December, while reinforcements were in motion for 
Johnston� (See Glen Williford’s Racing the Sunrise: Reinforcing America’s Pacific 
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Outposts, 1941–1942, published in 2010, for more on the reinforcement of the 
Pacific Islands after Pearl Harbor�) Genda’s “strategy” would not strike a vacuum� 
It was impractical and not within the capabilities of the available forces�
The Japanese showed throughout the war that they lacked flexibility and were 
less effective when operating outside preestablished plans� Genda’s strategic sug-
gestion took no account of Japanese capabilities to execute the idea or of potential 
U�S� countermeasures� Dr� Caravaggio would have a difficult time convincing any 
U�S� Marine that a pickup team of Japanese soldiers without local intelligence or 
proper assault or logistics planning, short on landing craft, and with no particular 
preparation or advance planning could have taken and held these islands�
It is easy to say an idea is brilliant, divorced from messy questions regarding 
feasibility� But details of practicability are important� Genda could just as well have 
suggested an invasion of Los Angeles or the capture of Washington, D�C� Both 
would have been brilliant coups and would have changed the course of the war, 
but would have been masterful strategies only if they had potential to succeed�
However, Dr� Caravaggio is to be praised for bringing attention to the inter-
views between Gordon Prange and Genda and the other Japanese officers� He has 
brought forward some new information to the historical community� Yet I would 
caution readers to be careful in accepting the accompanying analysis� Dr� Cara-
vaggio’s effusive praise for Genda’s strategy needs scrutiny before that strategy 
can be accepted as masterful�
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BOOK REVIEWS
WARTIME RELIGION
Jenkins, Philip� The Great and Holy War: How World War I Became a Religious Crusade. New York: 
HarperOne, 2014� 438pp� $29�95
The roots of today’s sectarian-fueled 
conflicts lie in the First World War� By 
igniting “a global religious revolution,” 
the “Great War” redrew the world’s 
religious map both figuratively and 
literally� Modern Islam, characterized as 
“assertive, self-confident, and aggres-
sively sectarian,” is a direct result, but 
so too are the spread of charismatic 
Christianity in Africa, an invigorated 
Zionism that led to the eventual creation 
of the modern state of Israel, and even 
the “efflorescence of esoteric and mysti-
cal ideas that we often summarize as 
New Age�” So argues Philip Jenkins� Like 
other recent authors, Jenkins claims 
that the Great War in effect “created our 
reality�” This book, however, is note-
worthy for placing the war’s political, 
social, and cultural elements, and effects, 
within an explicitly religious context� 
Jenkins, distinguished professor of 
history and member of the Institute 
for the Study of Religion at Baylor 
University, has written an ambitious 
and highly readable book� Synthesiz-
ing military, cultural, and religious 
history and drawing principally from 
a vast body of secondary literature, 
the book is admirable in its reach even 
when it exceeds the author’s grasp� 
By focusing on the religious dimensions 
and consequences of the war, this book 
fills a historiographical gap, one in which 
wartime religion is commonly regarded 
as “irrelevant � � � window dressing” with 
“each side cynically appropriat[ing] God 
to its own narrow nationalist causes�” In-
stead, Jenkins takes seriously the decid-
edly religious worldview that informed 
the war’s belligerents� While there were 
national and religious disparities (for 
example, where Orthodox Russians 
cast the war in traditional “crusade” 
language, British rhetoric emphasized a 
“war for Christian civilization”), a com-
mon religious vocabulary of sacrifice, 
holy war, divine mission/mandate, 
crusade, and cosmic battle, marked by 
both apocalyptic fears and millenar-
ian hopes, was widely shared across 
national and faith-group boundaries� 
In Jenkins’s view, it was these war-fueled 
expectations and the ensuing wartime 
cataclysm that fundamentally shaped the 
postwar world� A more secularized Eu-
rope was a reaction to wartime religious 
excesses, even as that same “rhetoric of 
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the holy war and holy nation” coupled 
with apocalyptic ideas to “metastasize” 
into “Fascism, Nazism, and racial exter-
mination�” So too was the Russian Revo-
lution a religious civil war, the Bolshevik 
cause as messianic and millenarian in 
vision as it was antireligious in doctrine� 
Anti-imperial and anticolonial move-
ments in Africa and elsewhere were also 
parts of this postwar “worldwide mille-
narian upsurge�” Similarly, the war led to 
a proliferation of “charismatic, funda-
mentalist, [and] traditionalist forms of 
faith” within Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam� Moreover, the defeat and geo-
graphical division of the Ottoman Em-
pire created not only the modern Middle 
East but also, according to Jenkins, 
modern Islam� The loss of a geopoliti-
cal center and the caliphate resulted in a 
“postwar search for new sources of au-
thority [that] led to the creation or reviv-
al of virtually all the Islamic movements 
that we know in the modern world�” 
Like many of the book’s broadest claims, 
this last one falls a little short� Still, Jen-
kins’s  book is important and timely� The 
Great War might not have been a “war 
of religion” per se, but Jenkins shows 
how for its participants it was certainly 
religious� Most of all, Jenkins reminds 
us, as sectarian fighting continues over 
national boundaries drawn following 
that century-old war, of the continued 
relevance of religion’s global effects� 
BRAD CARTER
Naval War College
Manicom, James� Bridging Troubled Waters: Chi-
na, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China 
Sea. Georgetown Univ� Press, 2014� 280pp� $54�95
As the world reacts to an increasingly 
powerful and assertive China, East 
Asia’s maritime frontiers are emerging 
as friction points that threaten regional 
stability� James Manicom’s Bridging Trou-
bled Waters presents a timely analytical 
history of Sino-Japanese relations in the 
East China Sea and makes important 
contributions to understanding the 
prospects for maritime cooperation� The 
book authoritatively documents new 
insights regarding this complex state of 
evolving affairs, one that has included 
elements of cooperation, compromise, 
competition, and conflict� It employs a 
helpful analytical framework from which 
to argue for optimism, by demonstrating 
that Chinese and Japanese leaders have 
historically been able to manage tensions 
by decoupling material issues from stra-
tegic and symbolic differences� Manicom 
has a PhD from Flinders University in 
Australia and is an expert in East Asian 
security, specializing in maritime issues� 
A research fellowship at the Ocean Pol-
icy Research Foundation in Tokyo and 
trips to China and Japan positioned him 
well to deliver this systematic analysis�
Manicom constructs a unique matrix 
for evaluating the value of maritime 
space vis-à-vis national objectives and 
applies this construct to motivations for 
cooperation versus conflict� Manicom 
then uses this framework to interpret 
case studies from the Sino-Japanese 
maritime relationship, examining the 
dispute over islands in the East China 
Sea, fisheries management, agreements 
governing research at sea, and coopera-
tive arrangements in the Chunxiao gas 
field� Building on the insights delivered 
by these case studies, the book’s final 
chapter and conclusion focus on the 
current political dynamics in the Sino-
Japanese maritime relationship and 
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assess the prospects for successful man-
agement of tensions through a shared-
jurisdiction arrangement that satisfies 
both countries’ territorial objectives�
The book is a densely packed, academic 
work� The opening chapter, in which 
Manicom lays his theoretical founda-
tions and analytical framework, will 
demand particular effort from readers 
seeking immediate, practical insights� 
However, this academic investment is 
well worth the effort� The follow-up 
analysis is exceptionally insightful for 
not only academics but also policy mak-
ers, strategists, and military profession-
als� Its tone, however, reflects the fact 
that the author did most of his research 
in Japan (only five of the twenty-six 
interviews were conducted in Beijing), 
and Manicom seems intermittently chal-
lenged to shake a Japanese perspective� 
A more significant shortfall is that the 
book qualifies its strong case for opti-
mism with two significant caveats� First, 
Manicom notes that past cooperation 
has only resulted when “material issues 
have been separated from the more 
symbolic aspects of [Sino-Japanese] 
relations” and that the countries have the 
greatest difficulty finding paths to co-
operation over contested symbolic and 
strategic issues� Second, he qualifies his 
optimism also by stating that tensions 
will be sufficiently managed to prevent 
war only so long as “the leaders of each 
state can exercise the necessary leader-
ship to manage their respective national 
pressures�” These caveats are of great 
concern, because leaders in both nations 
may find it increasingly difficult to man-
age the growing nationalistic demands  
of their constituents� Furthermore, 
because the years of cooperative efforts 
expertly documented in Manicom’s  
case studies have taken the edge off 
many of the material issues, the remain-
ing tension points are predominantly 
strategic and symbolic in nature� Still, 
despite these criticisms, the lessons 
contained in Manicom’s insightful 
analysis will be of great value to those 
seeking to understand Sino-Japanese 
tensions and other maritime disputes�
CDR� JOHN BRADFORD
Commanding Officer, USS Stethem (DDG 63), and 
LT� JOELLE PORTZER
USS Stethem
Westad, Odd Arne� Restless Empire: China and 
the World since 1750� New York: Basic Books, 
2012� 515pp� $32
The Norwegian historian Odd Arne 
Westad, in this well-written history of 
China over the past 250 years, tells the 
story from a broad global perspective� 
His approach tracks that of his earlier 
works on the Cold War, where he placed 
a binational rivalry into a larger world 
context� Similarly in this work, he sees 
the principal driver of China’s modern 
experience as relentless internationaliza-
tion� However, China is more than just 
a country� It is, as Lucien Pye once de-
scribed it, “a civilization-state, pretend-
ing to be a nation-state�” Imperial in ev-
ery respect, it pushed out, and the world 
has pushed back, powerfully, since 1750� 
However, the adjective “restless” in the 
title is an understatement� No country’s 
modern history has been more tumultu-
ous or more violent� Westad describes 
episodes, including the worst, that 
occurred in the time of “peace” that the 
Communist regime was supposed to 
usher in� The most deadly and destruc-
tive of modern China’s encounters with 
the world, Westad astutely notes, was 
between 1937 and 1945—its war with 
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Japan� In a campaign breathtaking in 
its brutality, Japan destroyed China’s 
nascent republic, enabled the victory 
of the Communists in their civil war 
with the Nationalists, and destroyed 
the old imperial order in Asia� Thus, 
the new China was born into a world 
of many possibilities� Unhappily, none 
of the good ones, either domesti-
cally or internationally, was realized 
until 1979, when China’s current 
“rise” can be said to have begun� 
Westad’s fine account of what has come 
before brings us to realize that the rise of 
China will not necessarily have a calm-
ing effect on either the Chinese people 
or on others who live nearby� Since 1750, 
“internationalization,” though not en-
tirely a one-way street, has been mostly 
that; now, the restless empire, once in a 
defensive crouch, is moving out smartly 
in all directions� Perhaps this should be 
expected of a “civilizational state,” except 
that today’s China offers to the world 
nothing of what it once did—no high 
culture, no attainments in intellectual 
and philosophical life, and certainly no 
models for wise and effective gover-
nance� Instead, as Westad helps us see, 
the current regime is thrashing around, 
which makes its own future, as well as 
the futures both of its “near abroad” and 
of the world at large, hard to predict� 
Empires, we have been taught, are sup-
posed to bring peace, but today’s Middle 
Empire ruled from today’s Beijing 
displays many indications that it is bent 
on becoming a major disturber of the 
peace� Yet even under a more enlight-
ened outlook, there would be chal-
lenges: the Middle Empire borders on 
three nuclear-weapons states—Russia, 
India, and Pakistan—and probably also 
a fourth, North Korea� Even so, from 
his own well-informed examination of 
China’s modern experience Westad con-
cludes that prospects for peace remain—
not a ringing vote of confidence in the 
powers that be in Beijing, but neither is 
it a wholly despairing outlook� After all, 
Westad is an accomplished historian of 
the Cold War, the nonviolent, freedom-
enhancing outcome of which reminds us 
that things do not always turn out badly�
CHARLES HORNER
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 
Washington, D.C.
Twomey, Christopher P� The Military Lens: Doc-
trinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-
American Relations� Ithaca, N�Y�: Cornell Univ� 
Press, 2010� 240pp� $35
It has been said that “weapons speak 
to the wise—but in general they need 
interpreters�” The Military Lens, writ-
ten by political scientist Christopher P� 
Twomey, associate professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, in Monterey, Cali-
fornia, shows the difficulty of that quote� 
Twomey makes a strong case that dif-
fering military languages and doctrines 
explain otherwise puzzling examples 
of deterrence failure and escalation�
The Military Lens is a welcome addition 
to the literature on deterrence, which 
too often treats actors as interchange-
able “black boxes�” Twomey writes in the 
spirit of authors who, like Robert Jervis, 
explore psychological factors that led to 
misinterpreting the actions of others� 
Twomey’s work adds the new factor of 
military doctrine� Every military has 
its own doctrine, or “theory of victory,” 
its vision of how military resources 
are to be used to achieve operational 
success� Twomey’s core argument is 
that strategists look through a doctri-
nal “lens” when assessing capabilities 
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and intentions and that this weakens 
deterrence in two ways: the credibility 
of others’ threats is discounted, because 
their doctrines are thought to be ineffec-
tive, and the others’ signals are missed 
by the use of one’s own doctrine as a 
template for indicators� This attention to 
misperceptions at the level of operation-
al net assessment is new and of direct 
relevance to planners and analysts�
Much of the book tests the author’s 
theory against three Korean War–era 
episodes: China’s failure to deter U�S� 
movement north of the thirty-eighth 
parallel, American failure to deter China 
from entering the war, and the less well-
known maritime story of how the United 
States prevented a planned Chinese inva-
sion of Taiwan� Twomey also traces how 
greatly the United States and the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) underestimated 
each other’s land warfare capabilities 
and as a result issued threats that neither 
considered credible� The PLA Navy, 
with officers largely educated abroad, 
understood that U�S� air supremacy ren-
dered landings impossible� The choice 
of the 1950 Korean cases was wise, as 
most variables other than PLA army/
navy differences are constant� A notable 
feature of the case studies is archival 
research, both in the United States and 
in China; fresh documentation alone 
will appeal to Korean War specialists�
Doctrinal difference fits the Korean 
War, but the radical divergence of the 
revolutionary PLA and atomic American 
military makes this a relatively easy case, 
as Twomey acknowledges� How often 
do doctrinal differences generally lead 
to deterrence failures? An additional 
chapter on two Arab-Israeli cases argues 
that deterrence failure is correlated with 
doctrinal divergence� The evidence 
is suggestive, but the book could be 
strengthened by a larger universe of  
cases that may answer such additional 
questions as these: Are doctrinal dif-
ferences more common in ground 
than naval warfare, for example? Do 
opponents in long-lasting rivalries 
(compared to the United States / 
People’s Republic of China in 1950) 
fare better at assessing the others’ 
capability despite differing doctrines? 
The Military Lens offers a warning that 
clear, credible threats may not be under-
stood as such by others� Since doctrinal 
misperceptions take place at the military 
level, the lessons here are particularly 
relevant to planners, as they develop 
assessments and deterrent options for 
civilian leaders� This work also holds 
implications for professional military 
education, stating as it does that officers 
should be encouraged to overcome doc-
trinal filters, that scholars should study 
foreign doctrines, and that educational 
exchanges might reduce misunderstand-
ings (the author himself is involved 
in U�S�-Chinese dialogues)� Perhaps 
weapons speak a common tongue, but 
Twomey reminds us that militaries need 
to be fluent in multiple languages� 
DAVID BURBACH
Naval War College 
Kane, Tim� Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military 
Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It’s Time for 
a Revolution� New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012� 271pp� $27
This book provides a critical analysis 
and highlights a dysfunctional U�S� 
Army officer personnel management 
system� The author explains why the 
best and brightest young officers depart 
early for civilian careers and what can be 
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done to encourage them to remain on 
active duty� Kane also outlines why the 
military’s leadership training is so suc-
cessful and admired by civilian industry� 
Tim Kane’s background as an Air Force 
veteran and successful entrepreneur 
with a PhD in economics gives him the 
perspective, skill, and insight to offer a 
comprehensive evaluation of the current 
system and a blueprint for the future� 
Kane conducted an online survey of 
West Point graduates from six dif-
ferent classes at different stages of 
their careers� Overall, it was a bal-
anced sample, with approximately 250 
respondents, both military and civilian� 
Based on the results of a first survey, 
Kane conducted a follow-up to gain 
additional insight� The results high-
light many reasons why young leaders 
leave the service, and Kane suggests 
what can be done to curb the exodus� 
Kane proposes an alternative to the 
current All Volunteer Force (AVF)—
what he calls the “Total Volunteer 
Force” (TVF)� He posits that there is 
a “philosophical difference between 
the current system, which gives people 
freedom to choose only at the moment 
of volunteering [the AVF], and a system 
in which employees are free every day�” 
Kane’s book is unique in that it offers 
possible alternatives to many of the 
Army’s current personnel policies that 
young leaders despise� It is relatively 
easy to criticize bureaucratic policies 
without offering solutions, but Kane 
does offer solutions, which the Army 
has already begun to implement� For 
example, Kane proposes allowing of-
ficers a break in service to enter civilian 
industry, after which they can return 
to the military without prejudice—a 
policy that the Army recently embraced�
One of Kane’s major criticisms of the 
military is that officer promotions, un-
like their civilian counterparts, are based 
more on year seniority than on merit� “It 
is fair to say that selection to general is 
highly competitive, but the reality is that 
longevity is a bigger factor than merit in 
determining who makes that rank�” The 
result is that in an effort to make the offi-
cer assignment process as fair as possible 
the system has become outdated and less 
than optimal for officers and command-
ers alike� Kane’s TVF proposes promo-
tions based on merit and assignments 
and using a market mechanism— 
that is, an internal job market, in 
which officers apply for any open job�
As a retired Army colonel with almost 
thirty years of active-duty service, 
many of them as a personnel officer, 
I was skeptical when I started read-
ing this book� It is difficult to criticize 
something when you have been a part 
of the problem� However, I found 
that Kane has skillfully proposed a 
series of recommendations that could 
make a difference� Bleeding Talent is a 
must-read for all on active duty today� 
Kane’s writing style and method of 
presenting counterarguments make 
for thought-provoking proposals that 
merit consideration in today’s Army�
THOMAS GIBBONS
Naval War College
Northrup, David� How English Became the Global 
Language� New York: Palgrave, 2013� 220pp� $24
In this slim volume David Northrup, 
a retired Boston College professor of 
history, gives a clear and concise account 
of the development of English into the 
twenty-first century’s one truly global 
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language� First he traces how English 
became the predominant language in 
the British Isles, overcoming such rivals 
as Cornish, Welsh, and Gaelic� Then he 
looks at how English spread through-
out the British colonies that eventually 
became the United States and Canada� 
Finally, Northrup analyzes the culminat-
ing phase of the globalization of English 
and its rise to its current status as the 
lingua franca of the modern world�
To account for this worldwide penetra-
tion Northrup points to a number of 
related developments, especially the way 
English has become the indispensable 
medium of international communica-
tion in science, business, and higher 
education� Northrup identifies the 
meteoric growth of the World Wide Web 
as the most important factor in spread-
ing English to every corner of the globe�
To his credit, Northrup rejects the easy 
and fashionable narratives that view the 
globalization of English as a world-
wide cultural disaster and the success 
of English as one more instance of the 
West’s cultural imperialism� Northrup 
shows that the spread of English has not 
necessarily involved the death of other 
languages� By learning English, in fact, 
people around the world are gener-
ally becoming more bilingual and even 
trilingual; as Northrup correctly insists, 
the global diffusion of English is more 
a matter of “pull” than of “push�” To be 
sure, some governments have mandated 
the learning of English� However, the 
“push” of governments has been less 
successful than the “pull” of people all 
around the world who simply want to 
learn the language to make their lives 
better� Northrup rejects the common 
view that people are passive with respect 
to language, that they just sit around 
waiting to have languages imposed 
on them by fiat� Instead, Northrup 
sees people everywhere taking active 
roles in their own educations, eagerly 
embracing English in the hope that it 
will allow them to trade more freely 
with the international community, to 
keep up with the latest developments 
in science, technology, and popular 
culture, and to take advantage of the 
remarkable educational opportunities 
available in the English-speaking world�
Language is thus a prime example of 
what the Austrian economist Friedrich 
Hayek calls “spontaneous order�” Spon-
taneous orders are the result of human 
action but not of human design� That 
means that many orderly phenomena in 
human life, such as the famous “invis-
ible hand” of the market, result not 
from government central planning but 
from the seemingly chaotic interaction 
of widely dispersed people pursuing 
their individual self-interest yet in the 
process producing a larger public good�
Language is a human institution that no 
one plans in advance but that grows out 
of the active usage of millions of indi-
viduals� As Northrup shows, attempts 
by linguistic experts to create a global 
language “scientifically” have failed 
completely, most notably in the case of 
Esperanto� Despite all the efforts to pro-
mote it, even official recognition from 
UNESCO in 1954, Esperanto has basi-
cally languished in the realm of faculty 
lounges and parlor games� Contrary to 
the conspiracy theories of postcolonialist 
pundits, no central authority set out to 
make English the global language that 
it is today� Some accidents of colonial 
history were undoubtedly involved in 
the process, such as the fact that Britain 
ruled over the populous Indian sub-
continent for several centuries� Yet if 
English had not appealed to millions 
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of individuals around the globe on its 
own, the language would never have 
achieved the preeminence it now enjoys�
Unfortunately, Northrup’s book could 
have profited from better copyediting 
and proofreading� It has far too many 
errors of grammar and spelling (on 
the order of “Isaac Azimov” instead of 
“Isaac Asimov”)� Ironically, in view of 
its subject, too much of the “research” 
is straight from the Internet� I did 
not expect to see so many citations to 
Wikipedia in a scholarly publication� 
These problems aside, How English Be-
came the Global Language offers a good 
introduction to its subject for the general 
reader, who will come away from the 
book with a better grasp of what brought 
about the globalization of English and 
what it means for the world’s future�
PAUL A� CANTOR
Clifton Waller Barrett Professor of English  
University of Virginia
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IN MY VIEW
NEARLY VERTICAL?
Sir:
While Lieutenant Commander Maksim Y� Tokarev’s article “Kamikazes: The 
Soviet Legacy” (Naval War College Review, Winter 2014) was extremely infor-
mative regarding the history and theory behind Soviet anti-carrier doctrine, his 
analysis of Japanese kamikaze tactics appears flawed with regard to his comments 
about dive bombing� While kamikaze pilots may have made near-vertical dives at 
times, such maneuvers were counter to Japanese doctrine as described by Rikihei 
Inoguchi in his book The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force in World War II 
(Naval Institute Press, 1958, paperback 1994)� As stated by Inoguchi,
In a high-altitude approach, caution must be taken to insure that the final dive angle 
is not too steep� In a long steep dive, as the force of gravity increases, a plane is more 
difficult to pilot and may go out of control� It is essential, therefore, to make the dive 
as shallow as possible, taking careful note of wind direction and the movement of the 
target�
The majority of kamikaze pilots received just enough flight training to be 
able to take off and fly straight and level� For such untrained pilots to attempt a 
steep dive would most likely have resulted in a loss of control� Thus, the Impe-
rial Japanese Navy’s strategy, as illustrated on page 91 of The Divine Wind, was 
to approach the target ship in a shallow glide, attacking in a 45 degree dive from 
an altitude of 1,000–2,000 meters� It is likely that the near-vertical dives alluded 
to by Tokarev were kamikaze pilots falling out of the sky� In contrast to his state-
ment, dive bombing accuracy is increased the closer an aircraft can be brought 
to the near vertical� 
THOMAS WILDENBERG
Tucson, Arizona
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
RECENT BOOKS
A selection of books of interest recently received at our editorial office, as de-
scribed by their publishers:
Marquet, L� David� Turn the Ship Around! A True Story of Turning Followers into 
Leaders. New York: Penguin, 2012� 236pp� $25�95
When David Marquet, captain of USS Santa Fe, unknowingly gave an impossible 
order, his crew tried to follow it anyway� It was then that Marquet realized he was 
leading in a culture of followers� No matter your business or position, you can 
apply Marquet’s radical guidelines to turn your own ship around� The payoff: a 
workplace where everyone around you is taking responsibility for their actions, 
where people are healthier and happier, where everyone is a leader�
Milqueen, Michael, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller� Small Navies: Strategy and 
Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace. Burlington, Vt�: Ashgate, 2014� 247pp� 
$109
From Confederate commerce raiders in the nineteenth century, to Somali pirates 
today, even the most minor of maritime forces can become a key player on a 
global stage� Examining a broad range of examples, this volume addresses the 
roles and activities of small navies in the past and present, in particular of the 
different ways in which such forces have identified and addressed national and 
international security challenges and the way in which they interact with other 
navies and security agencies�
Santi, Federico� The Newport Naval Training Station: A Postcard History. Atglen, 
Pa�: Schiffer, 2013� 79pp� $19�99
In the late nineteenth century, at the site of an old asylum for the poor on Coast-
er’s Harbor Island, off the city of Newport, Rhode Island, local residents made a 
decision that would change American military history forever—they proposed 
that the ninety-acre island become a U�S� Naval Training Center and the future 
home of the Naval War College� Postcards and other artifacts document physical 
changes over time� The collection in this book shows all the facets of life on the 
base� 
150
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 1, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20
 1 4 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Aboul-Enein, Youssef H�, ed� Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War 
Minister General Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–1971. Annapolis, Md�: Naval 
Institute Press, 2014� 231pp� $64�95
The memoirs of General Mohamed Fawzi, Egyptian war minister from 1967 to 
1971, were first published in 1984, but never translated from Arabic and there-
fore remained undiscovered by most English-speaking readers� Aboul-Enein, an 
American naval officer and established scholar whose personal and professional 
background gives him a unique vantage point, is determined to bring to life the 
military thoughts of this Arab war minister as part of his mission to introduce 
America’s military leaders to Arabic works of military significance�
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the program man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program. 
 This is the twenty-fifth article in the “Reflections on Reading” series to appear in the Naval War College Review since the Navy Professional Reading Pro-
gram (NPRP) was established in 2006� A great deal has occurred in world affairs 
over this period, and there have been major upheavals in the world of publishing� 
During the June 2006 meeting at which the initial NPRP was approved, a prepro-
duction model of a Sony e-reader was demonstrated to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions� The new technology was being touted at the time as “seeking to do for the 
written word what the iPod has done for digital music�” Little did any of us know 
the tremendous impact that e-readers would have on book writing, production, 
and distribution within a few short years� The purpose of what is now known 
as the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) is 
to encourage sailors of all ranks to read—and also to write. Reading can help to 
shape ideas and mentally refine concepts, and writing can help solidify ideas and 
share them with others� The digital-book revolution has facilitated our sailors’ 
ability to perform both tasks� 
To Read. In today’s world, if you want to read, you really don’t have to spend 
much money� This is true in society at large, and it is particularly true within 
the Navy� The no-cost options include borrowing hard-copy books from your 
CNO-PRP library on ships and stations throughout the Navy (well over a hun-
dred thousand hard-copy books have been distributed since the program be-
gan); borrowing e-books from the Navy General Library Program, accessible 
through the Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) portal; and downloading them (as 
loans or on a permanent basis) from a number of public sites� For example, the 
Digital Book Index offers 140,000 free books, and Project Gutenberg offers over 
forty-six thousand titles� With high-quality, portable e-readers widely available 
for less than a hundred dollars you can gather an impressive personal library at 
minimal cost� One of the most remarkable aspects of e-books is that they can 
be downloaded virtually instantly wherever an Internet connection is available� 
That means the assembled knowledge of the centuries is available with a few 
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keystrokes, a situation that would have astounded even the most learned indi-
viduals only a generation ago� 
To Write. No story illustrates the changing nature of the book publishing pro-
cess better than that of the brilliant science-fiction writer Hugh Howey� In July 
2011 he offered an e-book novella, Wool, for sale via Kindle Direct Publishing, 
for ninety-nine cents� Traditional publishers had been largely uninterested in the 
book, but self-publication in e-book form turned out to be a superior option� 
His fascinating postapocalyptic story about the remnants of human society in 
huge underground silos began to sell quickly, and Howey set about expanding the 
smaller work into a full-fledged book, which went on sale as a digital download 
in January 2012� By summer 2012 he was selling up to thirty thousand down-
loads a month, bringing in a monthly salary of $150,000� Two subsequent titles 
completed the Wool trilogy and introduced Howey’s other clever books to a huge 
audience� When traditional publishers ultimately came to him, offering exclusive 
publishing contracts, Howey negotiated deals unheard-of in the industry, where-
by he sold the hard-copy rights but retained rights to the digital format, which he 
has continued to market directly to savvy readers� 
The secret to e-publishing is the same as it is in the print world—quality sells� 
Howey’s success is by no means typical, but it does demonstrate what is possible� 
If you have a manuscript, fiction or nonfiction, that you would like to publish, 
you can do so in a matter of hours utilizing programs such as Amazon’s Kindle 
Direct Publishing, Smashwords, or Barnes and Noble’s Pubit� Authors have vir-
tually complete control of their work, and they receive up to 70 percent of all 
sales revenue� The big payoff is that your book becomes available to millions of 
potential customers, and you can take pleasure in knowing that your ideas could 
change the world� You can even offer your thoughts as free downloads, poten-
tially reaching an even larger audience� 
In August 2008, Admiral Jim Stavridis (now retired from the Navy and dean of 
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University) wrote, “So, dare 
to read and develop your understanding� Carve out the time to think and form 
new ideas� Dare to speak out and challenge assumptions and accepted wisdom 
if your view differs from them� Have the courage to write, publish, and be heard� 
Launch your ideas and be an integral part of the conversation�” We hope that the 
CNO-PRP assists our sailors in the challenge so eloquently set forth by Admiral 
Stavridis� 
JOHN E� JACKSON 
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